set-off against the advance of the French and for a weakness and vacillation of conduct English fleet to Besika Bay; and while Count which had complicated the Turkish governNesselrode's public notes refer to the question ment with Austria. He had agreed to give of the Holy Places as the one on which Rus- up to the Austrian consul a returned Hungasia is still proceeding, the reply shows that rian refugee, Kossta; and his delays in doing the very same minister and the Russian so appear to have led to the dispute, in the ambassador at Paris had spoken of the ques-course of which Kossta was seized by an tion of the Holy Places as " happily closed." Austrian sea-captain, the Austrian officer had At the same time, though M. Drouyn de a serious quarrel with an American officer, Lhuys renews the declaration that the gen- and in a riot an Austrian midshipman was eral interest of the world precludes the admis- killed. It is a detriment to Turkey that Ali sion of a doctrine that powerful states can use Pasha should have been minister even for an means of oppression towards weak states hour. which are their neighbors, he repeats, that the The uncertain conduct of the Sclavonian French government does not abandon the population in the principalities is another search for a means of reconciling Russia and disastrous circumstance. Russian emissaries Turkey. The conciliatory view is pursued in who had been in Servia, and were travelling a non-official article in the Pays—a paper about with great activity, were received by more elaborately hinting a desire on the part the people and their leaders with distinguished of Louis Napoleon, the supposed author, for honors. The Russians are evidently doing making it up with the Emperor Nicholas. their best, on the one hand, to alienate the This looks as if, while M. Drouyn de Lhuys Sclavonic population from Turkey, and on the was maintaining the sterner dignity of other to familiarize the Sclavonic mind with France before the world, M. de la Guerron- the Russians as their natural patrons. Innière were sent with a private hint to the stead of simply crossing the Pruth, the RusRussian Emperor that his dignity would not sian troops have established their headbe hurt by being as conciliatory as he has quarters at Bucharest, near the Danube. been before. Reports from St. Petersburg With extensive military arrangements, and announce the arrival of one of the many works even of so permanent a kind as fortifipropositions made to Russia, with a reception cations, Prince Gortchakoff appears to act as so favorable that the hopes of peace are very if his instructions did not anticipate a tempostrong; other reports announce the rejection rary, much less a brief, occupation of the of those proposals, with a counter-proposal; Turkish dominions. The statement that he but in fact no authentic information has had taken possession of the post-office, and arrived. The one thing certain is, that by these further negotiations Russia is gaining time; during which Turkey is feeling the full force of her own internal weaknesses, of which there are only too many signs. A conspiracy, apparently led by certain ecclesiastical students in Constantinople, had been discovered. Its object was to dethrone Abd-ul-Medjid, and to replace him by Abd-ul-Asis, his brother; who is presumed to be more favorable to the high Mussulman party. The conspiracy was strangled with the bowstring, in the persons of the leaders. usurped other civil functions, has not been denied. Possibly, Russia may negotiate in the hope of wearing out objections to her remaining in the principalities; and if so, those provinces are already taken from Turkey and annexed to Russia. Arguments of weight are industriously circulated, even in London, to show that it would be vain to persevere in any attempt to keep up the decayed Ottoman empire; and the foibles of the Turkish government are lending a fatal force to those arguments. But there is no reason why, because the Ottoman minority cannot be maintained in its political rule over Christian Turkey, that the great barrier of an independent state to the encroachments of the hordes beyond should be passively surrendered by Europe at large. From the Examiner, 16th July. WHY RUSSIA SHOULD BE NOW RESISTED. Shortly after, the Sultan dismissed Redschid Pasha and his colleagues, and called to his council as minister Ali Pasha; who was again obliged to vacate office for Redschid Pasha in a few hours. There are circumstances besides vacillation which mark the unfortunate character of this proceeding. Redschid has managed the negotiations on the part of Turkey with very great ability; he is at once the stronghold of the Divan in its To be a first-rate power, to have been so diplomatic storms, and a stronghold also blessed and favored by Providence as to beagainst the reactionary bigotries of the Mus- come one, and to have risen to that height by sulmans; and if it was bad to displace Red- the industry, courage, hardihood and resoluschid Pasha, Ali Pasha was the very worst tion, of the English race — - to be all this, and man to select in the whole Turkish dominions, yet shirk its manifest duties, is impossible. since he had just been recalled from Smyrna For who will say that that position has not CCCCLXXXIV. LIVING AGE. VOL. II. 36 entailed upon us duties, duties to ourselves | he could have renewed with us ten times over and our present interest, to our race and the struggle for maritime superiority. Suppast name, to Europe, and to the world? pose Russia in that position, and Greeks and To be a first-rate nation, and yet profess in- Sclavonians would then have no choice but to difference to the balance and distribution of adopt the Russian uniform. The wild races on power, or indifference to the fate of such na- either side of the Straits demand but a great tions as are emerging from barbarism and military power which will give them pay and struggling for independence, this, we repeat, a fair chance of success. Mahommedanism, is as impossible for a proud and a just nation, humbled in the person of the Prophet's deas it is impolitic for a prudent and foreseeing scendant and in the fall of his empire, would enlist its remaining energies in the service of the Russian Sultan. And we should soon find England, its colonial possessions, and worldwide trade, not only menaced and interrupted throughout Asia and Africa, but its naval power disputed on the Mediterranean. one. Such a view of our duties as a first-rate power is not the less just, because a sense of such duties may have been so strained on former occasions as to fling the country into a war of principles. The great struggle between France and England occupied a quarter of a century, and exhausted both the countries that were foremost in civilization. It was this that created opportunities for countries the youngest and least advanced of the European race to step forth before their time, and assume an ascendency which now menaces even to thrust back civilization itself. Our mistake was to have quarrelled for mere opinion with a country that stood beside us in the foremost ranks, and which, so closely our equal, maintained an almost interminable struggle. The duty now imposed, and the interests appealing to England and to France together for protection, involve no mere preferences of opinion. Considerations of democracy or despotism have nothing to do with them. It is the great material question whether one power shall be allowed to become so preponderant on the confines of Europe and Asia, as virtually, if it succeeds, to dominate the two continents. It is a question, not merely of government or its principles, but of self-conservation, of national existence. Whatever forbearance we may suppose to mark the politics of Russia, or whatever fabulous magnanimity we may impute to its Emperor, we can judge by his present tone and demands, while the Pruth yet bounds his empire, what would be his requirements and his policy were his eagles hoisted upon Saint Sophia. The Czar now, from his stronghold at the extremity of the Black Sea, ordains the closing of the Dardanelles against usan order, forsooth, which our marvellously prudent statesmen think it advisable already to obey. Enthrone the Czar at Constantinople, and could he do less than close the straits of Gibraltar? The stretch of authority would really not be greater than its proportion to his advanced empire and improved position. The possession of Constantinople, we well know, confers on him who grasps it the first maritime position in the world, an inexpugnable position, behind which navies to any extent could be prepared and manned. Had Napoleon, crushed as his naval strength was, possessed such a resource as Constantinople, But the result of such augmented might on the part of Russia, of the swelling of her armed masses from hundreds of thousands to tens of hundreds of thousands, would be even more fatal to the continent of Europe than to the maritime powers. As it is, the Sclavonians and Germans groan under her impending weight, which forbids to every remant of the races either nationality or representative institutions; and jeopardized as we already find the latter in France, we could scarcely hope other than to see them utterly extinguished on the continent of Europe, if Russian influence should be able now to strengthen and extend itself. It is, indeed, needless to dilate on such a theme, or to depict the too manifest consequences of a Russian occupation of Constantinople. That war would be obviated by allowing the Russians unresisted to establish themselves on the Bosphorus is an argument too absurd for even a Peace Society. Such an event would not only necessitate war in order to extricate ourselves, our trade, shipping, the sea, India and Europe, from a yoke more universal than Napoleon ever dreamed of imposing, but would involve a quarter of a century's war of the civilized and industrious West against the despotic and military East, in order to get back a full emancipation. The Russians, however, it will be said, do not mean to advance on Constantinople. The Czar in his very manifesto disclaims territorial aggrandizement. He merely insists on a kind of suzerainty over all men professing the Greek faith, which history, it is declared, has given to Russia, and which is now to be maintained by arms. But what is such dominion, if not over the soil, at least over the races that occupy it, save a sovereignty far more efficient than if extended over the soil itself, and rendering the latter facile of completion at any time? The doctrine of the Czar plainly establishes two kinds of allegiance, the political and the religious. the religious allegiance which he claims from the political subjects of Turkey, he claims openly not as a duty of charity or protection, And but as a source and prerogative of material | mistaken. Great forbearance may not prepower. clude resolute action at last. And if we may judge from the highly satisfactory remarks with which the Times followed up the highly unsatisfactory announcement on Monday that the passage of the Pruth would not be met by any immediate act of reprisal, we may perhaps hope that the hesitation and forbearance of the British cabinet have been exhausted, and that we may now expect from it a resistance more in accordance with dignity as well as good policy. The advancement of such principles, the attempted assertion of such rights, is as bold an advance on the part of the Czar to substitute himself for the Sultan as if one of his armies had reached Adrianople. His determination to occupy the principalities until such claims be allowed, is moreover as violent a proceeding towards Turkey, and as defiant towards those powers which have promised to support its independence, as Russia could venture on. Nevertheless it is all the result of deliberate calculation. Russia is bidding for the sovereignty over the Christians of the East. It is acting so as to invite their adherence, their admiration, their trust. It is its counter-invitation to that of the other powers which have been suggesting to the Greek and Sclavonian Christians that the immunities of their religion might perhaps be better preserved by freedom and independence than by subservience to Russia. Greeks and Sclavonians are at this moment wavering between the two kinds of advice, and between the powers that proffer them. And their adherence, it is to be feared, will not be given to those who would flatter their hopes of dignity and independence, but to those who will at once secure them the steadiest and most efficient succor. If Russia comes forward with acts and armies, while the West merely advances with embassies and protests, or with navies sneaking for a few weeks without and around the entrances to Turkish ports, the Greek Christians can have no choice. They become the prey of the boldest. And in the future struggle for the freedom of the East, of the sea, and of Europe, we shall find the Greek Christians arrayed against civilization, not for it. The Times hints its suspicion that the present occupation of the principalities by Russia, with all the plausible palaver put forth in excuse of it, may be merely a prelude to an advance of the Russian armies across the Danube in the approaching spring; the conquest of Constantinople in 1854 being facilitated by the manoeuvres of its diplomatists and soldiers in 1853. This may or may not be so. But, at all events, Russia is not a power to precipitate a movement that cannot be supported. She is always advancing towards her aim, from which her policy is never absolutely to recede. Years will give her numbers, resources, opportunities. She loses not by waiting, provided that in the waiting she does not lose character, or allow her antagonists to gain ground, in the affection and attachment of the Christian population of the Levant. Russia has of late years suffered two or three rebuffs at Constantinople, which, with the continued ascendency of Lord Stratford, ruinously diminished her prestige and affected her power. It is probably to undo this, rather than to make any movement this or next year on Constantinople, that she has now passed the Pruth. It remains for us either to enhance the success of her ambitious movement by acquiescing in it, or, by taking the fit steps to defeat its consequences, and bring the braggart to terms, to manifest that there are in Europe powers as much alive and energetic to work out the independence of the East, as there are powers but too eager for its permanent enslavement. From the Examiner, 23d July. The question is to be decided now, and decided in a great measure by the attitude which the British government shall assume. We regard it as not doubtful that the two wealthiest, most populous, and most advanced countries in Europe are more than a match for the poorest, the most barbarous, and the least peopled. We do not believe that Russia will risk a war with us. We are convinced that at present what we see of boldness and THE EASTERN QUESTION. decision on the part of Russia, of hesitation and doubt on the part of the maritime pow- ALL well-informed people both in London ers, has been owing altogether to the Russian and Paris appear to entertain the belief that Emperor's thorough acquaintance with our the Eastern quarrel is either arranged, or in weak points; too natural in a constitutional a fair way to be so. They rely on the fact government like ours, and which oftener enables enemies to take advantage of our weakness, than friends to put confidence in our strength. Russia, in fact, knows the carte du pays, and has marched across the Pruth solely because of the conviction that Lord Aberdeen would not resent it. In this, however, the Czar may find himself that Austria, and even Prussia, are at length in full accord with England and France, to urge upon Russia, now that its emperor has been gratified by a forth pouring of his legions to the Danube, to pursue no further a quarrel by which every country in Europe has been awakened, and in which every European government, not to speak of that of the United States, will be bound to take a part. The sine quâ non of the four powers is that Russia should fix a period for the evacuation of the principalities. Without this, nothing would be achieved. As to the note, declaration, or convention, relative to the Christians in Turkey, there are a hundred ways of drawing it up, a hundred modes of interpreting it, and a hundred modes of sanction. The strength and stringency of the convention are of little moment, however, provided the other powers insist on making themselves parties to it as well as Russia. Less than this can surely not be insisted on ; and yet, little as this may seem to us, there must be so much that is galling to Russia in a forced retreat behind the Pruth, redeemed by no plain or decisive diplomatic victory, that we cannot but still withhold our adherence to the general confidence which prevails. support in popular opinion, and stand right with it. The despotic rulers of both Russia and France have forwarded no despatch, have drawn up no remonstrance, which they have not communicated to the public of their respective countries, as well as to the court for which it was intended. Russians have been indulged with a knowledge of all the reasons and motives for war felt by the Czar. The French have been made to participate in a knowledge of every act of the government, as well as of its reasons for so acting, with a fulness and a frankness unusual even to constitutional countries. The only cabinet which has appeared desirous to act apart from national opinion, and quite independently of it, is the cabinet of Great Britain. to the excitement of this redoubtable personage is perhaps prudent. The only question is whether such prudence may not be carried too far. Louis Napoleon, however bound to be also prudent and circumspect, has not shrunk from ordering his minister to speak out. He has not shrunk from inviting the public of France to form a judgment upon his reasons, his declarations, his acts. No doubt we have our motives for forbearance which the French Emperor has not. We have a greater interest in not making Nicholas less zealous in the defence of the status quo of Europe in the West as well as East. But in aiming at too many things, we may chance to miss all. Going half and half between Russia and France, trusting or conciliating neither, yet awakening prejudice and suspicion in both, we may possibly end by making both our enemies. No doubt there have been reasons for this, and reasons by no means implying any wish The Czar has in truth so precipitated mat- to shake off the control of Parliament or people. ters, and indulged his imperial humor in such One of the difficulties in the way of bringing high-sounding language and pretensions, that the present quarrel to a peaceful determinahe has placed himself and his brother ruler tion has consisted in the fact that it was of Turkey in the same predicament. Both chiefly caused by the personal feeling of the will now find it equally difficult to satisfy Emperor Nicholas, by a temper which has their zealots. How is the great Russian become with years more susceptible and mission to dominate the universe? How is irascible. To avoid every possibility of adding the descendant of the Prophet to be always able and prepared for the religious duty of battling with the infidel? Undoubtedly it would be the Sultan's interest at this moment to provoke war. The fate of his empire, he must know, will in no very distant time be decided by arms; and never could the two sides proceed to the struggle, with so much of right on the Turkish side, and so much of wrong on that of Russia. Never can England and France be more united in principle, in policy, and in honor, to support Turkey. Never could the Sultan, in fact, hope for so favorable an opportunity; and that this is felt by Abdul Medjid, as well as by certain old politicians of Constantinople, is quite evident. Wherever there is mischief, one may be sure to find Riza Pacha at the bottom of it; and this personage has, it seems, been with the Sultan last week, and has even received the promise of being summoned to the council as the representative of the war party, the only minister who would satisfy Turkish fanaticism. In case of war, indeed, it is not Redschid Pacha or the present Grand Vizier who would be selected to carry it on. Nor can we hold war to be other than probable, even now. The Russian people have marched on to the Turkish verge of the principalities, as if their object were provocation; and this object will undoubtedly be fulfilled unless the Czar can be brought to such terms, and to such instant guarantees to their fulfilment, as may inspire Turkey with a just confidence in peace. One peculiarity of the present quarrel has been the anxiety of each government to find Much of this uncertain and vacillating attitude, so likely to be misconstrued, would have been avoided by letting Parliament earlier into a participation with the government policy, and making use of its unmistak able opinion as an expression of the national will, which it was not in the power of ministers either to elude or to gainsay. However desirable peace may be, it would be a much more solid and more respectable peace if Parliament were a party to the making of it, and if the country were made to feel that neither honor, nor interest, nor even an English love of frankness and truth, have been sacrificed to it. We must end, as we began, by confessing that we entertain great fears of its being in And, first and foremost, the quarrel is a the power of either Russia or Turkey to draw | completely back from their respective atti- just one. The Porte has offered to continue tudes of hostility. It will not do for the Czar to act the part of the emperor who marched up the hill and then marched down again. He must have some profit to show, some advantage to allege; and we do not see what diplomacy has in this respect to give him. From the Economist, 16 July. and to guarantee to all her Christian subjects perfect toleration and all their ancient privileges. She has merely refused to constitute the Czar the official guardian of those privileges-a demand that she could not concede without forever forfeiting her claim to the character of an independent power. language and proceedings of Russia have The ENGLAND'S INTEREST IN THE EASTERN throughout been insolent and peremptory to a QUESTION. THE REASON WHY. This degree which is rare indeed in modern diplomacy, and which argues a profound contempt, not only for her immediate adversary, but for THE Russian army has crossed the Pruth the usual courtesies and decencies which govand occupied the trans-Danubian Principali-ern the intercourse of civilized nations. Were ties. The English and French fleets, on their Turkey to yield to such demands, so presented side, have cast anchor in the Dardanelles. and so enforced, she must sink into a condiThe Sultan has rejected the last ultimatum of tion of ignominious vassalage to a covetous and the Emperor, and the Emperor has issued a imperious master. second manifesto to Europe and a stirring procSecondly. England has a direct concern in lamation to his own subjects, neither of this dispute. She has not thrust herself into which indicate any retrograde intentions. the quarrel; she has been dragged into it, We still hope that the last extremities may as Nicholas well knew that she must be. be escaped: -it is so much the general in- Not only is she bound by a strict alliance terest that peace should be preserved; it is so with the Ottoman Porte to assist it in all much the general belief that it will be pre- cases of unjust aggression, but the maintenserved. But if war is to be averted, it must ance of Turkish independence or at least be averted by retractations on the part of the repression of Russian encroachments in Russia not by concessions on the part of the direction of Constantinople—is to her a Turkey or her allies. Russia has assumed a matter of vital and immediate concern. false position, from which it will be difficult we have more than once pointed out. The to recede without loss and mortification; safety of our Eastern Empire - the security England has taken up a righteous position, of our Indian communications - depends on from which it will be impossible to recede Constantinople and Egypt being in the hands without dishonor and defeat. It will not be of a neutral, friendly, and unambitious supposed by any one that we can be advocates power. We have shown in another part of for war; we have too often denounced its our paper how pertinaciously Russia has been folly, stigmatized its guilt, laid bare its flimsy pressing forward to the possession, or at least pretexts, expounded the misery and ruin the control, of Roumelia, and how completely which it brings on all concerned in it; we this would give her the command of the Lehave more than once had to depict its destruc- vant. At present we can hold her effectively tion to commerce, its interruption to prosper- in check by shutting up her fleets in the Bality, its blighting influence on all the higher tic or the Gulf of Finland: let her once be interests of morality and civilization; but we fairly seated on the shores of the Ægean, and have never concealed our opinion that cases we should have at once to double our naval may arise few and rare as undoubtedly force in the Mediterranean, and should be exthey are when peace can only be preserved posed to the risk of daily collisions; and, in by sacrifices which make it both precarious case of war in India, to serious impediments and worthless; and that wicked, foolish, and to the transmission of orders and troops. ruinous as war too generally is, there may Without dwelling further on this point, it yet be iniquities far darker, follies still must be obvious to every one, that if any obinsaner, ruin incalculably deeper, sadder, and ject except the safety of our own shores can more irreparable. War or at least the be worth a war, that object assuredly is the willingness to encounter it may be a ne- prevention of Russia from either destroying cessity, a safety, a wisdom, a virtue. We de- the independence or seizing on the territories liberately believe that a war with Russia to of Turkey. sustain Turkey in her present righteous quarrel would be such a case; and we will state in a few words why we think that England's interest and duty combine to urge her to maintain a resolute and unreceding attitude, at all hazards, and in full view of all the consequences. Thirdly. The war would be a safe one, and success, unless there be awful mismanagement, absolutely certain. Few persons, we believe, estimate aright the relative forces of the two parties in the present contest. In the first place, the Turkish regular army is numerous, in good condition, and in high |