SECTION VII.

Continuation of the same Subject.-Differences in the Intellectual Characters of Individuals, arising from their different Habits of Abstraction and Generalization.

IN mentioning as one of the principal effects of civilization, its tendency to familiarize the mind to general terms, and to general propositions, I did not mean to say, that this influence extends equally to all the classes of men in society. On the contrary it is evidently confined, in a great measure, to those who receive a liberal education; while the minds of the lower orders, like those of savages, are so habitually occupied about particular objects and particular events, that, although they are sometimes led, from imitation, to employ general expressions. the use which they make of them is much more the result of memory than judgment; and it is but seldom that they are able to comprehend fully any process of reasoning in which they are involved.

It is hardly necessary for me to remark, that this observation, with respect to the incapacity of the vulgar for general speculations, (like all observations of a similar nature,) must be received with some restrictions. In such a state of society as that in which we live, there is hardly any individual to be found, to whom some general terms, and some general truths, are not perfectly familiar; and, therefore, the foregoing conclusions are to be considered as descriptive of those habits of thought alone, which are most prevalent in their mind. To abridge the labour of reasoning, and of memory, by directing the attention to general principles, instead of particular truths, is the professed aim of all philosophy; and according as individuals have more or less of the philosophic spirit, their habitual speculations (whatever the nature of their pursuits may be) will relate to the former, or to the latter, of these objects.

There are, therefore, among the men who are accustomed to the exercise of their intellectual powers, two classes, whose habits of thought are remarkably distinguished from each other; the one class comprehending what we commonly call men of business, or, more properly, men of detail; the other, men of abstraction; or, in other words, philosophers.

The advantages which, in certain respects, the latter of these possess over the former, have been already pointed out; but it must not be supposed, that these advantages are always purchased without some inconvenience. As the solidity of our general principles depends on the accuracy of the particular observations into which they are ultimately resolvable, so their utility is to be estimated by the practical applications of which they admit and it unfortunately happens, that the same turn of mind which is favourable to philosophical pursuits, unless it be kept under proper regulation, is extremely apt to disqualify us for applying our knowledge to use, in the exercise of the arts, and in the conduct of affairs.

In order to perceive the truth of these remarks, it is almost sufficient to recollect, that as classification, and, of consequence, general reason

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ing, presuppose the exercise of abstraction, a natural disposition to indulge in them, cannot fail to lead the mind to overlook the specific differences of things, in attending to their common qualities. To succeed, however, in practice, a familiar and circumstantial acquaintance with the particular objects which fall under our observation, is indispensably necessary.

But, farther: As all general principles are founded on classifications which imply the exercise of abstraction, it is necessary to regard them, in their practical applications, merely as approximations to the truth; the defects of which must be supplied by habits acquired by personal experience. In considering, for example, the theory of the mechanical powers, it is usual to simplify the objects of our conception, by abstracting from friction, and from the weight of the different parts of which they are composed. Levers are considered as mathematical lines, perfectly inflexible, and ropes, as mathematical lines, perfectly flexible; and by means of these, and similar abstractions, a subject, which is in itself ex. tremely complicated, is brought within the reach of elementary geometry. In the theory of politics, we find it necessary to abstract from many of the peculiarities which distinguish different forms of government from each other, and to reduce them to certain general classes, according to their prevailing tendency. Although all the governments we have ever seen, have had more or less of mixture in their composition, we reason concerning pure monarchies, pure aristocracies, and pure democracies, as if there really existed political establishments corresponding to our definitions. Without such a classification, it would be impossible for us to fix our attention, amidst the multiplicity of particulars which the subject presents to us, or to arrive at any general principles, which might serve to guide our inquiries in comparing different institutions together.

It is for a similar reason, that the speculative farmer reduces the infinite variety of soils to a few general descriptions; the physician, the infinite variety of bodily constitutions to a few temperaments; and the moralist, the infinite variety of human characters to a few of the ruling principles of action.

The

Notwithstanding, however, the obvious advantages we derive from these classifications, and the general conclusions to which they lead, it is evidently impossible, that principles, which derive their origia from efforts of abstraction, should apply literally to practice; or, indeed, that they should afford us any considerable assistance in conduct, without a certain degree of practical and experimental skill. Hence it is, that the mere theorist so frequently exposes himself, in real life, to the ridicule of men whom he despises; and in the general estimation of the world, falls below the level of the common drudges in business and the arts. walk, indeed, of these unenlightened practitioners, must necessarily be limited by their accidental opportunities of experience; but, so far as they go, they operate with facility and success; while the merely speculative philosopher, although possessed of principles which enable him, to approximate to the truth in an infinite variety of untried cases, and although he sees, with pity, the narrow views of the multitude, and the ludicrous pretensions with which they frequently oppose their trifling successes to his theoretical speculations, finds himself perfectly at a loss, when he is called upon, by the simplest occurrences of ordinary life, to

carry his principles into execution. Hence the origin of that maxim, "which" (as Mr. Hume remarks)" has been so industriously propa"gated by the dunces of every age, that a man of genius is unfit for "business."

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In what consists practical or experimental skill, it is not easy to explain completely; but, among other things, it obviously implies a talent for minute and comprehensive and rapid observation; a memory, at once retentive and ready, in order to present to us accurately, and without reflection, our theoretical knowledge; a presence of mind, not to be disconcerted by unexpected occurrences; and, in some cases, an uncommon degree of perfection in the external senses, and in the mechanical capacities of the body. All these elements of practical skill, it is obs vious, are to be acquired only by habits of active exertion, and by a familiar acquaintance with real occurrences; for, as all the practical principles of our nature, both intellectual and animal, have a reference to particulars, and not to generals, so it is in the active scenes of life alone, and amidst the details of business, that they can be cultivated and improved.

The remarks which have been already made, are sufficient to illus trate the impossibility of acquiring a talent for husiness, or for any of the practical arts of life, without actual experience. They shew also, that mere experience, without theory, may qualify a man, in certain cases, for distinguishing himself in both. It is not, however, to be imagined, that in this way individuals are to be formed for the uncommon, or for the important situations of society, or even for enriching the arts by new inventions; for, as their address and dexterity are founded en tirely on imitation, or derived from the lessons which experience has suggested to them, they cannot possibly extend to new combinations of circumstances. Mere experience, therefore, can, at best, prepare the mind for the subordinate departments of life; for conducting the estab lished routine of business, or for a servile repetition in the arts of com, mon operations.

In the character of Mr. George Grenville, which Mr. Burke introduc ed in his celebrated Speech on American Taxation, a lively picture is drawn of the insufficiency of mere experience to qualify a man for new and untried situations in the administration of government. The obser vations he makes on this subject, are expressed with his usual beauty and felicity of language, and are of so general a nature, that, with some trifling alterations, they may be extended to all the practical pursuits of life.

"Mr. Grenville was bred to the law, which is, in my opinion, one of "the first and noblest of human sciences; a science which does more "( to quicken and invigorate the understanding, than all the other kinds "of learning put together; but it is not apt, except in persons very "happily born, to open and to liberalize the mind exactly in the same "proportion. Passing from that study, he did not go very largely into "the world, but plunged into business; I mean, into the the business of "office, and the limited and fixed methods and forms established there. "Much knowledge is to be had, undoubtedly, in that line; and there is "no knowledge which is not valuable. But it may be truly said, that 66 men too much conversant in office, are rarely minds of remarkable enlargement. Their habits of office are apt to give them a turn to

"think the substance of business not to be much more important, than "the forms in which it is conducted. These forms are adapted to ordinary occasions; and, therefore, persons who are nurtured in office, do "admirably well, as long as things go on in their common order; but "when the high roads are broken up, and the waters out, when a new "and troubled scene is opened, and the file affords no precedent, then "it is, that a greater knowledge of mankind, and a far more extensive "comprehension of things, is requisite, than ever office gave, or than of"fice can ever give."

Nor is it in new combinations of circumstances alone that general principles assist us in the conduct of affairs; they render the application of our practical skill more unerring, and more perfect. For, as general principles limit the utility of practical skill to supply the imperfections of theory, they diminish the number of cases in which this skill is to be employed; and thus, at once, facilitate its improvement, wherever it is requisite, and lessen the errors to which it is liable, by contracting the field within which it is possible to commit them.

It would appear then that there are two opposite extremes into which men are apt to fall, in preparing themselves for the duties of active life. The one arises from habits of abstraction and generalization carried on to an excess; the other from a minute, an exclusive, and an unenlightened attention to the objects and events which happen to fall under their actual experience.

In a perfect system of education, care should be taken to guard against both extremes, and to unite habits of abstraction with habits of business, in such a manner as to enable men to consider things, either in general, or in detail, as the occasion may require. Whichever of these habits may happen to gain an undue ascendant over the mind, it will necessarily produce a character limited in its powers, and fitted only for particular exertions. Hence some of the apparent inconsistencies which we may frequently remark in the intellectual capacities of the same person. One man, from an early indulgence in abstract speculation, possesses a knowledge of general principles, and a talent for general reasoning, united with a fluency and eloquence in the use of general terms, which seem, to the vulgar, to announce abilities fitted for any given situation in life while in the conduct of the simplest affairs, he exhibits every mark of irresolution and incapacity. Another not only acts with propriety and skill, in circumstances which require a minute attention to details, but possesses an acuteness of reasoning, and a facility of expression on all subjects, in which nothing but what is particular is involved; while, on general topics, he is perfectly unable either to reason, or to judge. It is this last turn of mind, which I think we have, in most instances in view, when we speak of good sense, or common sense, in opposition to science and philosophy. Both philosophy and good sense imply the exercise of our reasoning powers; and they differ from each other only, according as these powers are applied to particulars or to generals. It is on good sense (in the acceptation in which I have now explained the term) that the success of men in the inferior walks of life chiefly depends; but, that it does not always indicate a capacity for abstract science, or for general speculation, or for able conduct in situations which require comprehensive views, is matter even of vulgar

remark.

Although, however, each of these defects has a tendency to limit the utility of the individuals, in whom it is to be found, to certain stations in society, no comparison can be made, in point of original value, between the intellectual capacities of the two classes of men to which they characteristically belong. The one is the defect of a vigorous, an ambitious, and a comprehensive genius, improperly directed; the other, of an understanding, minute and circumscribed in its views, timid in its exertions, and formed for servile imitation. Nor is the former defect, (however difficult it may be to remove it when confirmed by long habit,) by any means so incurable as the latter; for it arises, not from original constitution, but from some fault in early education; while every tendency to the opposite extreme is more or less characteristical of a mind, useful, indeed, in a high degree, when confined to its proper sphere, but destined, by the hand that formed it, to borrow its lights from another.

As an additional proof of the natural superiority which men of general views possess over the common drudges in business, it may be farther observed, that the habits of inattention incident to the former, arise in part from the little interest which they take in particular objects and particular occurrences, and are not wholly to be ascribed to an incapacity of attention. When the mind has been long accustomed to the consideration of classes of objects and of comprehensive theorems, it cannot, without some degree of effort, descend to that humble walk of experience, or of action, in which the meanest of mankind are on a level with the greatest. In important situations, accordingly, men of the most general views are found not to be inferior to the vulgar in their attention to details; because the objects and occurrences which such situations present, rouse their passions, and interest their curiosity, from the magnitude of the consequences to which they lead.

When theoretical knowledge and practical skill are happily combined in the same person, the intellectual power of man appears in its full perfection, and fits him equally to conduct, with a masterly hand, the details of ordinary business, and to contend successfully with the untried difficulties of new and hazardous situations. In conducting the former, mere experience may frequently be a sufficient guide, but experi ence and speculation must be combined together to prepare us for the latter. "Expert men," says Lord Bacon, "can execute and judge of "particulars one by one; but the general counsels, and the plots, and "the marshalling of affairs, come best from those that are learned."

SECTION VIII.

Continuation of the same Subject.-Use and Abuse of general Principles in
Politics.*

THE foregoing remarks, on the dangers to be apprehended from a rash application of general principles, hold equally with respect to most

The events which happened since the publication of the former edition of this volume in 1792, might have enabled me to confirm many of the observations in this section, by an appeal to facts still fresh in the recollection of my readers: and in one or two instances by slight verbal corrections, to guard against the possibility of uncandid misinterpretation: but, for various reasons, which it is unne.