which, arising from circumstances in which all the situations of mankind must agree, are common to the whole species. Such active principles as fall under this last description, at whatever period of life they may appear, are to be regarded as a part of human nature, no less than the instinct of suction; in the same manner as the acquired perception of distance by the eye is to be ranked among the perceptive powers of man, no less than the original perceptions of any of our other senses. Leaving, therefore, the question concerning the origin of our active principles, and of the moral faculty, to be the subject of future discus sion, I shall conclude this section with a few remarks of a more practical nature. It has been shewn by different writers, how much of the beauty and sublimity of material objects arises from the ideas and feelings which we have been taught to associate with them. The impression produced on the external senses of a poet, by the most striking scene in nature, is precisely the same with what is produced on the senses of a peasant or a tradesman: yet how different is the degree of pleasure resulting from this impression! A great part of this difference is undoubtedly to be ascribed to the ideas and feelings which the habitual studies and amusements of the poet have associated with his organical perceptions. A similar observation may be applied to all the various objects of our pursuit in life. Hardly any one of them is appreciated by any two men in the same manner; and frequently what one man considers as essential to his happiness, is regarded with indifference or dislike by another. Of these differences of opinion, much is, no doubt, to be ascribed to a diversity of constitution, which renders a particular employment of the intellectual or active powers agreeable to one man, which is not equally so to another. But much is also to be ascribed to the effect of association; which, prior to any experience of human life, connects pleasing ideas and pleasing feelings with different objects, in the minds of different persons. In consequence of these associations, every man appears to his neighbour to pursue the object of his wishes, with a zeal disproportioned to its intrinsic value; and the philosopher (whose principal enjoyment arises from speculation) is frequently apt to smile at the ardour with which the active part of mankind pursue what appear to him to be mere shadows. This view of human affairs some writers have carried so far, as to represent life as a scene of mere illusions, where the mind refers to the objects around it, a colouring, which exis's only in itself; and where, as the Poet expresses it, "Opinion gilds with varying rays, "Those painted clouds which beautify our days." It may be questioned, if these representations of human life be useful or just. That the casual associations which the mind forms in childhood, and in early youth, are frequently a source of inconvenience and of misconduct, is sufficiently obvious; but that this tendency of our nature increases, on the whole, the sum of human enjoyment, appears to me to be indisputable; and the instances in which it misleads us from our duty and our happiness only prove, to what important ends it might be subservient, if it were kept under proper regulation. VOL. I. 25 Nor do these representations of life (admitting them in their full extent) justify the, practical inferences which have been often deduced from them, with respect to the vanity of our pursuits. In every case, indeed, in which our enjoyment depends upon association, it may be said, in one sense, that it arises from the mind itself; but it does not therefore follow, that the external object, which custom has rendered the cause or the occasion of agreeable emotions, is indifferent to our happiness. The effect which the beauties of nature produce on the mind of the poet, is wonderfully heightened by association, but his enjoyment is not, on that account, the less exquisite: nor are the objects of his admiration of the less value to his happiness, that they derive their principal charms from the embellishments of his fancy. It is the business of education, not to counteract, in any instance, the established laws of our constitution, but to direct them to their proper purposes. That the influence of early associations on the mind might be employed, in the most effectual manner, to aid our moral principles, appears evidently from the effects which we daily see it produce, in reconciling men to a course of action which their reason forces them to condemu; and it is no less obvious that, by means of it, the happiness of human life might be increased, and its pains diminished, if the agreeable ideas and feelings which children are so apt to connect with events and with situations which depend on the caprice of fortune, were firmly associated in their apprehensions with the duties of their stations, with the pursuits of science, and with those beauties of nature which are open to all. These observations coincide nearly with the ancient stoical doctrine concerning the influence of imagination* on morals; a subject, on which many important remarks (though expressed in a form different from that which modern philosophers have introduced, and, perhaps, not altogether so precise and accurate,) are to be found in the Discourses of Epictetus,fand in the Meditations of Antoninus. The doctrine of the Stoical school Dr. Akenside has in view in the following passage : "Action treads the path "In which Opinion says he follows good, "Was drawn by fancy, lovely or deform'd : ་་ "And black before him; nought but death-bed groans "And fearful prayers, and plunging from the brink According to the use which I make of the words Imagination and Association, in this work, their effects are obviously distinguishable. I have thought it proper, however, to illustrate the difference between them a little more fully in Note [R.] f See what Epictetus has remarked on the χρησις οία δει Φαντασίων. - (Arrian, 1. i. c. 12,) Οία αν πολλάκις Φαντασθης, τοιαύτη σοι εσται η διανοια· βαπτεται γαρ ύπο των Φαντασίων η ψυχη, βαπτε ουν αυτήν, τη συνέχεια των τοιούτων Φαντασίων, &c. &c. Anton. 1. v. c. 16. "An unknown depth? Alas! in such a mind, 3ヶ SECTION IV. General Remarks on the subjects treated in the foregoing Sections of this Chapter. IN perusing the foregoing Sections of this Chapter, I am aware, that some of my readers inay be apt to think that many of the observations which I have made, might easily be resolved into more general principles. I am also aware, that, to the followers of Dr. Hartley, a similar objection will occur against all the other parts of this work; and that it will appear to them the effect of inexcusable prejudice, that I should stop short so frequently in the explanation of phenomena; when he has accounted in so satisfactory a manner, by means of the association of ideas, for all the appearances which human nature exhibits. To this objection, I shall not feel myself much interested to reply, provided it be granted that my observations are candidly and accurately stated, so far as they reach. Supposing that in some cases I may have stopped short too soon, my speculations, although they may be censured as imperfect, cannot be considered as standing in opposition to the conclusions of more successful inquirers. May I be allowed farther to observe, that such views of the human mind as are contained in this work, (even supposing the objection to be well founded,) are, in my opinion, indispensably necessary, in order to prepare the way for those very general and comprehensive theories concerning it, which some eminent writers of the present age have been ambitious to form ? Concerning the merit of these theories, I shall not presume to give any judgment. I shall only remark, that, in all the other sciences, the progress of discovery has been gradual, from the less general to the more general laws of nature; and that it would be singular, indeed, if, in the Philosophy of the Human Mind, a science, which but a few years ago was confessedly in its infancy, and which certainly labours under many disadvantages peculiar to itself, a step should, all at once, be made to a single principle comprehending all the particular phenomena which we know. Supposing such a theory to be completely established, it would still be proper to lead the minds of students to it by gradual steps. One of the most important uses of theory, is to give the memory a permanent hold, and a prompt command of the particular facts which we were previously * Pleasures of Imagination, b. iii. acquainted with; and no theory can be completely understood, unless the mind be led to it nearly in the order of investigation. It is more particularly useful in conducting the studies of others, to familiarize their minds, as completely as possible, with those laws of nature for which we have the direct evidence of sense, or consciousness, before directing their inquiries to the more abstruse and refined generalizations of speculative curiosity. In natural philosophy, supposing the theory of Boscovich to be true, it would still be proper, or rather indeed absolutely necessary, to accustom students, in the first stage of their physical education, to dwell on those general physical facts which fall under our actual observation, and about which all the practical arts of life are conversant. In like manner, in the philosophy of mind, there are many general facts for which we have the direct evidence of consciousness. The words Attention, Conception, Memory, Abstraction, Imagination, Curiosity, Ambition, Compassion, Resentment, express powers and principles of our nature, which every man may study by reflecting on his own internal operations. Words corresponding to these, are to be found in all languages, and may be considered as forming the first attempt towards a philosophical classification of intellectual and moral phenomena. Such a classification, however imperfect and indistinct, we may be assured, must have some foundation in nature; and it is at least prudent, for a philosopher to keep it in view as the ground work of his own arrangement. It not only directs our attention to those facts in the human constitution, on which every solid theory in this branch of science must be founded; but to the facts, which, in all ages, have appeared to the common sense of mankind, to be the most striking and important; and of which it ought to be the great object of theorists, not to supersede, but to facilitate the study. There is indeed good reason for believing, that many of the facts, which our consciousness would lead us to consider, upon a superficial view as ultimate facts, are resolvable into other principles still more general. "Long before we are capable of reflection," (says Dr. Reid,) "the original perceptions and notions of the mind are so mixed, com"pounded, and decompounded, by habits, associations, and abstrac"tions, that it is extremely difficult for the mind to return upon its own "footsteps, and trace back those operations which have employed it "since it first began to think and to act." The same author remarks, that, "if we could obtain a distinct and full history of all that hath "passed in the mind of a child, from the beginning of life and sensation, "till it grows up to the use of reason; how its infant faculties began to "work, and how they brought forth and ripened all the various notions, opinions, and sentiments, which we find in ourselves when we come to be capable of reflection; this would be a treasure of Natural "History, which would probably give more light into the human facut"ties, than all the systems of philosophers about them, since the be"ginning of the world." 66 To accomplish an analysis of these complicated phenomena into the simple and original principles of our constitution, is the great object of this branch of philosophy; but, in order to succeed, it is necessary to ascertain facts before we begin to reason, and to avoid generalizing, in any instance, till we have completely secured the ground that we have gained. Such a caution, which is necessary in all the sciences, is, in a more peculiar manner, necessary here, where the very facts from which all our inferences must be drawn, are to be ascertained only by the most patient attention; and where almost all of them are, to a great degree, disguised, partly by the inaccuracies of popular language, and partly by the mistaken theories of philosophers. I have only to add, that, although I have retained the phrase of the Association of Ideas, in compliance with common language, I am far from being completety satisfied with this mode of expression. I have retained it, chiefly that I might not expose myself to the censure of delivering old doctrines in a new form. As I have endeavoured to employ it with caution, I hope that it has not often misled me in my reasonings. At the same time, I am more and more convinced of the advantages to be derived from a reformation of the common language in most of the branches of science. How much such a reformation has effected in Chemistry is well known; and it is evidently much more necessary in the Philosophy of Mind, where the prevailing language adds to the common inaccuracies of popular expressions, the peculiar disadvantage, of being all suggested by the analogy of matter. Often, in the composition of this work, have I recollected the advice of Bergman to Morveau. "In reforming the nomenclature "of chemistry, spare no word which is improper. They who under"stand the subject already, will suffer no inconvenience; and they to whom the subject is new, will comprehend it with the greater facility." But it belongs to such authors alone, as have extended the boundaries of science by their own discoveries, to introduce innovations in language with any hopes of success. CHAPTER SIXTH. OF MEMORY. SECTION I. General Observations on Memory. AMONG the various powers of the understanding, there is none which has been so attentively examined by philosophers, or concerning which so many important facts and observations have been collected, as the faculty of Memory. This is partly to be ascribed to its nature, which renders it easily distinguishable from all the other principles of our constitution, even by those who have not been accustomed to metaphysical "Le savant Professeur d'Upsal, M. Bergman, écrivoit à M. de Morveau dans les derniers temps de sa vie. Ne faites graces à aucune dénomination impropre. Ceux qui savent déjà entendront toujours; ceux qui ne savent pas encore entendront plutôt." Méthode de Nomenclat. Chimque, pár MM. MORVEAU, LAVOISIER, &c. |