nity, it would interrupt the series of semicomplete metamorphosis, by which, besides other characters, those two orders are so closely united.' The essential, artificial, and natural characters of this order are defined with great minuteness; as are those of the two genera, Stylops and Xenos, the latter comprehending two species, namely, X. Rossii, and X. Peckii. For the detailed illustration of this outline, we must refer to the original communication, and its accompanying figures. A Monograph of the British Species of the Genus Cholera. By William Spence, Esq. F.L.S.-Mr. Spence has here favoured us with another flattering testimony of the ability and perseverance with which entomological researches are now prosecuted in this country. Of the eighteen species which the ingenious monographist has accurately discriminated, five are denominated from British amateurs; namely, Cholera Leachii,—Kirbii,— Marshami,-Watsoni, and-Wilkinii. The critical annotations, with which the scientific exposition is interspersed, likewise bespeak much discernment, and an intimate acquaintance with the subject. Description of a new Species of the Genus Mus, belonging to the Section of Pouched Rats. By John Vaughan Thompson, Esq. F.L.S. In this species, which is said to be not very uncommon in Trinidad, the two upper teeth are placed without the opening of the mouth, the cheek-pouches are formed by a duplicature of the common integuments, the body is covered with fine lanceolate spines, and the tail is remarkably long. The habits of this tribe of rats are singular and curious: where numerous, they do incalculable mischief in barns and granaries; for, not satisfied with what they can eat on the spot, they stow away and carry off in their cheek-pouches no inconsiderable quantity, to be deposited in their retreats for times when food is not to be procured from without.' An Analysis of Satin Spar, from Alston Moor, in Cumberland. By the Rev. John Holme, A.M. F.L.S.-If we may rely on this author's analysis, the ingredients of satin spar are, carbonate of lime, 95.75, and carbonate of manganese, 4.25.100. Description of Mus Castorides, a new Species. By the Rev. E. J. Burrow, A.M. F.L.S.-Mr. Burrow classes this animal under the genus Mus; between which and Castor it seems to form a connecting link. As he had frequent opportunities of observing it, we could have welcomed a more circumstantial account of its manners and habits than that which will be found in these two very succinct paragraphs: • When teased or disturbed, it uttered a weak cry, but was good tempered, and not easily roused to resistance. • The The method of feeding was the same with that of most of the Glires, but the fore-part of the body was very little raised.' - On Woodsia, a new Genus of Ferns. By Robert Brown, Esq. F.R.S. Lib. L.S. Under this new appellation, which Mr. Brown has selected in honour of his friend, Mr. Joseph Woods, are included Polypodium ilvense and P. hyperboreum; whose involu crum, being inserted under the sorus, so as to surround it completely at the base, gives rise to a new generic character, but which, owing to certain peculiarities of structure, remained for a long while undiscovered. The two species are so nearly allied, that Mr. Brown entertains some doubt of any very essential difference. An Account of four rare Species of British Birds. By Mr. William Bullock, F. L.S.-The four species in question are, Stryx nyctea, or Snowy Owl, Tringa Calidris, or Duslay Sandpiper, Hirundo Pratincola, or Austrian Pratincole, and Anas Africana, or African Teal. The first three have been found to occur in some of the Orkney islands. As the history of the fourth is still somewhat doubtful, it may be proper to quote the writer's own words: This species of duck, several of which have come within my knowledge, were all purchased at Leadenhall Market during the winter season, and were said to be taken in Lincolnshire. Dr. Latham, in his very excellent work on birds, says they inhabit the rivers in Egypt; which, if so, is a remarkable circumstance, as few natives of so warm a country could be supposed to migrate so far north at that season. Buffon figures it in the Planches Enluminées, to which Dr. Latham refers his African Teal. That figure is so good as to leave no doubt of its being the bird; otherwise the var. A. of the Anas Fuligula of Lath. Syn. (Anas Nyroca of Gmel. Syst. Nat. and of Lath. Ind. Orn. ii. 869. 91.) might be mistaken for it. Indeed I cannot help thinking that Dr. Latham has described the same bird twice under different names. In the account of the latter it is said to inhabit the river Don, which is certainly the most probable resi dence of a bird that visits this country only during winter.' Mr. Bullock dates from the London Museum; -a highly in teresting establishment, which owes its richness and extension to his personal skill, activity, and zeal. ART. III. An Essay on Genius; or, the Philosophy of Literature. By John Duncan. 8vo. pp. 264. 78. 6d. Boards. Longman and Co. 1814. A N Essay on Genius should either begin or end with a definition of the quality under contemplation. If the term be as yet of indistinct and equivocal meaning, let us investigate R 4 the the derivation of the word, and compare the use made of it by various eminent writers and contending authorities, Abstract expressions, which denote not an individual being but a generalized idea, very slowly obtain that precision of outline and closeness of definition, which can alone fit them for the purposes of critical philosophy. They require to be weighed repeatedly in the balance of the synonymist; and it is not usually the first or the second rebuke of the grammarian, which suffices to caution the inattentive writer against impropriety and confusion. The labour of composing a volume is not ill bestowed, if it reduces one such unintelligible or hitherto indefinite word into the class of known quantities. Truth, or science, has no other road for progression.. By the present author, an exact definition is neither assumed nor inferred, nor attempted: on the contrary, genius is, in this work, confounded with intellectual ability, or strength of mind; whereas it is only one form of mental excellence. We do not call Hobbes a man of genius, nor Shakspeare a man of intellect, but the reverse; it being usual to confine the attribution of genius to those who excel in point of fancy. Yet, in defiance of general usage, and with an effect fatal to precision, the author of this Essay chooses to employ the denomination genius · for mind, or ves, in general. He divides his dissertation on mental excellence into twenty chapters; and, with laudable zeal for the honour of the literary character, he begins by placing the true dignity of man in eminence of mind. The second chapter remarks that one idea is equal to another; and that subjects differ only in complexity. We deny this proposition. Ideas differ in vividness, and are in that respect unequal: the more stimulant ideas being illuminated within the mind to a pitch of splendour bordering on the consciousness of perception. Secondly, ideas differ in extent, and are on that account unequal: the more important ideas overspreading the whole cavern of the memory, and mingling with every object depicted on its walls. Thirdly, ideas differ in complexity, and are in that respect unequal: the pictures within the mind, the hieroglyphic forms with which we think, are not compounded of simple and equal parts associated together, (as the Hartleyans, in defiance of observation, assume,) but are originally copied from sensation in various degrees of ramification, and are progressively simplified by the successive oblivions, or emissions, of the memory. Ideas of the first impression are the most branched out or complex: as they become more abstract, they become simpler, but less definite, and are thus fitted to stand for generalities, instead of individualities. The memory generalizes a recollection by forgetting forgetting whatever was peculiar to the individual whence the original image was derived. Chapter iii. treats of the importance of order in mental, operations. Arrangement is rather a machinery of the mind, by means of which it repeats with quickness the operations of frequent recurrence, than a native force by which its power can be appreciated. Education may construct with more or less art the mill on the stream: but the stream itself has its supply from the fountains of nature. In the fourth chapter, Mr. Duncan converses about the improvement of the mind. The word improvement has so vague a meaning as to be ill adapted for metaphysical philosophy. Dr. Watts introduced and Dr. Johnson sanctioned the present but recent acceptation of the word. On the church-clock we read, in capitals, « Improve your time;" and in the farmer's manual, we continually find, " Improve your land." Now both Time and Land may be applied to our use, but cannot both be made better. The mind acquires certain facilities of exertion by exercise, and accumulates memorable hoards by study but does the activity which is taught by discipline, or the armour which is put on by labour, bestow strength on the combatant? The mind may be said to improve its education, when it makes a good use of it. The memory is analyzed in chapter v. and is stated to be dependant on strength of mind. What is memory?-a power of reproducing ideas, in the absence of the sensible objects which occasioned them; and the memory is good in proportion to the completeness with which it repictures, without the model, that which it first copied from the model. Now it is probable that, in proportion to the distinctness and completeness of the original perception, will be the power of repeating it; and that memory has for its ultimate cause the perfection of the organs of perception. Chapter vi. considers classification as the great instrument of judgment. We should rather have regarded it as a sort of mechanism, which increases the voluntary exercise of the memory, and enables it at pleasure to call up the ideas of which it desires the presence. The observation at p. 70. is just, that distinctness is the greatest attainment of the mind. In chapter vii. the author maintains that the greatness of minds is to be known by the extent of objects which they can embrace. This definition wants distinctness. Minds do not embrace objects, but ideal pictures of objects: now the ideal pictures of objects of the greatest extent, such as the sidereal heavens, have no more nor less space in the mind than the microscopic pictures of objects of the smallest extent, such as the the foot of a centipes: since the mind always stretches the actual object of attention over its whole circle of view. As on the screen of a phantasmagoria, the figures contemplated dilate or dwindle: but the illuminated circle remains of the same dimension, whether it includes more or fewer apparitions. We copy a paragraph of this chapter. The conception of connection and distinction is, in reality, but an act of the same talent inversely applied. As judgment is always produced by comparison, acuteness, whether it be displayed in the union or separation of qualities or objects, is equally the criterion of an enlarged mind. Every original idea, whether it appear in the discovery of truth, or the detection of error, every production independent of rules, and effort beyond education, displays strength of mind, as it shows extent of view. Novelty of ideas is always the indication of comprehensive, and the want of it, of contracted, ca. pacity. Genius is uniformly discovered by chusing a path for itself, while common talents are known by following the beaten tract. Little minds find employment within a very narrow circle, and are easily governed by the authority of celebrated names, established doctrines, and prevailing maxims. But independence of opinion, originality of thinking, and freedom of remark, denote the mind which is not to be fettered by common rules, and infallibly indicate a genius expanded beyond ordinary bounds.' The eighth chapter observes that the mind excels in all things according to its strength. This is a truism; an identical proposition. In chapter the ninth, it is remarked that the mind is governed by the passions, and directed by accident. Are the passions accidents? The mind is said to be in a state of passion, or excitement, when its visual ideas are unusually illuminated, its auditive ideas unusually vibratory, its tactile ideas unusually prominent, and so forth. It is in this stimulated state of mind that the fancy acquires splendour, animation, and vigour, and scatters from her pictured urn "Thoughts that breathe, and words that burn." Ideas in a vivid state necessarily obtain notice in preference to ideas in a faint state; and, being themselves more active and motive than others, they more easily impart motion to the body, and occasion volition. The cause of passion is consequently to be sought in the tendency of certain ideas to grow. vivid in the hero's mind, the imagery of warfare more easily kindles into a glowing brightness; and this tendency arises, not always, as the author thinks, from accident, but often from deliberately presenting to the mind such imagery when it is in an excited state, and prone to illuminate the present objects of contemplation. The passions themselves may, in a great degree, |