whilst another corps, under General St. Cyr, penetrated by the Eastern Pyrenees into Catalonia. Orders were also sent to the different ports, directing Junot's corps to take the shortest route to Bayonne, the moment it arrived from the English vessels which, by the convention, had been employed to transport it to France. By these arrangements, before October, the French army on the Ebro amounted to 150,000 men. On the 5th November, Napoleon arrived at Vittoria himself, for the purpose of assuming the commandin-chief.

During the absence of Sir Arthur Wellesley in England, Sir Harry Burrard, who had succeeded Sir Hew Dalrymple, resigned his command after holding it only a few days, on the plea of ill health. His successor, Sir John Moore, was the general, of all others after Wellesley, whom his countrymen delighted to honour. It was on the 6th of October that Sir John received the order of the English ministers to enter Spain. An army of 35,000 men was promised him, of which 25,000 were to be taken from the troops already in Portugal, and 10,000 were to be sent to the coast of Gallicia direct. Within twenty days of the receipt of his instructions the columns were on the march, and the head quarters had quitted Lisbon. With the main body of his army he marched to Salamanca by Almeida. His first mistake was sending, on some vague rumour that the Almeida route was not practicable for artillery, his guns, cavalry, and a small column of infantry under Sir John Hope, by the valley of the Tagus, when they might have marched much more conveniently by the ordinary road. Sir John entered Salamanca on the 13th November. Sir David Baird, with 10,000 men, was on his way from Corunna to join him, and Sir John Hope was pursuing his circuitous route with the same object: the successive divisions of his corps were not concentrated until the 23rd. It was a splendid army, in a high state of health and efficiency; of a discipline not to be surpassed, and burning with heroic ardour to engage the foe. Sir John Moore had been left very much to his own resources for information, and to his own discretion for a plan of operations, and found himself disappointed and discouraged on all hands. The armies (of Blake and Belvedere) he had come to support had been already annihilated; and

the people, instead of being enthusiastic in their own cause, and full of energy, were to the last degree spiritless, depressed, and impoverished. He found, indeed, many discouragements which had been repeatedly, encountered and overcome by Sir Arthur Wellesley, without possessing his power of controlling them. Thanks to the government at home, he was without magazines, or money in the military chest to form them. He found his army unpopular in Salamanca: the people who had fled from every fight in which the slightest reverse had overtaken them, wondering why he did not advance and fight the French as the Spaniards had (not!) done. From the moment that he became acquainted with the actual character and condition of the Spanish people in these provinces, and their means of defence, he determined in the first instance to retreat by Ciudad Rodrigo upon Portugal, but unluckily did not (as he ought to have done at once) do so. Having heard of the enthusiastic manner in which the people of Madrid resisted the French, he ordered Baird to suspend his retreat to Corunna, and signified his intention of resting on his oars at Salamanca until he received further intelligence. On the following day he seemed more confident; Baird was directed to return to Astorga, and a communication was soon afterwards opened with Romana, with the view of securing his co-operation in a forward movewent. Sir John was urged on all sides either to march on Madrid and join the armies of Castaños and San Juan, or follow the rear of the French army, and create a diversion in favour of the capital. Unhappily he did nothing at a moment when promptitude of decision was most important. Although he had in the interim been joined by Hope's corps, and been assured that Madrid continued to hold out, he nevertheless remained inactive at Salamanca until the 13th December. The reason which has been assigned for this unhappy delay is, that Baird, when he received the order to retrace his steps was half way to Corunna, and had therefore to countermarch every regiment, and every string of mules bearing provisions for his army, between Astorga and Corunna; which necessarily occupied so much time, that he was not able to reassemble his entire corps at Astorga on the 13th of December; and as Sir John Moore did not consider it safe to move forward with his own corps until Baird was ready to

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advance and form a junction, nine days had been irreparably lost by his hasty determination to retreat after the battle of Tudela. Sir David Baird received the order to return to Astorga at Villa Franca, on the 7th December; and urged on Sir John Moore that in the event of being compelled to retreat, they should retire upon and defend Gallicia; whilst Romana, occupying the Asturias on the left, could re-form the disorganized army of Blake, and another Spanish army might easily be raised in their rear. This suggestion, feasible enough, was unhappily not adopted; perhaps the time had gone by when it could have been carried out successfully. Anything would, however, have been preferable to the miserable alternative.

The

The force under Moore's command was sufficiently strong to have ensured a successful issue to the operation originally intended. It was also in hand; and to plan and to execute were, consequently, within the power of the English general. His infantry were concentrated at Mayorga, the cavalry at Melgar Abaxo-the entire amounting (including 2,278 cavalry) to 23,600 men, with 60 pieces of cannon. whole was organized in three divisions-a reserve, and two light brigades of infantry-and one division of cavalry. The guns were divided into seven brigades, of which four batteries were attached to the infantry, two to the cavalry, and one was held in reserve. Soult's corps, of 16,000 infantry and 1,200 horse. lay upon the Carrion. Of these 12,000 could be assembled to oppose the British. He marched forward, alas, too late for any practicable purpose. Having halted on the 22nd and 23rd, for supplies, he determined to proceed during the night and attack the French force at Saldana in the morning. Already were his troops on their way to the Carrion when intelligence was brought him which converted his advance into a retreat. Napoleon had heard of Moore's movement, and had 50,000 men under his orders at the foot of Guadarama pass. The French troops at Talavera were also in full march to act upon the English army. An expeditious retreat therefore had now become inevitable; and it was only by twelve hours that Sir John Moore saved the passage of the Esla, where Napoleon in person had expected to intercept him. Never were hours of deeper importance to an army. Napoleon, night and day,