3d. We proposed to consider the nature of God. For this purpose we shall observe,

(1.) God is everlasting.

That God has existed from eternity, follows from his having been the first cause of all things. For this infers, that he is himself uncaused, and that which is uncaused must be eternal. That he will exist for evermore, follows from the same property. For the cessation of his existence could only be produced by the act of a superior being, but no such superior being can be conceived, as he could not have been created by God. As to the manner of this existence, it must be necessary, not contingent existence. For the latter implies dependence on another, whereas all others were the effect of his power. God therefore must be eternal and self-existent.

(2.) God is a spirit, that is, he is without body, parts, or passions.

For a contrary supposition would imply an imperfection in God.

Thus with respect to the first, experience shows us, that our mind is, in a great measure, under the control of the body. It certainly has some superiority over it, consisting in the power of commanding the motion of any part, by an act of the will. But its inferiority arises from this, that the organs of the body must be properly disposed, else that motion will not follow. Were the body in a glorified, and therefore the

purest state, it could only serve as a repository for ideas, or as an instrument of local motion. The supposition, therefore, of its being necessary to God for either of these purposes, implies an imperfection, which cannot consist with the nature of the Supreme Being.

Some of the ancient philosophers, however, who conceived that the world could not be made from nothing, held that matter was eternal and self-existent. They acknowledged at the same time the existence of an intelligent mind, but supposed that the world served as a body in which it dwelt. But this opinion is liable to

many objections.

1.) It does not remove the difficulty it is intended to obviate.

For the giving motion to matter, is as much beyond our conception, as the giving existence to it. Both require an equal exertion of power

a Some of those who hold this opinion, have conceived it recon cileable with the account given by Moses of the creation. The principal argument by which they endeavour to support this idea is, that the word used in expressing that creation, does not necessarily signify to make out of nothing, but implies a pre-existent matter. Now, it is true, that the term is frequently adopted in Scripture to convey a formation out of something previously existing, but it is also true, that there is no word in the Hebrew language, strictly meaning creation. If, then, Moses intended to reveal the doctrine we maintain, he could not have found a word more to his purpose.-See Volkel de Ver. Relig. 1. 2. c. 4.; and in refutation of him, Stillingfleet's Orig. Sac. B. 3. c. 2. sec. 8.

to effect them, for though the pre-existence of matter be assumed, the creation of motion out of nothing must still be acknowledged.

2.) It involves a contradiction.

If matter be eternal and self-existent, it must be an independent being; but an independent being can never be under the control of another.

3.) It supposes God to be a dependent being.

The idea of dependence, implies, that there is something whose existence is required, in order to the exercise of a certain power. If, therefore, God cannot create any thing except from pre-existent matter, it is evident he cannot be independent of it.

4.) It changes the universe into a deity, and therefore leads to atheism.

From seeing the body, men always conclude the existence of the person. If, therefore, matter be the body of God, it will naturally be regarded as the Supreme Being himself. This doctrine then amounts to atheism.

It is true, God manifested himself to the Jews, under bodily appearances. But this circumstance only shows his power over matter, in moulding it so as to produce such appearances. He is likewise said in Scripture, to have ears, eyes, and the various organs of the human body. But these expressions are used in accommodation to our finite understandings, and the mean

ing to be attached to them is, that the actions described by them, are such as would be the effects of those organs among men. That this is the true way of considering the question appears, from the anxiety always evinced to prevent men from framing an image of the Deity. If God were possessed of a body, this anxiety would be unaccountable.

Again, God has no parts.3

Parts belong only to body; if he has not the latter, therefore he cannot have the former. Lastly, God is without passions.

Passion is an agitation of the mind, which supposes pain to arise from the contemplation of the past, or anxiety, from the uncertainty of the future. Both produce present uneasiness; an imperfection which is evidently inconsistent with the nature of God. It is true, that anger

a Besides, parts imply quantity and locality. If, therefore, God had parts, since he is immense he should fill all space to the exclusion of every thing else.-See Welchman in Articulis.

b In the original, Bishop Burnet adds a clause to that given above, in which he ascribes parts to a spirit, viz.: "thoughts distinct from its being." But I am inclined to doubt that these can properly be called parts. Parts are those, which taken together, constitute the whole. But thoughts added together do not make a spirit. They are the effects of the power of thinking, which is essential to its existence. Certainly, if Mr. Locke's doctrine be true, that our souls are not always in a state of thinking, they should thus be constantly changing from creation to annihilation, and vice versú, according as the thinking faculty was suspended or exercised.

and other passions are ascribed to the Deity in Scripture. But these expressions intend no more than this, that there is then, in the providences of God, a vehemence of action, which among men would be considered as the effect of the passion attributed to him.

It may be necessary to observe, that though God is said to be a spirit, there is yet an infinite distance between his nature and that of all other spirits. The thoughts of the latter are successive, and liable to change, but God has all the varieties of things under his view at the same moment. And here a distinction may be made between the immanent and transient acts of the Deity. The former, (such are his knowledge and decrees,) are co-existent with his essence; the latter, (such are creation, particular providence, and miracles,) are the effects of these, and are executed in a succession of time.

4th. We proposed to consider the attributes of God.

(1.) He is a Being of infinite power.

To give being to things which had no existence, and to add to that existence all the possibilities of motion and figure, is plainly the act of omnipotence. It is no diminution of this power, that God cannot produce results of their own nature impossible, as to take from any being that which is essential to it. Thus, he has formed matter so that it is capable of various