such as they were (most of them being new levies); but so many detachments were required for various services that his disposable force was inadequate, either in number or effectiveness, for his object. On the first rumours of the British expedition, he sent Loison with 7,000 men, to scour the country, overwhelm the insurrection, and "drive the English into the sea.

The appointment of Sir Hew Dalrymple to the command of the expedition, and the sailing of the armament under Sir John Moore, reached Sir Arthur Wellesley off the Mondego. This mortifying intelligence led him to make an immediate descent on the coast, and with the handful of troops at his command, to commence operations.* With only 9,000 men he threw himself into a country occupied by a well-disciplined French army mustering more than double his numbers. But with this small force did he lay the foundation of his future glory.

The troops began to disembark on the 2nd of August, when Sir Arthur immediately placed himself in communication with the civil and military authorities of the country. Having established his head-quarters, on the 2nd, at Lavaos, Sir Arthur issued a proclamation to the Portuguese people, explaining the objects for which he had been sent to their assistance. The disembarkation, owing to the roughness of the water, was difficult; and it was not until the 5th that the whole of the men and stores were safely landed. General Spencer had disembarked his force at Puerto de Santa Maria the instant he heard of the surrender of Dupont ; and thus, on the 8th, Sir Arthur found himself at the head of a body of men of sufficient strength to warrant him in undertaking a forward movement. Although, however, the disembarkation was effected without molestation from the enemy, his operations were retarded by the want of an adequate commissariat and proper means of transport. The united forces of the two divisions amounted to 12,300 men. Having furnished the Portuguese General Freire with 5,000 stand of arms and the necessary ammunition for his

* The latest despatch received from the Secretary of State authorised him to put his previous instructions into execution, without waiting for the arrival of the general appointed to the future command of the army.

EMBARKATION AND ADVANCE OF THE ARMY. 63

troops, Sir Arthur moved from his ground on the 9th, and was followed on the 10th by the main body of his army. Having arrived at Leiria on the 10th, he caused a magazine of provisions, which had been collected for the British, to be handed over to Freire. His first movement had interrupted the line of communication between Loison and Laborde, who was marching from Lisbon with a view to unite with him at Leiria, and who was now driven to circuitous and forced marches. To oppose the British force, Loison had some 7000, Laborde 5000, and Junot 10,000. Loison was on the left of the British route, and Laborde in front. Where these armies intended to unite could not be ascertained. Sir Arthur, with his accustomed good luck, had so interposed himself between them as to be enabled to take them in detail. On the 15th, Junot quitted Lisbon, and on the 17th, pushing on in person, and leaving them to follow, joined Loison at Alcoentre. On the 15th, a French post at Bulos was attacked, and their pickets driven out of Óbidos. The riflemen of the 95th and 60th had the honour of the first encounter, and were so eager in pursuit as to be well nigh cut off. Two officers and twenty-seven men were killed or wounded in this skirmish. The next day Sir Arthur surveyed the strong position of Laborde, which was drawn up on the table-land before Roliça, a village situated at the head of the valley, from which rises the hill of Obidos. The favourable points upon the hills on either side and in the valley below were occupied by his posts. Behind him, a mile to the rear, the steep and difficult ridge of Zambugeira offered a second position. The valley leading from the old Moorish fort of Obidos to the romantic village of Roliça, is walled on the left by rude heights rising above each other till they were finally lost in the dark summits of the Sierra de Baragueda.

Never was a sweeter spot chosen for the scene of a murderous combat, than that which the village of Roliça, and its surrounding landscape, presented at sunrise on the 17th of August. The place, with its adjacent hamlets, contained, it was computed, a population of nearly 300 families. The houses were neat and commodious, each surrounded by an inclosed garden, stocked with vines; while the country about the villages, studded thickly with olive grounds, ilex

groves, and cork woods, exhibited all that rustic comfort which marks a contented and industrious peasantry. Upon a table-land immediately in front of Roliça, and overlooking the country for many miles, the French were strongly posted. Laborde had seized every advantage a position of immense strength naturally presented-while the Sierra afforded a succession of posts on which he might easily fall back. To preserve his communication with Loison, and to avoid exposing the line of Torres Vedras and Mafra, Laborde was compelled to await the attack of the British troops. His force was under 6000, but his position was a very strong one, and besides five pieces of cannon, 500 of his troops were cavalry.

The English army broke up from Caldas at daybreak on the 17th of August, and forming three columns, advanced against the enemy's position. The right column, consisting of 1200 infantry and 50 cavalry of the Portuguese corps left under Sir Arthur's orders by General Freîre, was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Trant, who received directions to turn the enemy's left and penetrate into the mountains in his rear. The left column, commanded by MajorGeneral Ferguson, and composed of a brigade of infantry, three companies of riflemen, and a few dragoons, was ordered to ascend the mountain ridge on the eastern side of the valley, and turn the right of the French position. This division was also directed to keep a look-out on its left for Loison's corps. The centre column, consisting of four brigades of British infantry and 400 Portuguese light infantry, the remainder of the cavalry and two brigades of artillery were destined to attack the position of the enemy in front. The moral effect of the battle of Roliça was of immense importance. It was the dawning of a glorious day; and its results were admirably calculated to confirm the wavering faith of doubtful allies, and remove the conviction of the French regarding their military superiority. It was a noble compliment paid by Napoleon to British infantry, when he observed, "that they never knew when they were beaten;" and it was the happiest delusion under which a soldier ever laboured-that of fancying himself unconquerable. That belief had been artfully cherished by Napoleon; and to its prevalence among his soldiers half his victories

may be ascribed. But the battle of Roliça at once dispelled the dream; and the French discovered in the island-soldiers to whom they were opposed, men in everything their equals and in unflinching gallantry infinitely their superiors. When Roliça displayed the fine properties of British soldiers to their enemies, it was not its least advantage, that it also confirmed the confidence of their leader in the troops on which he depended for success. If the sharp affair at Obidos proved the gallantry, the advance upon Roliça dislayed the high discipline of Wellesley's little army. The following graphic sketch happily describes the opening movements of the 17th.

"As the distance between Caldas and Roliça falls not short of three leagues, the morning was considerably advanced before the troops arrived within musket-shot of the French outposts. Nothing could exceed the orderly and gallant style in which they traversed the intervening space. The day chanced to be remarkably fine, and the scenery through which the columns passed was varied and striking; but they were by far the most striking feature in the whole panorama. Whenever any broken piece of ground, or other natural obstacle, came in the way, the head of the column having passed it, would pause till the rear had recovered its order, and resumed its station; and then the whole would press forward, with the same attention to distances, and the same orderly silence, which are usually preserved at a review. At last, however, the enemy's line became visible, and in a few minutes afterwards the skirmishers were engaged. The centre division now broke into columns of battalions; that on the left pressed on with a quick pace, whilst the riflemen on the right drove in, with great gallantry, and in rapid style, the tirailleurs opposed to them."*

Laborde's first position soon became untenable; his rear was endangered; and, without a moment's indecision, he fell farther back, and occupied the mountain passes. Nothing could be stronger than this second position. "The way by which the assailants had to ascend was up ravines, rather than paths, more practicable for goats than men; so steep, that in many parts a slip of the foot would have been fatal; in some parts overgrown with briers, and in others impeded

* Lord Londonderry's Narrative.

F

on.

by fragments of rock.”* Of these the centre was the most practicable; and the 29th and 9th regiments advanced to storm it, protected by the fire of the British guns; while a cloud of skirmishers vanished among rocks and copsewood, connecting the advance of the different columns, and feeling or forcing their way through obstacles that a vigorous defence had rendered almost insurmountable. Gradually, the scene became more animated, as on each of the several points of attack, the assailants and the assailed became warmly engaged. The spattering fusilade of the light troops was lost in the rolling volleys of the columns, which, with the deeper boom of cannon, echoed loudly through the mountains. The hollow watercourses, behind which the British had attacked, hid for a time the combatants from view: but the smoke wreathing over the ravines, showed by its density the place where the work of death went fastest On the left, Laborde gradually lost ground; but on the right, his exertions were redoubled, in the desperate hope that Loison might yet come up, and thus retrieve the fortune of the day. Here, of course, the struggle became bloodiest. While the flank movements of Trant and Ferguson had not yet proved themselves successful; the 9th and 29th regiments forced their respective passes, and gained the plateau of the hill. They reached the summit out of breath, their ranks disordered, and their formation requiring a few minutes to correct. At that moment a fine battalion of Laborde's came boldly forward, delivered a shattering volley, and broke through the centre of the British regiment. But the 29th were broken, not beaten; and the 9th came to their assistance. The officers discharged their duties nobly, and the men fought, and formed, and held their ground with desperate obstinacy, until Ferguson won the right flank of the position; when, aware that the chance of support was hopeless, Laborde retreated in excellent order, covering the regressive movement of his battalions by repeated charges of his cavalry.

His last stand was made at Zambugeira. The British having now arrived in force, rendered opposition unavailing, and falling back on the Quinta de Bugagliera, he united his beaten corps with the troops he had detached to look after * Southey.