out neceffity of recurring to an imaginay power of acting against motives."

The only plaufible objection I have met with against the foregoing theory, is the remorse a man feels for a crime he fuddenly commits, and as fuddenly repents of. During a fit of bitter remorfe for having flain my favourite fervant in a violent paffion, without just provocation, I accufe myself for having given way to paffion; and acknowledge that I could and ought to have reftrained it. Here we find remorse founded on a fyftem directly oppofite to that above laid down; a fyftem that acknowledges no neceffary connection between an action and its motive; but, on the contrary, fuppofes that it is in a man's power to refift his paffion, and that he ought to refift it. What shall be faid upon this point? Can a man be a neceffary agent, when he is conscious of the contrary, and is fenfible that he can act in contradiction to motives? This objection is ftrong in appearance; and would be invincible, were we not happily relieved of it by a doctrine laid down in Elements of Criticifm* concerning the irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments. Upon examination, it will be found, that the prefent cafe may be added to the many examples there given of that irregular influence. In a peevish fit, I take exception at fome flight word or gefture of my friend, which I interpret as if he doubted of my veracity,

*Chap. 2. Part 5.

"What have

veracity. I am inftantly in a flame: in vain he protests that he had no meaning, for impatience will not fuffer me to liften. I bid him draw, which he does with reluctance; and before he is well prepared, I give him a mortal wound. Bitter remorfe and anguifh fucceed inftantly to rage. "I done? I have murdered my innocent, my best "friend; and yet I was not mad-with that hand "I did the horrid deed; why did not I rather "turn it againft my own heart?" Here every impreffion of neceffity vanishes: my mind informs me that I was abfolutely free, and that I ought to have fmothered my paffion. I put an oppofite cafe. A brutal fellow treats me with great indignity, and proceeds even to a blow. My paffion rifes beyond the poffibility of restraint: I can fcarce forbear fo long as to bid him draw; and that moment I ftab him to the heart. forry for having been engaged with a ruffian; but have no contrition nor remorfe. In this cafe, I never once dream that I could have refifted the impulfe of paffion on the contrary, my thoughts and words are, "That flesh and blood could not "bear the affront; and that I must have been "branded for a coward; had I not done what I "did." In reality, both actions were equally neceffary. Whence then opinions and fentiments fo oppofite to each other? The irregular influence of paffion on our opinions and fentiments, will folve the question. All violent paffions are prone to their own gratification. A man who has done VOL. III.

N

I am

an

an action that he repents of and that affects him with anguish, abhors himself, and is odious in his own eyes he wishes to find himself guilty; and the thought that his guilt is beyond the poffibility of excufe, gratifies the paffion. In the first case, accordingly, remorfe forces upon me a conviction that I might have reftrained my paffion, and ought to have reftrained it. I will not give way to any excufe; because in a severe fit of remorse, it gives me pain to be excufed. In the other cafe, as there is no remorse, things appear in their true light without disguise. To illuftrate this reafoning, I obferve, that paffion warps my judgment of the actions of others, as well as of my own. Many examples are given in the chapter above quoted: join to these the following. My fervant aiming at a partridge, happens to fhoot a favourite fpaniel croffing the way unfeen. Inflamed with anger, I ftorm at his rafhnefs, pronounce him guilty, and will liften to no excufe. When paffion fubfides, I become fenfible that the action was merely accidental, and that the man is abfolutely innocent. The nurse overlays my only child, the long-expected heir to a great eftate. With difficulty I refrain from putting her to death: "The wretch "has murdered my infant: fhe ought to be torn "to pieces." When I turn calm, the matter appears to me in a very different light. The poor woman is inconfolable, and can fcarce believe that fhe is innocent: the bitterly reproaches herself

for

for want of care and concern. But, upon cool reflection, both she and I become fenfible, that no perfon in found fleep has any felf-command, and that we cannot be anfwerable for any action of which we are not conscious. Thus, upon the whole, we difcover, that any impreffion we occafionally have of being able to act in contradiction to motives, is the refult of paffion, not of found judgment.

The reader will obferve, that this fection is copied from Effays on Morality and Natural Religion. The ground-work is the fame: the alterations are only in the fuperftructure; and the fubject is abridged, in order to adapt it to its prefent place. The preceding parts of the Sketch were published in the fecond edition of the Principles of Equity. But as law-books have little currency, the publishing the whole in one effay, will not, I hope, be thought improper.

1

I

APPENDIX.

Upon Chance and Contingency.

Hold it to be an intuitive propofition, That the Deity is the primary cause of all things, that with confummate wifdom he formed the

great plan of government, which he carries on by laws fuited to the different natures of animate and inanimate beings; and that thefe laws, produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan *. Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded. But I cannot subscribe to what follows, "That we have an im"preffion of chance and contingency, which con"fequently must be delufive." I would not willingly admit any delufion in the nature of man, unless it were made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that the impreffion we have of chance and contingency, is not delufive, but perfectly confiftent with the established plan..

The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon.

66

"In our

ordinary train of thinking, it is certain that all events appear not to us as neceffary. A multi❝tude of events feem to be under our power to "caufe or to prevent; and we readily make a di"ftinction betwixt events that are neceffary, i. e. "that must be ; and events, that are contingent, i. e. that

* See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, Part i. Effay 3.