ceremony. So that this great branch of the doctrine of fyllogifm, fo diligently handled by Ariftotle, fell into neglect, if not contempt, even while the doctrine of pure fyllogifms continued in the highest esteem. Moved by these authorities, I fhall let this doctrine reft in peace, without giving the leaft difturbance to its afhes.

SECT. 7.

On Syllogifms that do not belong to Fi gure and Mode.

Ariftotle gives fome obfervations upon imperfect fyllogifms: fuch as, the Enthimema, in which one of the premises is not expreffed, but understood: Induction, wherein we collect an univerfal from a full enumeration of particulars: and Examples, which are an imperfect induction. The logicians have copied Ariftotle upon thefe kinds of reafoning, without any confiderable improvement. But to compenfate the modal fyllogifms, which they have laid afide, they have given rules for feveral kinds of fyllogifm, of which Ariftotle takes no notice. Thefe may be reduced to two claffes.

The firft clafs comprehends the fyllogifms into which any exclufive, reftrictive, exceptive, or re duplicative propofition enters. Such propofitions are by fome called exponible, by others imperfectly modal. The rules given with regard to thefe are obvious, from a juft interpretation of the propofien drive emigollit ishom g

The

The fecond clafs is that of hypothetical fyllogifms, which take that denomination from having a hypothetical propofition for one or both premifes. Moft logicians give the name of hypothetical to all complex propofitions which have more terms than one fubject and one predicate. I use the word in this large fense; and mean by hypothetical fyllogifms, all thofe in which either of the premises confifts of more terms than two. many various kinds there may be of fuch fyllogifms, has never been afcertained. The logicians have given names to fome; fuch as, the copulative, the conditional, by fome called hypothetical, and the disjunctive.

How

Such fyllogifms cannot be tried by the rules of figure and mode. Every kind would require rules Logicians have given rules for fome kinds; but there are many that have not fo much as a name.

peculiar to itself.

The Dilemma is confidered by moft logicians as a species of the disjunctive fyllogifm. A remarkable property of this kind is, that it may fometimes be happily retorted: it is, it feems, like a handgrenade, which by dextrous management may be thrown back, fo as to spend its force upon the affailant. We fhall conclude this tedious account of fyllogifms, with a dilemma mentioned by A. Gellius, and from him by many logicians, as infoluble in any other way.

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Euathlus, a rich young man, defirous of learning the art of pleading, applied to Protagoras, a "celebrated fophift, to inftruct him, promifing a great fum of money as his reward; one-half of " which was paid down; the other half he bound "himself to pay as foon as he should plead a cause "before the judges, and gain it. Protagoras found him a very apt fcholar; but, after he had made

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good progrefs, he was in no hafte to plead causes. "The master, conceiving that he intended by this means to shift off his fecond payment, took, as "he thought, a fure method to get the better of "his delay. He fued Euathlus before the judges; "and, having opened his cause at the bar, he

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pleaded to this purpose. O moft foolish young man, do you not fee, that, in any event, I must "gain my point? for if the judges give sentence "for me, you must pay by their fentence; if

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against me, the condition of our bargain is ful"filled, and you have no plea left for your delay, "after having pleaded and gained a caufe. To "which Euathlus anfwered. O moft wife master, "I might have avoided the force of your argu

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ment, by not pleading my own cause. But, gi"ving up this advantage, do you not fee, that "whatever fentence the judges pass, I am fafe? "If they give fentence for me, I am acquitted by "their fentence; if against me, the condition of our bargain is not fulfilled, by my pleading a caufe, and lofing it. The judges, thinking the 66 arguments

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"arguments unanfwerable on both fides, put off "the cause to a long day."

CHAP. V.

ACCOUNT OF THE REMAINING BOOKS OF THE

ORGANON.

SECT. I. Of the Laft Analytics.o'

N the First Analytics, fyllogifms are confidered in respect of their form; they are now to be confidered in refpect of their matter. The form lies in the neceffary connection between the premifes and the conclufion; and where fuch a connection is wanting, they are faid to be informal, or vicious in point of form.

But where there is no fault in the form, there may be in the matter; that is, in the propofitions of which they are compofed, which may be true or falfe, probable or improbable,

When the premises are certain, and the conclufion drawn from them in due form, this is demonftration, and produces fcience. Such fyllo

gisms are called apodictical; and are handled in the two books of the Laft Analytics. When the premises are not certain, but probable only, fuch fyllogifms are called dialectical; and of them he treats in the eight books of the Topics. But there are fome fyllogifms which seem to be perfect both in matter and form, when they are not really fo; as, a face may seem beautiful which is but painted. These being apt to deceive, and produce a falfe opinion, are called fophiftical; and they are the fubject of the book concerning Sophifms.

To return to the Laft Analytics, which treat of demonstration and of feience: We shall not pretend to abridge these books; for Ariftotle's writings do not admit of abridgment: no man in fewer words can fay what he fays; and he is not often guilty of repetition. We shall only give fome of his capital conclufions, omitting his long reasonings and nice distinctions, of which his genius was wonderfully productive.

All demonstration must be built upon principles already known; and these upon others of the fame kind; until we come at last to first principles, which neither can be demonftrated, nor need to be, being evident of themselves.

We cannot demonftrate things in a circle, fupporting the conclufion by the premises, and the premises by the conclufion. Nor can there be an infinite number of middle terms between the first principle and the conclufion.

In