prince of philofophers, as one who had carried every branch of human knowledge to its utmost limit; and who was not very fcrupulous about the -mearis he took to obtain his end.

We ought, however, to do him the justice to obferve, that although the pride and vanity of the fophift appear too much in his writings in abftract philofophy; yet in natural hiftory the fidelity of "his narrations feems to be equal to his industry ; and he always diftinguishes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abstract philofophy, it would be unfair to impute to Aristotle all the faults, all the obscurities, and all the contradictions, that are to be found in his writings. The greatest part, and perhaps the best part, of his writings is loft. There is reason to doubt whether fome of those we afcribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. Thefe fufpicions are juftified by the fate of Ariftotle's writings, which is judicioufly related, from the beft authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article Tyrannion, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. First Analytics, two books. 4. Last Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophifms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions. many others that are loft. Those I have mentioned have commonly been published together, under

the

the name of Ariftotle's Organon, or bis Logic; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

SECT. 2. Of Porphyry's Introduction.

In this Introduction, which is addreffed to Chryfoarius, the author obferves, That in order to understand Aristotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceffary to know what a genus is, what a Species, what a specific difference, what a property, and what an accident; that the knowledge of these is alfo very useful in definition, in divifion, and even in demonftration; therefore he proposes, in this little tract, to deliver fhortly and fimply the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning these five predicables; avoiding the more intricate queftions concerning them; fuch as, Whether genera and fpecies do really exift in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exift in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of fenfe, or disjoined from them? Thefe, he fays, are very difficult queftions, and require accurate difcuffion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and fubdivides each of them, and then pursues all

..the

the agreements and differences between one and another through fixteen chapters.

SECT. 3. Of the Categories.

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is observed, that what we say is either fimple, without compofition or structure, as man, borse; or, it has compofition and ftructure, as, a man fights, the horse runs. Next comes a distinction between a fubject of predication; that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a subject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a subject, which, although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exift without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Ariftotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no fubject; as man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a subject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its subject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a fubject, and may be predicated of a fubject, as fcience; which is in the mind as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laftly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any subject. Such are all individual fubftances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals;

and

and cannot be in a fubject, because they are subftances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themfelves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the anteprædicamenta. It may be obferved, however, that notwithstanding the diftinction now explained, the being in a fubject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics ufed as fynonymous phrafes; and this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not written by Ariftotle.

Things that may be expreffed without compofition or structure, are, says the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either fubftance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The first four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as fufficiently clear of themfelves. As a fpecimen, I fhall give a summary of what he fays on the category of substance.

Substances are either primary, to wit, individual fubftances, or fecondary, to wit, the genera and fpecies of fubftances. Primary fubftances neither are in a fubject, nor can be predicated of a subject; but all other things that exift, either are in primary substances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may also be predicated of the fubject itfelf, Primary fubftances are more fubftances

than

than the secondary; and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a fubftance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

2.

The properties of fubftance are these 1. No fubftance is capable of intenfion or remiffion. No fubftance can be in any other thing as its fubject of inhefion. 3. No substance has a contrary ; for one fubftance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a fubftance and that which is no fubftance. 4. The most remarkable property of fubftance, is, that one and the fame. fubftance, may, by fome change in itself, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold,

Let this ferve as a specimen of Aristotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the schoolmen call postprædicamenta; wherein first, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated in all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which anfwer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and

habere.

SECT. 4. Of the book concerning Interpretation, We are to confider, fays Ariftotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what