nions, by mistaking a falfe standard for that of nature. And hence a distinction between a right and a wrong fenfe in morals; a distinction which every one understands, but which, unless for the conviction of a moral ftandard, would have no meaning.

The final cause of this branch of our Nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining endlefs controverfies about matters of intereft, the strong would have recourse to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would diffolve. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a standard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with such a standard: it is neceffary in fociety that our actions be uniform with refpect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alfo uniform: to produce fuch uniformity, a ftandard of morals is indifpenfable. Nature has provided us with that standard, which is daily applied by courts of law with fuccefs *.

ས

In reviewing what is faid, it must afford great fatisfaction, to find morality established upon the folid foundations of intuitive perception; which is a fingle mental act complete in itself, having no dependence on any antecedent propofition. The moft accurate reafoning affords not equal convic

See Elements of Criticism, vol. ii. P. 490.

edit.

5.

tion;

tion; for every fort of reafoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reafoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abstain from and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws than of any propofition discoverable by reasoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of Heaven, when he is fo admirably qualified for doing his duty. The moral fenfe or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties are fufceptible of demonftration: how agreeable to him would have been the difcovery, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, ftill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral fenfe, we are taught what we ought to do; and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But fociety would be imperfect, if the moral fenfe ftopped here. There is a third branch that makes us accountable for our conduct to our fellow-creatures; and it will be made evident afterward in the third fketch, that we are accountable

accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow-creatures.

It follows from the standard of right and wrong, that an action is right or wrong, independent of what the agent may think. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, refcues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even though he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different ftan-* dard to the agent: a man is approved and held to be innocent in doing what he himself thinks right he is disapproved and held to be guilty in doing what he himself thinks wrong, Thus, to affaffinate an atheist for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthufiaft who com-. mits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty, who against conscience eats meat in Lent, though the action is not wrong. In fhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or difapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SECT. III.

Laws of Nature refpecting our Moral Conduct in Society.

A

STANDARD being thus eftablished for regulating our moral conduct in fociety, we proceed to investigate the laws that refult from it.

But

But first we take under confideration, what other principles concur with the moral fenfe to qualify men for fociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might feem, that of all fubjects human nature should be the beft understood; because every man has daily opportunities to study it, in his own paffions and in his own actions. But human nature, an interefting fubject, is feldom left to the investigation of philofophy. Writers of a fweet difpofition and warm imagination, hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himself but as one of the number*. Thofe of a cold temperament and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely selfish; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end +. Neither of these systems is that of nature. The selfish fyftem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the clearest evidence, that men frequently act for the fake of others, without regarding themselves, and fometimes in direct oppofition to their own intereft ‡.

* Lord Shaftesbury.

+ Helvetius.

And

Whatever wiredrawn arguments may be urged for the selfish fyftem, as if benevolence were but refined selfishness, the emptiness of fuch arguments will clearly appear when applied to children, who know no refinement.

ments of the focial principle are no lefs

In them, the rudi

vifible than of the

felfifh

And however much felfishness may prevail in action; man cannot be an animal entirely selfish, when all men confpire to put a high eftimation upon generofity, benevolence, and other focial virtues: even the moft felfish are disgusted with felfifhnefs in others, and endeavour to hide it in themselves. The most zealous patron of the felfifh principle, will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow-creatures. Laying afide felf-intereft with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one gives pleasure to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is painful to all. On the other hand, the system of universal benevolence, is no lefs contradictory to experience; from which we learn, that men commonly are difpofed to prefer their own intereft before that of others, especially where there is no ftrict connection: nor do we find that fuch bias is condemned by the moral fenfe. Man in fact is a complex being, compofed of principles, fome benevolent, some selfish: and thefe principles are fo justly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in fociety. It would indeed be lofing time to prove, that without fome affection for his fellow-creatures, he would be ill qualified

for

selfish principle. Nothing is more common, than mutual good will and fondness between children: which must be the work of nature; for to reflect upon what is one's intereft, is far above the capacity of children.