60 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. App. unite together; and in the prefent yourable for this nation as it is at conjuncture, when there is fuch an prefent: Nay, it may even be fufappearance of a war between France pected, that two years ago M. Enand us, it must in a particular man- fenada might fend private orders to per be agreeable to us, to find that the Spanish governors in America Spain is not like to join with France for defeating the publick orders fent against us, notwithstanding the known A to them by his matter; and every connexion and near relation that thing that has been lately done, or there is ftill, to our misfortune, be- attempted to be done by the Spatween the fovereigns of these two niards in America, muft have propowerful monarchies, ceeded from the influence of the fame minifter; fo that for the future we have reason to expect better treatment in that part of the world, and confequently we have from what is paft no reason to doubt the fincerity of the profefiions of friendship now made by the court of Spain. B I am, from many circumstances, Sir, perfuaded, that the profeffions C now made by the court of Spain are hearty and lincere; and I think I have great reafon to rejoice in that perfuation; for if France alone be more than a match for this pation, furely the most fanguine amongst us could not expect, that we should be able to stand single and alone in a war against France and Spain. Againft both united together I do not think we could ftand fingle and alone even in a fea war, becaufe of the neceflity we should be under of di D The imparting of this piece of advice was therefore, Sir, fo far from being unbecoming, that it was a fresh inftance of his majesty's goodnefs, and of the conftant defire he has to contribute, as much as he can, to the eafe and happiness of his fubjects I mean, fuch as are not led by their private intereft to wish for a war with Spain; for that there may be fuch amongst us every one muft grant, who confiders what rich prizes may be taken in time of war from the Spaniards, and what profits may be made by forcing a trade with their dominions in America. This, it is true, will always put a great deal of money into the pockets of fome private men among us, but the people of this country in general will get more by the trade between the two nations in time of peace, because of the great concern_viding our naval ftrength, by having our merchants always have in the E Spanish flota, galleons, and regifter hips. For this reafon, a friendship and good correfpondence with Spain muft be agreeable to the people of this nation in general; and we are not to judge of the effect of the or. der, lately fent by the king of Spain to his governors in America, from what was the effect of the like order fent two years ago; for we know, that minifters often take private methods for rendering the orders of their fovereign ineffectual, therefore in all fuch cafes the complexion of the court for the time being is to be confidered, and it is well known, that the complexion of the court of Spain two years ago was not fo fa a strong fquadron in the Mediterranean, another in the Weft-Indies, and a third upon our own coast, befides the great number of cruizers and convoys we should always be obliged to have at fea, for protecting our own commerce, and for F ruining that of our enemies. Againft France alone, I fhall grant,, we may be at prefent fufficiently able to carry on a fea war, because our naval ftrength is, I believe, at prefent very much fuperior to theirs; but I am not fo fanguine as to fuppofe, that G we could preferve that fuperiority during a long war, if France fhould continue free from any war upon the continent of Europe. They might refolve to fufpend carrying on any commerce 1755. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. 603 A commerce in their own flipping for three or four years: They might refolve even to leave their colonies in America a facrifice to us for that time; and to keep all their fhips of war in port where we could not deftroy any of them, until they had got fuch a number of fhips new built as might render them fuperior to us at fea. That they might be able to accomplish this in three or four years time, no one can doubt, who confiders the abfolute power and the vast revenue which the French monarch is poffeffed of; and one general and compleat naval viétory would enable them not only to recover all they had loft in America, but alfo to extort from us as much as they pleafed to C demand in that part of the world. B This, I fear, Sir, would be the confequences of our standing fingle and alone for three or four years in a war against France, and this confequence we could not prevent, be caufe we could not hinder neutral D powers from carrying any fort of naval ftores to France, as no naval ftores of any kind are by any treaty comprehended among those goods that in time of war are to be deemed contraband, but on the contrary, are by moft treaties exprefsly declared E not to be contraband: Nay, iron, copper, and brass, are likewise declared not to be contraband; fo that in time of a war with us the French might not only build as many fhips of war, but caft as many cannon for the ufe of thofe hips as they pleafed. F Therefore, in my opinion, we have no way of preventing the French becoming an overmatch for us, even at fea, but by cultivating and engaging fuch an alliance upon the continent of Europe, as fhall give them foʊ much to do in defending themselves at land, that it fhall not be in their power to spare money enough for repairing, much lefs for increafing their naval ftrength. It was by this means, Sir, that we got the better of them both in king William and queen Anne's wars; for at the be near ginning of both they were very an equal match at fea for the Dutch and us united together. Every one knows, that in the year 1690, they obtained a compleat victory over the combined squadrons of England and Holland near Beachy-head, by our court's fending a rash and ridiculous order to our admiral, the lord Tori rington, to engage the enemy, tho' greatly fuperior to him in ftrength. But luckily for us the French court committed the fame mistake in 1692, by which means we got an opportunity to pay them back with ufury at La Hogue, the little advantage they had gained over us at Beachy-head; and as they were then vigorously at tacked by our allies at land, they could not fpare money for repairing, much lefs for increafing their navy before the end of that war. Again, Sir, in queen Anne's war, at the beginning of it, they appeared formidable even at fea, and in 1704, engaged the united fquadrons of England and Holland in the Medi terranean near Malaga. Here, indeed, they did not obtain any vic tory, as the Hon. gentleman feemed to infinuate; tho' they were fuperior in ftrength, as I could prove by an old ballad, which fhews that it was a drawn battle; but they might have continued to be formidable at fea, if the glorious victory, which the duke of Marlborough obtained that fummer at Blenheim, had not put an end to all their naval projects; for from that time they were under fuch difficulties to defend themfelves at land, that they were ob liged to leave their men of war to lie rotting in their harbours, and thought of nothing but annoying our trade by their privateers. As they, fuffered fo much in that war, and as it was foon after followed by a long minority, they could not for many years think of re-establishing their navy; and their minifters pro bably judged very wifely, that there was no fupporting a refpectable navy, without 604 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. App. without a great number of thorough- * B be in a moft difmal and dangerous fituation, if it had not a port in Europe to retire to upon occasion, except thofe belonging to ourselves alone. From what I have faid, Sir, I think it is evident, that if we should ftand fingle and alone in a war against France, they might in three or four years become fuperior to us at fea, and the moment they did fo we must fubmit to a Carte Blanche, because they could then bring their numerous land armies into this ifland, and might make a conqueft of it in one fingie campaign. For preventing this we have no way left but reforting to that which is now, and, I Chope, will always be at our command, a powerful confederacy upon the continent of Europe; and whatever the melancholy apprehenfions of fome gentlemen may fuggeft, I make no doubt of our being able to fupport it as long as we fhall have occaDfion; for France is involved in debt as well as we are, and the people of France do not feem to be to unanimous or fo zealous for a war upon the prefent occafion, as the people of this country appear to be; and I muft fay, that both are very much in the right, becaufe the people of France know, that they are contending for boundless waftes, from whence neither they nor their pofterity can draw much advantage for ages to come; whereas we are contending for the prefervation and fecurity of a weil cultivated country, inhabited by our own countrymen, and of infinite prefent advantage to the people both of Britain and Ireland: Nay, of fuch advantage, that many thoufands, in both islands, owe the whole of their fubfiftence to our colonies and plantations in America. E Thus, Sir, we may fee, that in all the wars we have been lately. engaged in againit France, our pre ferving a fuperiority at fea did not proceed from our preventing their getting a fufficient fupply of nursal flores, but from our preffing them fo hard at land, by means of our allies upon the continent of Europe, that they could not spare money enough for purchafing that fupply; and to fuppofe, that the other nations of Europe, or even thofe who are our firmeit allies, would bear our telling them, that they must not trade with France, or any of the French dominions, because of their being all blockaded by us at fea, is really, in my opinion, a fuppofition too chimerical to be entertained by any fober mind. The very attempt would F unite moft of the states of Europe in a confederacy for pulling down the overgrown naval power of England; and I hope it will not be fo much as fuppofed, that we are able to carry on even a naval war againft all the maritime powers of Europe; for every nation that borders upon the fea, may in fome degree be called a maritime power, as every one of thein has at leaft tome teamen, if not fome fhips of war; and even our navy, sormidable as it is, would G For this reason, Sir, I was glad to hear, that our colonies were able to fupport themfelves. I therefore hope they will not fland in need of much afliftance from us; but if they fhould, we muft give it. Even for them 1755. PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. 605 them we must fight as if we were The next that spoke was T. Sempro- MONG the many paradoxes I A have heard upon different oc D the cause of the revolution? Was it not because the prince then upon the throne had acted contrary to, and was endeavouring to fubvert our conftitution. How could this be true if we had then no conftitution ? A Thus, Sir, fome gentlemen are ignorantly or very unadvifedly endeavouring to undermine the very foundation of the revolution; for if we had then no conftitution, the king upon the throne must have been ab folute, and confequently the revoB lution could have been nothing but a rebellion. But it is certain, Sir, that we had a conflitation, and a moft regular and wife constitution, not only before the revolution, but ever fince we had a monarchy; and the end of the revolution was to re ftore and fecure that conftitution for which our ancestors had so often fas crificed their blood, and I hope their lateft pofterity will always be ready to follow their example. This, I fay, Sir, was the end of the revolu tion, and a great many good confequences have enfued, among which must reckon the establishment of our prefent royal family the chief but, as in all human affairs, among thefe good confequences fome bad ones have crept in, and among these I must reckon this complaifant meE thod of addreffing at the beginning of every feffion; for however much it may be fan&tified by cuftom, it would look very odd in the eyes of all foreigners to fee the commons of England, in their addrefs to their fovereign, approving by the lump of all the meatures puriued by his ministers, and in a week or two afterwards impeaching those minifters for thofe very measures, which may happen to be the cafe in fome future feflion of parliament, if this complaifant method of addreffing should be continued; for at the opening of a feflion, and before any lights have been laid before parliament, no one can fay, whether the minifters may, or may not deferve to be impeached, cafions from the mouth of the Hon. gentleman who spoke laft, no one ever furprized me more than to hear, that we had no fixed conftitution before the revolution, I fhall readily grant, that almost every adminiftration has in fome refpects acted contrary to our conftitution; but a breach of our conftitution is not furely to be called an alteration of our conftitution; for if it were, I am afraid, it could not be justly said, that we have had a fixed conftitution fince the revolution any more than before, as minifters have fince frequently acted contrary to our conftitution, which the Hon. gentleman from his long and great experience muft be fully fenfible of. This doctrine has indeed prevailed a great deal too much of late years; but I am very much furprized to hear it maintained or propagated by oneG who pretends to be a friend to the revolution, and to the royal family now upon our throne. What was F for 606 PROCEEDINGS of the POLITICAL CLUB, &c. Appi for fome of the measures hinted at in the fpeech from the throne, and perhaps hinted at on purpose to obtain the ufual lumping approbation. and if they could, as the Hon. gentleman fays, make a conquest of this ifland in one campaign, they would compleat that conqueft before any confederacy upon the continent could penetrate far into their frontiers, which are upon all fides guarded by fo many well fortified cities and towns; and fuch a conqueft would not only put an end to any fupport we could give to fuch a confederacy, but would turn the wealth and the power of this nation against it. For this reafon, Sir, tho' I highly approve of the revolution, and upon a more folid foundation than any A gentleman can have, who thinks we had no constitution before that time, yet I cannot approve of this method of addreffing; and as little can I approve of another doctrine now advanced by fome among us, and ftrongly inculcated by the Hon. gen. B What a wretched condition, Sir, tleman who spoke laft, which is, are gentlemen reduced to, who, in that we can by no means be able to order to prove that we are not able ftand fingle and alone in a war against to ftand fingle and alone in a war France, because, faid he, tho' we againft France, muft grant, that we be at present fuperior to them in na- have but three or four years to conval power, yet during the courfe of tinue a free and independent nation; the war they would increafe their C for this is the unavoidable confenavy, and if not diverted by any quence of their argument, unless war upon the continent of Europe, we could now purchase at fuch a they might in three or four years in price as we are able to pay, fuch a crease it so much as to become fupe- confederacy upon the continent as rior to us at fea. Sir, if there were would not only enable us to prethe leaft foundation for this doctrine, fcribe, but join with us in prefcribing I fhould think this nation in a moft D fuch terms of peace to France as the wretched and lamentable fituation; Romans prefcribed to the Carthagi for if the French could in the time nians at the end of the fecond Punic of war with us fo much increase their war, that is to fay, that they fhould navy, furely they could with more deliver up all their fhips of war, and eafe and conveniency increase it in promife never to build any more; time of peace, and confequently, if but fuch a condition I believe, no they continue at peace with us, and confederacy we can purchafe could all the reft of their neighbours, we enable us to obtain, nor would any have but three or four years to con- confederacy fupport us in demandtinue mafters at fea, at the end of ing, for among many other misforwhich fhort term we must, accord- tunes attending a confederated war ing to this gentleman, fubmit to a this is always one, that none of the Carte Blanche, if the French fhould parties concerned can pufh their fucthen please to demand it, or pur- cefs further than the reft will give chafe a confederacy upon the conti- them leave, nor demand any condinent at any price our allies might tion from the enemy which the reft then think fit to infift on, which in will not concur in. fuch a cafe would, I fear, be much higher than we could poffibly pay. Nay, as the Dutch have of late years fo much neglected their marine, no fuch confederacy could protect us; for the French, by being mafters at fea, would prevent their landing any troops in this ifland, G I perfuade myself, Sir, that it will now appear evident, what a lamentable fituation we fhould be in, were there any foundation for the doctrine, that we cannot ftand fingle and alone in a naval war against France; I fay, a naval war, Sir, because tho' carried on upon the continent or |