the true meaning of those disputed clauses of the Union Act, according to the intention and spirit-as well as the letter-the latter of which is seemingly admitted.

The

The veto power, as every student knows, is an essential element of our system of Monarchical Government : no legislation under British rule can have existence independently of it. Acts of all the Colonial Legislatures are, and must continue to be, subject to the veto in the hands of the Sovereign. This power, as it existed in respect of the old Provinces of British North America, now included in the Confederation, was in the most formal manner made over to the Central Government of the Dominion, so far as it applied to future legislation by the Provinces; and although copies of all the Acts prepared by the Dominion Parliament are required-as was the case under the old Provinces-to be transmitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies (so that Her Majesty's right of veto may be exercised or not exercised) there is no similar provision as to the acts of the Local Legislatures, nor is Her Majesty's Government kept advised thereof, the right of veto in respect of the same having been transferred to the Dominion.

A question as to a New Brunswick School Act was submitted by the Imperial authorities to the highest court of resort-the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council-and the following reply, under date of 13th September, 1872, was officially communicated to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

It appears to His Lordship (the Lord President of the Privy Council) that, as the power of confirming or disallowing Provincial Acts is vested by the Statute (the B. N. A. Act of 1867) in the Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, acting under the advice of his constitutional advisers, there is nothing in the case which gives to Her Majesty in Council any jurisdiction over this question.'

This dictum is in perfect harmony with the Confederation scheme, as agreed upon at Quebec, namely, that the Federal authority should be substituted for that of the Crown in respect of the Provincial Governments and Legislatures.

It is proper to note the advance in self-government which this constitutional change has effected. Under the system before Confederation the legislative acts of the Provinces could have been vetoed (under similar powers of disallowance) by the Crown, acting under the advice of Imperial Ministers who were in no way responsible to the people of those Provinces, and, although it may be said that the veto was seldom used, yet it was certainly exercised time and again, for during the Union of Upper and Lower Canada, from 1841 to 1867, we find that no fewer than nine Acts of the Legislature were disallowed or refused the Royal assent, some of which were purely local and provincial in their character.

On the other hand, the veto of Provincial Acts under our present system of government can only be effected by the Governor-General with the advice of his Canadian Ministers who are responsible directly for such advice to the Dominion Parliament, which is the proper Court of Impeachment, should they err in such advice. Thus responsible government, in respect of the disallowance of Provincial Acts, is more effectually secured to the people of the respective Provinces under Confederaation than it ever was before; and we do not find that the occasions for the exercise of the power have numerically increased. Keeping in view the large increase of legislation that has taken place, the number of Ontario Acts, for instance, that have been disallowed since Confederation is four; while the whole number of disallowed Acts throughout the Dominion is in the neighbourhood of thirty, as against a a total number of acts that were passed in all the provinces of over 5,000

In this connection it is also worthy of notice, that no fewer than eight of the Acts of the Dominion Parliament have, since Confederation, been disallowed, or refused the Royal assent, by Her Majesty acting upon the advice of her Imperial Ministers, some of which were so disallowed, or refused, not for reasons of Imperial policy, but for reasons of State bearing on the interests of Canada-as so statednotably the Act to reduce the GovernorGeneral's salary, which was passed in 1868; and yet, if we turn to sec. 91, and indeed to the whole context of the B. N. A. Act, we find that the legis lative powers of the Dominion Parliament are far more absolute, as well as more extensive, than any that were conferred on the Provinces in sec. 92.

Is there, then, it may be asked, any good reason for the contention that the Provinces were intended to occupy the anomalous position of entire freedom from the veto power in cases within their jurisdiction, while the provision as to disallowance of Dominion Acts, couched in the very same language, preserve (and must ever preserve) to Her Majesty in Council a complete control over all the legisla tion of the Dominion ?

In order to arrive at a clear, and we may hope conclusive, answer to this important question, we must turn to the Official Acts, the public speeches, and the debates just before and at the time of the passing of the Union Act.

The Quebec Conference closed its labours on the 31st October, 1864, the result being the adoption of a series of resolutions which formed the basis of the Act of Union subsequently passed by the Imperial Parliament, and known as the British North America Act of 1867.

After the close of the Conference, the delegates visited the chief cities of the different Provinces, and made known publicly the purport of the resolutions that had been so adopted.

At Toronto, in the month of November of that year, before a very large

and enthusiastic audience, the Hon. George Brown, as President of the Executive Council of the Province of Canada, gave the official explanation in a speech of great power and clearness of detail. The Hon. gentleman is reported inter alia to have spoken as follows:

'The various details of the Confederation scheme were brought up for consideration by the Conference in the form of resolutions. Those resolutions were separately discussed, amended, and adopted; and, as finally adopted by the unanimous consent of the whole Conference, they now stand on record.'

'There was one point to which he was desirous of calling particular attention, namely, to the fact that in framing their constitution they had carefully avoided what had proved a great evil in the United States, and that is the acknowledgment of an inherent sovereign power in the separate States, causing a collision of authority between the general and States Governments which, in times of trial, had been found to interfere gravely with the efficient administration of public affairs. In the Government to be formed under this new constitution, while we have committed to the local governmentall that necessarily and properly belongs to the localities, we have reserved for the general government all those powers which will enable the legislative and administrative proceedings of the central authority to be carried out with a firm hand.

With this view we have provided that the whole of the judges throughout the Confederation, those of the County Courts as well as of the Superior Courts, are to be appointed and paid by the General Government. We have also provided that the General Parliament shall be specially charged with the performance of all obligations of the Provinces, as part of the British Empire, to foreign countries. The Lieutenant-Governors of the different sections are to be appointed by

the General Government, and the power of disallowing all bills passed by the local legislatures is to be vested in the Governor-General in Council. In this way we will have a complete chain of authority, extending from Her Majesty, the Queen, to the basis of our political fabric.'

The Governor General, having transmitted to Her Majesty's Government a copy of the Resolutions adopted at the Quebec Conference, the same was acknowledged in a despatch by the Colonial Minister of the 3rd December, 1864, in which occur the following passages:

Her Majesty's Government have given to your despatches, and to the resolutions of the Conference, their most deliberate consideration. They have regarded them as a whole, and as having been designed, by those who have framed them, to establish as complete and perfect a union of the whole into one Government, as the circumstances of the case, and a due consideration of existing interests, would admit.

They accept them, therefore, as being, in the deliberate judgment of those best qualified to decide upon the subject, the best framework of a measure to be passed by the Imperial Parliament for attaining that most desirable result. . . . But upon the whole, it appears to Her Majesty's Government that precautions have been taken which are obviously intended to secure to the Central Government the means of effective action throughout the several Provinces, and to guard against those evils which must inevitably arise if any doubt were permitted to exist as to the respective limits of central and local authority. They are glad to observe that although large powers of legislation are intended to be vested in local bodies, yet the principle of central control has been steadily kept in view. The importance of this principle cannot be overrated. Its maintenance is essential to the practical efficiency of

the system, and to its harmonious operation both in the general administration and in the Governments of the several Provinces.'

It will be apparent from this despatch, and from the subsequent debates in the British Parliament, that any plan of confederation which did not provide for a supreme central control over the Provincial Governments and Legislatures would not have been sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government, nor would any such measure have been submitted by them to the Imperial Parliament.

The Legislature of the Province of Canada met in February, 1865, when the Quebec resolutions were submitted and carried in both Houses by large majorities. It would be tedious to refer at any great length to the Debates, which exhausted the whole subject, under a sharp and determined criticism directed against the whole and every part, feature, form, and condition of the scheme, and led by able and talented exponents of every conceivable theory of Government, the statu quo of the present colonial condition, the legislative against the strictly federal system, and the union of a legislative and federal system as against both. The following extracts from some of the speeches delivered in the Assembly which bear specially on the subject of the supreme authority in regard to the proposed autonomy of the provinces will show how thoroughly this subject was sifted, analysed, and understood.

See the Confederation debates :

Sir John Macdonald said: 'Here we have adopted a different system (from that of the United States), we have strengthened the General Government, we have given them all the great subjects of legislation, we have conferred on them all the powers which are incident to sovereignty

We have avoided all conflict of jurisdiction and authority

and we

will have in fact, as I said before, all the advantages of a Legislative Union

under one administration, with, at the same time, the guarantees for local institutions and for local laws which are insisted on by so many in the Provinces now I hope to be united

With respect to the local governments, it is provided that each shall be governed by a chief executive officer who shall be nominated by the General Government. As this is to be one united Province, with the local governments and legislatures subordinate to the General Government and Legis. lature, it is obvious that the chief executive officer in each of the Provinces must be subordinate as well. The General Government assumes towards the local governments precisely the same position as the Imperial Government holds with respect to each of the colonies now.'

Mr. George Brown: 'We have retained in the hands of the General Government all the powers necessary to secure a strong and efficient administration of public affairs. By vesting the appointment of the LieutenantGovernors in the General Government and giving a veto for all local measures, we have secured that no injustice shall be done without appeal in local legislation.'

Sir A. Dorion (speaking contra) : When I look into the provisions of this scheme, I find another most objectionable one; it is that which gives the General Government control over all the Acts of the local legislatures. What difficulties may not arise under this system? Now, knowing that the General Government will be party in its character, may it not, for party purposes, reject laws proposed by the local legislatures, and demanded by a majority of the people of that locality.

We shall be (I speak as a Lower Canadian), we shall be at its mercy, because it may exercise its right of veto over the local parliaments.'

authority between the local and central governments in this case, as there has been in the case of the Americans. The powers of the local governments are distinctly and strictly defined, and you have no assertion of sovereignty on the part of the local governments as in the United States, and of powers inconsistent with the rights and security of the whole community. Then the other point which commends itself so strongly to my mind is this, that there is a veto power on the part of the General Government over all the legislation of the local Parliaments. That was a fundamental element which the wisest statesmen engaged in the framing of the American Constitution said, that, if it was not engrafted, it must necessarily end in the destruction of the Constitution.

Now, sir, I believe this power of negative, this power of veto, this controlling power on the part of the Central Government, is the best protection and safeguard of the system; and if it had not been provided, I would have felt it very difficult to reconcile it to my sense of duty to vote for the resolutions.'

Mr. Alexander Mackenzie: 'Personally, I have always been in favour of a Legislative Union where it can be advantageously worked; if it could be adapted to our circumstances in these colonies, I would at this moment be in favour of a Legislative Union as the best system of government.

It is quite clear that if the Legislative Union could not be worked well with Upper and Lower Canada, it would work still worse with the other Provinces brought in. There remained, therefore, no other alternative than to adopt the Federal principle. .

The veto power is necessary in order that the General Government may have a control over the proceedings of the local legislatures to a certain extent. The want of this power was the great source of weakness in the United States.

Mr. Dunkin (speaking contra):