that was to have been driven into the sea, was now looking down upon "the sacred soil of France" from her mountain barriers. It was not the immediate evil that so much annoyed him, as the thought of the moral influence it would exercise elsewhere. In the spring of that year, Napoleon had again appeared in arms in Germany, and had obtained new successes on the fields of Lutzen and Bautzen. Profiting by these successes, he had concluded an armistice with the hostile forces opposed to him; and a negociation, under the mediation of Austria, was actually pending when the news of the defeat and expulsion of the army of Spain was received. To drive back the Allies, therefore, and re-establish his armies on the line of the Ebro, became of the highest importance to him. With this view he despatched Marshal Soult with the imposing title of his Lieutenant, and extensive powers, to take command of the French troops, with orders to reinforce and re-equip them with all possible expedition. Soult arrived at Bayonne, on the 12th July, and published a proclamation, conceived in the true Gascon vein, in which he attributed all the reverses which had been experienced by the French, to the imbecile and pusillanimous conduct of his predecessor, and promised to dislodge the enemy from a position "whence they were enabled presumptuously to look down upon the fertile fields of France, and to drive them from across the Ebro." He felt it prudent, however, to compliment the British general and his troops. A few days before the arrival of Soult, the Marquis of Wellington had been appointed by the Prince Regent a Field Marshal, having been created, 2nd February preceding, a knight of the Garter, both of which distinctions were announced to him in the most flattering terms.

It is impossible, within our limits, to follow the movements of the auxiliary force which was termed the Anglo-Sicilian army. Placed under a most incompetent commander, Sir John Murray, it proved an incumbrance rather than a help, whilst it was maintained at a vast expense, which might have been devoted with far greater advantage to the payment and subsistance of the troops by which all the work had been done. The scandalous failure of Sir John Murray before Tarragona ought to have subjected him to the most severe penalties. No sooner did he hear that Suchet was in march

from Barcelona with 10,000 men and 14 pieces of cannon, than he abandoned all his siege artillery and commenced a most discreditable flight. Having effected his embarkation, with most of his stores, he "took his usual repose in bed." After he had had the opportunity of doing as much mischief as it was possible for him to do, he was superseded in his command by Lord William Bentinck. The disastrous termination of these operations was followed by a courtmartial on Sir John Murray. In writing of his procedings, Lord Wellington remarks:-" The best of the story is, that all parties ran away. Maurice Mathieu ran away; Sir John Murray ran away; and so did Suchet. He was afraid to strike at Sir John Murray without his artillery, and knew nothing of Maurice Mathieu ; and he returned into Valencia either to strike at Duque del Parque, or to get the assistance of Harispe, whom he had left opposed to the Duque del Parque. I know that in the first proclamation to his army on their success, he knew so little what had passed at Tarragona, that he mentioned the English general's having raised the siege, but not his having left his artillery." Sir John Murray was tried in England; but, as is too often the case with great offenders, escaped with merely an admonition. In the pages of Napier, however, and in the despatches of the Duke of Wellington, he has been gibbeted to all future times. In addition to this discouragement, Lord Wellington received most unfavourable accounts of the troops he had left at Vittoria. The diminution of the British army, from marauding, straggling, &c., since the 17th June, had been 2,733 men, and in the Portuguese force, 1,423. They appear to have spread themselves over the country, plundering the inhabitants in every direction.

In this conjuncture of affairs, a congress was about to be held at Prague; and Napoleon had proposed, that persons accredited by his brother and the Cortes should submit the arrangements of a treaty of peace to that body. The Emperor's object was to partition Spain, a measure which would be inconvenient only to England; as, if excluded from that arrangement, it would have had to deal singlehanded with France. Meantime Lord Wellington determined to hold the Pyrenees, and this could only be done by reducing the fortresses of Pampeluna and San Sebastian.

His determination was soon formed. Pampeluna he had already blockaded, and he now prepared to besiege San Sebastian. The battering-train was accordingly ordered round from Bilbao to Passages, and such dispositions made of the Allied troops as would cover the blockade_and shield the besiegers from the chance of interuption. Lord Wellington now made his final dispositions. Sir Thomas Graham with 10,000 men was appointed to conduct the operations; whilst to the 5th division, under Major-General Oswald, comprising Hay and Robinson's British, and Spry's Portuguese brigades, the executive duties of the siege were entrusted. The division of the Guards, and that under Lord Aylmer, with the Germans, covered the great road leading from Irun to Oyarzun, and supported Freîre's Spanish division, which was in position in the heights of San Marcial, protecting the line of the Bidassoa from the Crown Mountain to the sea. The corps of Giron and Longa communicated with the left centre at Vera, which consisted of the light division, posted at the pass of Echellas, and the 7th division on the heights of Santa Barbara and Vera. The right centre, under Hill, remained in the valley of the Bastan, while the brigades of Pringle and Walker (2nd division) occupied the pass of Maya. On the right, the passes of Col d'Ariette, and Col d'Espegas were guarded by the Conde d'Amarante's brigades, under Ashworth and Da Costa. Campbell's Portuguese brigade was strongly posted between the valley of Aldudes and Hayra, connecting the troops in the valley of the Bastan with the right wing posted at Roncesvalles. The 6th division, under Pack, occupied San Estevan, forming a reserve for the Allied centre, and supporting the brigades at the passes of Maya and Echellas. The right wing covered the direct approaches from St. Jean Pied-dePort to Pampeluna, while its front was secured by Byng's brigade of the 2nd division, which held the passes of Roncesvalles and Orbacete. Morillo's Spanish corps, also, guarded the latter opening-while the 4th division formed a second line in rear of Roncesvalles. The 3rd divison was in reserve at Olaque; and the mass of the Allied cavalry, with the heavy artillery, were extensively cantoned in the country between Pampeluna and Tafalla, in rear of the fortress, and in a position from which they could operate if required.

Some regiments of cavalry, British and Portuguese, with 36 light guns, were attached to the right and centre of the Allies. The great hospital had been, since the battle, established at Vittoria; and commissariat depôts were formed along the coast, as the places best adapted for obtaining supplies, and forwarding them to the different divisions.

The works of Pampeluna were in excellent order, and surmounted by 200 pieces of ordnance. The town was protected by the river on one side and the citadel on the other. The garrison consisted of 4,000 men. To reduce it by siege would have required large means and a heavy expenditure of life. A close blockade was therefore decided on, the duties of which service were confided to Lord Dalhousie.

Strong field-works were thrown up on every side, so that the investing force might command all the roads and communications. Nine redoubts, on favourable heights, from 1,200 to 1,500 yards from the fortress, were accordingly raised; and having been armed with French guns captured at Vittoria, were garrisoned by detachments from the investing force. When the defences of the blockading lines were completed, the duties of the blockade were transferred to the Spanish army under O'Donnell; and Lord Dalhousie, with his corps, joined the army in the Pyrenees.

Soult's first care was to reorganise the beaten armies, with the large reinforcements at his disposal, into one vast corps, entitled L'Armée d'Espagne. This body comprised nine divisions; formed into a right, centre, and left. The first was commanded by Reille, the second by Drouet, and the third by Villatte. The cavalry was also organised into three divisions, of which two were heavy dragoons, under Generals Treillard and Tilly, with a light division under Pierre Soult, the brother of the Marshal. The lost artillery had been replaced. Never had the casualties attendant on a total defeat been so speedily and effectually remedied. On the 21st of June, the armies were all but annihilated: on the 21st of July, Soult was in command of a force 80,000 strong, with 90 pieces of artillery.

"The town of San Sebastian, containing nearly ten thousand inhabitants, is built on a low peninsula, running north and south; the defences of the western side being washed by the sea, and those on the eastern side by the river