redoubts, and were variously employed in the lines. At one period, exclusive of these, of the British engineers, artificers, or infantry soldiers, 7,000 peasantry worked as labourers in the completion of an undertaking only to have been accomplished under the most favourable circumstances, both with regard to cordiality of assistance, neighbouring arsenals, a British fleet in the Tagus, constant uninterrupted communication with a great capital, a regular remuneration to the labourers, an anxious and deep interest in the result to be accomplished by the assistance of the works in progress, and, above all, an intelligence and firmness in command, that could at the same time extract the greatest benefits from these combinations, and urge exertion where it appeared to relax."

The presence of a powerful British fleet was of great importance; for the Royal Marines manned Fort St. Julian, whilst the defences on the right of the first line were flanked by gun-boats worked by British sailors.

Before the end of October, Romana's Spanish troops had joined from Estremadura; and reinforcements having arrived from England and Cadiz, the motley force collected behind the lines amounted to little short of 100,000 men, of whom 55,000 were regular troops, British and Portuguese. These were posted for locomotion, whilst the irregular troops garrisoned the chief part of the forts and redoubts. The lines were armed with 600 pieces of cannon, most judiciously disposed. Thus arrested in his threatened operation of driving the English into the sea (although he could not have been wholly ignorant of the vast preparations for his reception, which had been making for some months past), the Marshal chafed and fumed in front of these impregnable lines,

"Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike."

After a time, he began to despair of being allowed to plant the eagles of his master on the towers of Lisbon, and wish for more ordinary acquisitions for the subsistence of his starving troops. Provisions were every day becoming more scarce, and Trant and Wilson were both harassing his rear with unceasing activity. The country, which he had covered with his bivouacs, and ravaged by his foragers, was exhausted; sickness had broken out in his ranks, and discon

tent and disunion among his officers. Whilst Wellington's troops were enjoying health and abundance within the lines, the army of Massena was reduced to great extremity, and was at length compelled to commence a retreat. When he had attempted to form magazines at Santarem, the militia and ordonanza of the north hung upon his rear, and impeded or wholly prevented his attempts; until his position at the head of so large an army became no longer tenable. Meanwhile the Portuguese government was doing everything in its power to embarrass Lord Wellington's plans, and to contribute to their failure. From the Portuguese line the desertions, in nine months, amounted to several thousands; whilst the ordonanza disbanded themselves by whole companies.

At home, the most discouraging predictions of the fate of his army were indulged in by the Whigs and their newspaper organs, until Lord Liverpool, harassed on every side. by evil auguries and malicious representations, was compelled to appeal to the British general for advice and information as to his future course. Lord Wellington's reply is one of the ablest of the many able documents included in his "Despatches," and appears to have completely satisfied the mind of his noble correspondent. He contrasted the condition of the French army with his own:

"All the troops are months (says he) in arrears of pay; they are in general very badly clothed; their armies want horses, carriages, and equipments of every description; their troops subsist solely upon plunder, whether acquired individually, or more regularly by the way of requisition and contribution; they receive no money, or scarcely any, from France, and they realize but little from their pecuniary contributions in Spain. Indeed, I have lately discovered that the expense of the pay and the hospitals alone of the French army in the Peninsula, amounts to more than the sum stated in the financial exposé as the whole expense of the entire French army. This state of things has very much weakened, and in some instances destroyed, the discipline of the army; and all the intercepted letters advert to acts of malversation and corruption, and misapplication of stores, &c., by all the persons attached to the army. I have no doubt, therefore, that the desire to relieve this state of distress, and to remove

L

the consequent evils occasioned by it, by the plunder of Lisbon and Oporto, was the first motive for the expedition into Portugal."

It was the determination of Lord Wellington not to attack Massena until he could do so with a tolerable certainty of success. The French marshal soon relieved the British commander from all doubt as to the course to be adopted, by retiring his army altogether: thus everything had fallen out as Lord Wellington had predicted; and the dismal prophecies of the discontented abroad and the malicious at home were entirely falsified. Towards the end of November, an attempt was made by General Guidanne to join Massena with a convoy of ammunition; and he had penetrated within twelve miles of the French posts, when, alarmed by a rumour that he had returned, he precipitately retreated, not however until he had been forced to abandon his convoy, surrender all his baggage, and lose some hundreds of his men. General Drouet reached Leiria soon afterwards with 10,000 men, and taking post on the right flank of the French army, cut off the communication of the allies with the northern provinces. About this time, reinforcements and supplies, which ought to have been furnished by the Portuguese themselves, arrived at Lisbon from England. They left the Whig croakers at home predicting all sorts of disasters to Wellington and his army. The loss of the gallant Romana at this juncture added seriously to the perplexities of Lord Wellington; he was one of the very few Spanish commanders in whom he felt he could repose faith. The Spanish army was then in a very disorganized state; wanting discipline, energy, pay, and provisions-in short, almost everything that can be said to conduce to the efficiency of an army.

CHAPTER X.

First Siege and Capture of Badajoz-Surprise and Surrender of the Garrison-Lord Wellington pursues Massena-Relief of Campe-Mayor by Marshal Beresford, and Preparations to recover Badajoz-Massena attempts to relieve Almeida-Battle of Fuentes d'Onor-Blockade and Fall of Almeida-Siege of Badajoz raised.

SOULT now prepared to besiege Badajoz, which though well garrisoned, was ill provided with provisions. Mendizabal, with 10,000 Spanish troops, was at hand to interrupt the enemy's operations, maintain a communication with the place, and generally assist the besieged. The post assigned to him was the heights of San Cristoval behind the Gevora, which though not naturally strong, were capable of being rendered impregnable; and being held,would have prevented Soult from obtaining possession of Badajoz; Mendizabal, however, neglected to intrench his position; and allowing himself to be surprised by Soult and Mortier, was completely routed, and the garrison, thanks to the treachery or cowardice of the governor, surrendered to the enemy. This disaster added to the new difficulties of Lord Wellington, who only awaited the arrival of a reinforcement from England to detach such a force to Badajoz as would, with Mendizabal's corps, have defeated Soult, and relieved that fortress. To detach the requisite force was now out of the question; and seeing that a bold stroke would alone save the fortress, Wellington resolved to fall upon Massena the moment his expected reinforcement should arrive. Lord Wellington was now in full pursuit of Massena, and on the 13th of March, 1811, came up with the French army at Ponte Ciberta, and had well nigh captured Massena himself. By the disobedience of one of his officers, who led on a pursuit against his directions, an engagement was precipitated which completely defeated his plans. After a sharp skirmish Ney drew off, and Wellington had by his vigorous and skilful movements confined the army of Massena to one narrow line of retreat between the mountains and the river

Mondego. Ney, who covered the movements of the main body with a strong rear-guard, had halted upon the left bank of the Ceira in a defensible position near the village of Fons d'Aronce. Here Lord Wellington came up with him, and making a feint upon his right, vigorously charged his left with the 3rd division, whilst a battery of horse-artillery being advanced rapidly to a favourable point, drove his dismayed battalions into the river in such confusion, that many were drowned, and many trampled to death on the bridge. In this affair the French lost 500 men, whilst the casualties on our side were quite trifling. Ney blew up the bridge and retired, and on the 16th the entire body of the enemy had passed the Alva, and occupied the line of mountain beyond that river. So soon as he heard of the infamous surrender of Badajoz, Lord Wellington resolved to reinforce the corps of Beresford, which he had already halted at Thomar, as he desired that he should take instant measures

for the recovery of that fortress. On the night of the 16th, a temporary bridge having been thrown over the Ceira, he marched onwards in pursuit. Massena attempted to concentrate his troops on the Sierra de Morta, but was soon forced from it by the manoeuvres of his antagonist. Two divisions of the Allies passed the Alva by a flying bridge, and threatened Massena by Argani: and upon the north bank of the Mondego a body of militia, under Trant and Wilson, harassed his flank. Thus pressed, he again destroyed all the stores and baggage that impeded his march, and hastened on to Celerico and Guarda. He arrived at the former post on the 21st. Regnier, with the second corps, had occupied Guarda. Massena hoped to keep his ground long enough to enable him to avoid the mortification of a forced retreat into Spain. The pursuing army had outmarched its supplies, and were subjected to great privations, the means of transport being inadequate to the rapidity of its march, and a short pause became inevitable, which led Massena to infer that the pursuit was at an end, and to make sure dispositions under that impression. Meanwhile Massena and Ney had quarrelled, and the Commanderin-chief superseded Ney, and sent him to Paris.

Massena's hope of being able to maintain himself in Portugal until he could resume the offensive, was defeated