no armed force at its disposal, and to proclaim the monarchy then and there would have been to let slip the dogs of civil war. The Commune would have broken out in all the other great cities as it did at Paris. To temporise and wait for a better opportunity in the future was for the Monarchists the only practicable course.

Thiers explained the composition of his first Cabinetwhich contained three members of the Government of National Defence, only one Legitimist, and one rather doubtful Orleanist-as a coalition of men belonging to opposite parties, unavoidable in the distressing circumstances of the country. Before entering upon the discussion of a constitution, he said, it was above all things necessary to put an end to the occupation of French soil by the victorious foe, to conclude peace, to bring back the officers and men held as prisoners in Germany, to reorganise the army, reconstitute the civil administration in all its branches, put a stop to the ruinous expenditure, re-establish, if not the finances, at least financial credit, send home the reservists to the workshop and the field, and re-open the great routes of communication. His speech terminated with an appeal for unity, which was received with unanimous applause. Two days later he quitted Bordeaux for Paris, accompanied by Jules Favre, and followed by a committee of fifteen members of the Assembly appointed to share with him the negotiations.

It does not come within our scope to narrate the discussions which resulted in the conclusion of a preliminary treaty of peace on February 26, with which Thiers returned to Bordeaux, nor the debate which was closed by its ratification on March 1, when the partisans of la guerre à outrance noisily resigned their seats and took their departure to organise the Commune. Gambetta, who had been elected for an Alsatian constituency, also resigned his seat, but was too intelligent to join the ranks of the anarchists. He retired over the frontier to San Sebastian, and did not reappear in the Assembly till July, when he was elected for the Var.

At the last sitting held at Bordeaux before the Assembly left for Versailles, Thiers delivered another notable speech reminding the members that, though they were invested with sovereign power, they had

spontaneously refrained from claiming the right to legislate on the future constitution, in order that they might preserve the unity of action which was indispensable for attaining the great objects that he had set before them on a previous occasion. He pointed out that they were divided into two great parties, one believing that the country could not find repose except under a constitutional monarchy, the other convinced that the logical effect of universal suffrage and of modern political tendencies was a republican form of government. Both parties, moreover, were subdivided among themselves. His duty, as well as theirs, was loyalty towards all the parties into which the country and the Assembly were divided. The duty of the Government towards all parties equally was not to betray any one, nor to prepare in an underhand manner an exclusive solution which would plunge the rest in despair. He vowed to the country and in sight of history to act on these principles. Neither Monarchists nor Republicans would be betrayed. The members of the Government had undertaken a heavy task, namely, to occupy themselves with the reorganisation of the country; and, if they transgressed the limits thus fixed, they would create dissension in the Assembly and among themselves. To those who had consecrated their whole life to the Republic he would say:

'Be just to those members of the Assembly who do not think as you do. You have entitled me Chief of the Executive power of the French Republic. In all governmental documents this word "Republic" is repeated incessantly. The reorganisation of the country, if we achieve it, will take place under the republican form and to its advantage. Do not tell us, "Do not sacrifice the Republic." I should reply to you, "Do not be its ruin!" The Republic lies in your hands. It will be the result of your moderation, and of nothing else. Every time you lose your self-control, every time that you unintentionally appear to be in the confidence of, or the accomplices of, the partisans of disorder, you will be inflicting on the Republic the worst of injuries. When the country is reorganised we will come back to you and say, "You confided to us a bleeding country, covered with wounds, with scarcely a breath of life in it; we restore it to you somewhat recovered." That will be the moment to give to it its definitive shape. And I give you the word of an honourable man that none of the questions which are reserved will have been

decided, no solution of them will have been affected by unfaithfulness on our part.'

These were the assurances on the part of Thiers known as 'the compact of Bordeaux.' Reading between the lines, it is possible to discern already a leaning towards the Republic. Still, it was impossible to express doubts of his sincerity when he declared that both parties should have their chance, as soon as the time arrived, of setting up the polity they preferred. In any case, the Monarchists were not ready to put forward their own claims; nor was it practicable to dispense with his services at this crisis. He was the most eminent Frenchman of the day, universally respected on account of his great age and wide political experience, and of the constant opposition he had presented during the previous fifteen years to the fatal policy of Napoleon III, which had imperilled the international status of France and weakened her position among surrounding nations by facilitating the rise of Italy and Prussia, and the waste of her resources in the ill-starred Mexican expedition. The Monarchists were not united; they had no real leader, and probably their ranks contained few or none equal in reputation, ability, or familiarity with public affairs to the men whom Thiers had chosen as his ministers. They were thus compelled, even against their will and in spite of their doubts, to leave the direction of affairs in his hands.

No sooner had Thiers reached Paris than a revolutionary movement broke out; and for two months civil war raged, until the Commune was finally crushed in May. In a speech on March 27 he somewhat accentuated his attitude towards the constitutional question by repeating his undertaking not to betray any party, and prophesied that, when the moment came to frame a constitution, the victory would remain with the most moderate and prudent; but he added that there were enemies who would accuse him of preparing to upset the Republic. He denied it absolutely. He had found the Republic established. It was a fact of which he and his ministers were not the authors; but he would not destroy the form of government which he was utilising for the re-establishment of order. He went even further,

according to an admission made by him in debate on November 29, 1872, for he received certain representatives of Paris and other great cities, to whom he gave an undertaking to maintain the Republic. He afterwards alleged that this promise bound only himself; but, however this may be, his subsequent action proved that he was guided by his preference for Republican institutions. With them he felt assured of being able to retain the supreme power as long as he chose, while under a monarchy, instead of remaining at the head of the State, he would have had to descend to the rank of first minister. M. de Marcère relates a conversation in which Thiers afterwards explained as his reason for preferring the Republic that it was an admirable instrument of government. You cannot imagine what it is to have to do, not only with a parliament, but also with a king and a court.' M. de Meaux says: 'I still seem to hear him exclaiming, "I would not accept again the position of first minister. Louis Philippe was too much in my way."' Experience induced him to believe that he was indispensable; for, whenever he found himself outvoted by the Conservatives, he had only to threaten to offer his resignation in order to compel them to rescind their vote.

6

It cannot be denied that justification existed for his want of confidence in the future of monarchy. The Conservative majority was originally almost equally divided between Legitimists and Orleanists, who were intelligent enough to perceive that their only chance lay in a reconciliation between the two branches of the royal family, which seemed all the more feasible, seeing that the Comte de Chambord, married in 1846 and childless, was no longer likely to have a son, and would, in the course of nature, be succeeded by the Comte de Paris. Two things were requisite, that the latter should recognise the Comte de Chambord as the only lawful representative of monarchy, and that the former should accept the crown on the conditions which the country desired.

Unfortunately for the success of the plan of 'fusion,' the legitimate claimant had been brought up in the strictest views of the dogma of Divine Right. Already at Bordeaux some steps had been taken towards a reconciliation, and the Comte de Paris had proposed to visit him: but the Comte de Chambord declined to receive his

relative until he had acquainted the country with the whole of his views, and the letter in which he conveyed this decision also spoke of certain reserves. This could only mean the question of the flag. Several of his most attached followers endeavoured to persuade him to refrain from committing himself to an absolute refusal. There could be no doubt that the nation was profoundly attached to the tricolour flag, under which the triumphs of the First Republic and the First Empire had been achieved, which had been victorious again under the Second Empire until the last disastrous campaign, while the white flag in modern times could boast only of the conquest of Algiers. It was in vain; the Comte de Chambord would make no compromise. On July 5, 1871, he signed a manifesto containing such sentences as these:

'In regard to the flag, conditions have been spoken of to which I cannot submit. I will not allow the standard of Henri IV, of François I and Jeanne d'Arc to be torn from my hands. Frenchmen, Henri V cannot abandon the white flag of Henri IV.'

On this a note was communicated to the press declaring that the Right were partisans of hereditary monarchy in all circumstances, and that they would preserve to France the flag she had chosen for herself. But the result was a division in the ranks of the Legitimists, who, split up into the Moderate Right (which held by the tricolour), and the Extreme Right (known as the Chevau-légers from their place of meeting), resolved to follow the Comte de Chambord blindly in his refusal of compromise. The remainder of the monarchical party, known as the Right Centre, contained some eighty Orleanists, a group called after General Changarnier, and about forty who followed the lead of Thiers.

Thiers was more than satisfied with the turn of events, which entirely justified his previsions. He now suggested the revival of a proposal made by his friend Rivet in April to appoint him President for three years; and he let it be known that he would not continue to discharge the duties he had accepted at Bordeaux unless his authority were prolonged and defined. Eventually, at the end of August, a law was passed conferring on him the title of President of the French Republic so long