THE

THEORY

O F

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

PART II.

OF MFRIT AND DEMERIT; OR OF THE OBJECTS OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT.

Confifting of three Sections.

SECTION I

OF THE SENSE OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.

INTRODUCTION.

THER

HERE is another fet of qualities ascribed to the actions and conduct of mankind, diftinct from their propriety or impropriety, their decency or ungracefulness, and which are the objects of a diftinct species of approbation and disapprobation. These are Merit and Demerit, the qualities of deferving reward, and of deferving punishment.

It has already been obferved, that the fentiment or affection of the heart, from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice depends, may be confidered under two different afpects, or in two different relations: first,

in relation to the cause or object which excites it; and fecondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or to the effect which it tends to produce: that upon the suitableness or unsuitableness, upon the proportion or difproportion, which the affection feems to bear to the cause or object which excites it, depends the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungracefulness of the confequent action; and that upon the beneficial or hurtful effects which the affection proposes or tends to produce, depends the merit the good or ill defert of the action to which it gives occafion. Wherein confifts our sense of the propriety or impropriety of actions, has been explained in the former part of this difcourfe. We come now to confider, wherein confifts that of their good or ill defert.

CHAP. I.

That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the fame manner, whatever appears to be the proper object of refentment, appears to deferve punishment.

To us, therefore, that action must appear to deferve reward, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that sentiment, which most immediately and directly prompts us to reward, or to do good to another. And in the same manner, that action muft appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of that fentiment which most immediately,

and directly prompts us to punish, or to inflict evil upon another.

The fentiment which moft immediately and directly prompts us to reward, is gratitude; that which moft immediately and directly prompts us to punish, is refentment.

To us, therefore, that action must appear to deferve reward, which appears to be the proper object of gratitude; as, on the other hand, that action must appear to deserve punishment, which appears to be the proper and approved object of

refentment.

To reward, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, to return good for good received. To punish, too, is to recompenfe, to remunerate, though in a different manner; it is to return evil for evil that has been done.

There are fome other paffions, befides gratitude and refentment, which intereft us in the happiness or mifery of others; but there are none which for directly excite us to be the inftruments of either. The love and efteem which grow upon acquaintance and habitual approbation, neceffarily lead us to be pleased with the good fortune of the man who is the object of fuch agreeable emotions, and confequently, to be willing to lend a hand to promote it. Our love, however, is fully fatisfied, though his good fortune fhould be brought about without our affiftance. All that this paffion defires is to see him happy, without regarding who was the author of his profperity. But gratitude is not to be fatisfied in this manner. If the perfon to whom we owe many

obligations, is made happy without our affiftance, though it pleases our love, it does not content our gratitude. Till we have recompenfed him, till we ourselves have been inftrumental in promoting his happiness, we feel ourselves ftill loaded with that debt which his paft fervices have laid upon us.

The hatred and dislike, in the fame manner which grow upon habitual disapprobation, would often lead us to take a malicious pleasure in the misfortune of the man whofe conduct and character excite so painful a passion. But though diflike and hatred harden us againft all fympathy, and fometimes difpofe us even to rejoice at the distress of another, yet, if there is no refentment in the case, if neither we nor our friends have received any great perfonal provocation, these paffions would not naturally lead us to wish to be inftrumental in bringing it about. Though we could fear no punishment in confequence of our having had fome hand in it, we would rather that it fhould happen by other means. To one under the dominion of violent hatred it would be agreeable, perhaps, to hear, that the person whom he abhorred and detefted was killed by fome accident. But if he had the least spark of justice, which, though this paffion is not very favorable to virtue, he might ftill have, it would hurt him exceffively to have been himself, even without defign, the occafion of this misfortune. Much more would the very thought of voluntarily contributing to it fhock him beyond all measure. He would reject with horror even the imagination of fo execrable a defign; and if he

could imagine himself capable of fuch an enormity, he would begin to regard himself in the same odious light in which he had confidered the person who was the object of his dislike. But it is quite otherwise with resentment: if the person who had done us fome great injury, who had murdered our brother, for example, fhould foon afterwards die of a fever, or even be brought to the. fcaffold upon account of fome other crime, though it might footh our hatred, it would not fully gratify our refentment. Refentment would prompt us to defire, not only that he should be punifhed, but that he fhould be punished by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us. Refentment cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his turn, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have fuffered from him. He must be made to repent and be forry for this very action, that others, through fear of the like punishment, may be terrified from being guilty of the like offence. The natural gratification of this paffion tends, of its own accord, to produce all the political ends of punishment; the correction of the criminal, and the example to the public.

Gratitude and refentment, therefore, are the fentiments which moft immediately and directly prompt to reward and to punish. To us, therefore, he must appear to deferve reward, who appears to be the proper and approved object of gratitude; and he to deserve punishment, who appears to be that of refentment.