work a parliamentary constitutional monarchy of the English type, and was unable to free himself from the ingrained habits of his past. Perhaps he might have been more successful if he had joined frankly with the conservative majority in the restoration of monarchy. To do that, however, he must have sunk his own personality and governed in accordance with their wishes. He preferred to ally himself with the Republicans, and to rely on their support to maintain himself in power, miscalculating to the last the strength and the increasing self-confidence of those whose opinions and prejudices he had combated almost from the moment when they accepted him as provisional head of the State.

Thiers had been overthrown by the Monarchists in order to prevent him from establishing a republic; and they had replaced him by a man on whose sympathies they could safely count. They felt that no time must be lost if they would secure the fruits of their victory. A hint from Broglie induced the Comte de Paris to seek an interview with the Comte de Chambord at Frohsdorf early in August, 1873. He declared that he had come, not merely to pay his respects to the head of the house of Bourbon, but also to recognise the principle of which the Comte de Chambord was the representative; and he added his wish that France would seek salvation in this principle. This seemed, on the face of it, explicit enough. Every one was aware that by 'the principle' the Comte de Chambord meant hereditary kingship by divine right, as distinguished from constitutional sovereignty, symbolised respectively by the white flag and the tricolour. But the Comte de Paris considered that his language about France 'seeking her salvation' reserved the right of the nation to choose its own form of government, and to impose its own conditions before inviting back the representative of its ancient kings. From the Orleanist point of view, the necessity of the monarchy being constitutional as well as traditional lay at the root of the matter. Thus the accord established between them was more apparent than real. The question of the flag had been carefully avoided. Since the overwhelming majority of the nation, as well as of the Assembly, were determined to insist on the tricolour, it was evident that the Mon

archists must direct their efforts towards inducing the Comte de Chambord to accept it; yet what hope was there of persuading him to surrender the symbol of his principle, with which, as he had declared, his honour was indissolubly bound up?

Further elections of republican deputies by crushing majorities, and the increasingly republican tone of the conseils-généraux, came as a warning that delay would be dangerous. The Legitimist restoration must be ac complished, if at all, before the meeting of the Assembly in November 1873. The Cabinet contained two repre sentatives of the Legitimist Right, Ernoul and de la Bouillerie. As they were precluded by their position from acting in person, two unofficial members were deputed to lay before the Comte de Chambord a statement of what was possible in existing political circumstances. They were received by him on September 18: but he had already committed himself to a categorical declaration of his views in a letter to Ernoul, which had crossed them on their way. He had laid it down that the Assembly ought simply to proclaim the monarchy appointing at the same time a committee to conside constitutional questions in agreement with himself, and the laws in which the result should be embodied. As to the flag, he reserved to himself the right to treat the question directly with the army on his return to France; and he was prepared for his own part to obtain a solu tion compatible with his honour, and without seeking the help of any intermediary. This was as much as to tell his followers that they need not concern themselves with attempts at a solution. The two envoys, however, derived from him the impression that he would not insist on the adoption of the white flag as a condition of his accepting the throne, although he gave them to understand that, if it were ultimately rejected by the nation, he would return to Frohsdorf.

It seems strange that, in spite of this, an optimistic tone prevailed among the Legitimists. A meeting of about sixty deputies belonging to the party was held, with d'Audiffret-Pasquier in the chair, who made it quite clear that the Orleanists would not support any but a tricolour monarchy, and besought the friends of the Comte de Chambord to procure his consent. MacMahon, in order

to place his own intentions beyond a doubt, despatched an aide-de-camp to Frohsdorf to say that he would not oppose a restoration, provided the tricolour was maintained. Ernoul sent an answer to the letter he had received, asking for a change in the phrase about the flag. His messenger having returned without a reply, a meeting of the bureaux of the four groups of the Right was held, at which d'Audiffret-Pasquier once more declared that the tricolour was a sine quâ non. Then there interposed a worthy gentleman named Chesnelong, a clothier by origin, whose business experience had convinced him of his own skill in bargaining. He had an idea of combining the two flags in such a way as to satisfy every one. At his suggestion a committee of nine was appointed, with Changarnier as chairman, to seek for the basis of a compromise. There had been a further letter from the Comte de Chambord, saying that he reserved to himself to speak again about the flag on his return to France, and that he undertook to obtain from her representatives a solution compatible with his honour. This they altered into the following: 'The tricolour flag is maintained, and can only be modified by an agreement between the King and the Assembly.' It was then that MacMahon uttered the well-known phrase: If the white flag were displayed opposite to the tricolour, if the white flag floated at one window and the tricolour at another, the chassepots would go off of themselves.' Finally, Chesnelong was deputed to proceed to Salzburg, where he arrived on October 14, 1873, armed with certain stipulations as to the constitutional arrangements which would have to be accepted besides the flag.

During all this time the Left was not inactive. Thiers and Gambetta openly announced their opposition to the monarchy, while the Bonapartists entered the field as advocates of an' appeal to the people.' Further republican successes in the elections showed the tendency of national feeling. Chesnelong had several conversations with the Comte de Chambord, who seemed to accept the constitutional conditions; but, when the question of the flag was broached, he found great difficulty in obtaining even the slightest modification of the language previously used. Strange to say, Chesnelong, who returned to Paris on October 16, imagined himself to have succeeded in his

mission. Several meetings of the committee of nine took place; and such confidence was entertained that a draft resolution for submission to the Assembly was prepared. A communication to the press was also agreed upon. stating the result of the negotiations in such a manner as to satisfy the deputies of the Right, but not the Comte de Chambord's confidential servants. Reservations began to be made by the Legitimist press; and rumours go abroad of an intention to appoint the Duc d'Aumal Lieutenant-General of the Kingdom, as well as of the project, conceived some time back by Broglie, of prelonging the powers of the Marshal. Nevertheless, pre prè parations were continued for the entry of the King into Paris, and a state-coach was even ordered. The Republicans and Bonapartists renewed their agitation while the friends of the Comte de Chambord urged him not to abate his pretensions. Finally, deriving from private letters as well as from statements in the press a conviction that misunderstanding prevailed and w daily increasing, he decided to clear up the situation by making his views known through the press.

This fresh manifesto took the form of a letter to Chesnelong, a copy of which was simultaneously com municated to the Legitimist organ in the press. It declared that he declined to become the legitimate sovereign of the Revolution. His answer to the demand that he should sacrifice his honour was that he retracted none of his previous declarations; and he intimated with perfect lucidity that he would not accept the tricolour, nor the conditions which it had been sought to impose on him. The letter amounted to a re-assertion of the principle,' devoid of all ambiguity, and, so far as the Assembly was concerned, finally extinguished all possi bility of monarchy being restored in his person.

It is not probable that the Monarchists had looked forward with any confidence to a successful result of their negotiations. The moderate Legitimists threw the blame of failure on the Comte de Chambord. The Vicomte de Meaux says (p. 182):

'How can we avoid the conclusion that in his heart of hearts he did not aspire to the throne? He believed himself called to it by Providence, and held himself bound to assert his claim, but he was afraid of obtaining it. . . . Without direct

།

descendants, and having too many reasons for taking no interest in his heirs . . . he preferred to remain, what he was accustomed to be, King in partibus.'

We do not think this view is justifiable. For the Comte de Chambord's political principles had the force of a religious conviction, which consistency forbade him to renounce; and he felt that if, in order to regain the throne of his ancestors, he had accepted the proposed restrictions on the exercise of an authority which he believed to be his by divine appointment, he would have been an exile again before six months were over. He could make no compromise with the political heresies of 1789 or 1830. That he nevertheless believed in the possibility of ascending the throne on his own conditions seems evident from his subsequent action. On hearing that the Monarchists had been led, by the interpretation they put on his letter, to abandon the immediate realisation of their aims in favour of a prolongation of the Marshal's authority, he endeavoured to obtain an interview with MacMahon at Versailles, in the hope of persuading him to bring about the proclamation of monarchy by a coup de théâtre. He miscalculated the character of the man he proposed to influence. The unpublished memoirs of the Marshal, quoted by M. Hanotaux, show that he had accepted the new situation created by the proposal to prolong his powers, and that his sense of honour forbade his lending himself to a secret interview such as that proposed to him.

Failing the assent of the Comte de Chambord to conditions which would satisfy all sections of the monarchical party, Broglie fell back on the expedient he had contemplated for some time past as the only possible means of staving off the establishment of the Republic, namely, the prolongation of the powers of the Marshal for ten years. It was a remarkable forecast, for this period would have covered the death of the Comte de Chambord, in which event the Comte de Paris would have succeeded as the Legitimist heir, while maintaining the principles of the monarchy of 1830. However, in the committee charged with the examination of this proposal, containing a majority of members of the Left, this period was cut down to five years, but raised again to seven by way of compromise. In the course of the discussion the