next his heart. One march would bring him to the cityand all expected that the attempt would be made. "The troops desired the enterprise-the Spaniards demanded it as a proof of good faith-the Portuguese to keep the war away from their own country." Romana came specially from Badajoz to urge its necessity, and offer his co-operation. Massena, in his proclamations, taxed his opponent with timidity, and accused him of breach of honour and good faith, in allowing his ally's fortress to fall, "without risking a shot to save them." Nothing, however, could shake the determination of the English general. Stern in his purpose, Wellington remained inflexible; and to his resolution not to stand the issue of a battle, the downfal of Napoleon's dynasty may be traced. Lord Wellington's reasons for declining to take part in this defence were communicated to Lord Liverpool in a despatch, dated July 1, 1810, and appear to have been considered perfectly satisfactory.

The fate of Rodrigo was sealed; but the city held out until the 11th, when the counterscarp having been blown in, and a breach formed, over which carriages might have passed, and the French columns formed, and only awaiting the signal to assault, Herrasti hoisted the white flag and surrendered.

During the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo the country between the Azava and the Coa was covered and protected by the British army, under General Craufurd, who in utter disregard of his orders, brought on an action on the Coa, which neither was nor could be productive of advantage. This action was fought on the 24th of July, and is said to have terminated in a loss to the enemy of 1,000 men killed, and to the allies of 320. With this affair the invasion of Portugal may be said to have been opened. It did not, however, retard the investment of Almeida for a single day; Massena had boasted that in three months he would drive the English into the sea, but he was nearly a month inactive on the banks of the Coa before he commenced his operations against Almeida. On the 15th of August he began to invest that place; what his next step would be appeared to be uncertain. In Ciudad Rodrigo he was already provided with a place of arms, and was known to have collected there large stores of provisions. His army

was vastly superior in numbers to that of the Allies, and in cavalry he had greatly the advantage over it; the latter had therefore only to wait for and to watch the movements of their adversaries. On the 4th of August the British general issued his memorable proclamation, calling upon the inhabitants of that portion of the country which it was not in his power to protect, to evacuate their homes, to remove their goods, drive away their cattle, and destroy all stores and provisions they were unable to carry with them. It was further intimated that those who disregarded this order would be punished as traitors. This peremptory proclamation had been rendered necessary by the credulity of those who, having trusted to the promises of Massena, had to lament their credulity amid scenes of plunder, violation, and blood.

CHAPTER IX.

Siege and Fall of Almeida-Battle of Busaco-Retreat of Massena-The Lines of Torres Vedras-Arrival of Reinforcements and Supplies from England-Operations of Lord Wellington from the Battle of Busaco to the Occupation by the British General of the Lines of Torres Vedras -Massena makes an attack on one of the Redoubts, and is repulsed.

ALMEIDA was a regularly constructed fortress, with a garrison of 4,000 Portuguese. Colonel Cox, an Englishman, was its governor. It was well provided, and was expected to hold out for a considerable time. It was not until the 25th that the French opened their fire, from sixty-five pieces of cannon. The same evening, a shell falling on some ammunition at the door, set fire to the great powder magazine, which exploded, throwing down everything around it, and killing and wounding hundreds of the inhabitants. The besiegers were not in a condition to profit on the instant by this accident, but demanded the next day the immediate surrender of the place. Colonel Cox, deprived of his ammunition, and betrayed by the Lieutenant-Governor, who had acquainted the French with the exact condition of the for

tress, and who afterwards deserted to Massena, was compelled to capitulate; stipulating only that the regular troops should be prisoners of war, the militia being allowed to return home, and serve no more. These terms were fulfilled with Massena's accustomed good faith. He forcibly detained the militia-men, and employed them as pioneers; and the regulars he compelled to enrol themselves in his ranks, placing them under the command of the Marques de Alorna, a Portuguese renegade. Eventually they nearly all returned to the allied army, and were received without reproach.

The fall of Almeida was a heavy blow and great discouragement to the British General-in-Chief, following as it did so rapidly the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo, whilst it gave a corresponding prestige to the already over-rated power of the enemy. At Lisbon and Oporto it had the effect of creating a complete panic. By the Whig party, and their newspaper organs at home, it was, of course, regarded as but the beginning of the end," which they had so confidently prophecied.

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"All this" (says Lord Wellington) "would not much signify, if our staff and other officers would mind their business, instead of writing news and keeping coffee-houses. But, as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his account of what he does not know, and his comments on what he does not understand; and these are diligently circulated and exaggerated by the idle and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies. The consequence is, that officers and whole regiments lose their reputation; a spirit of party, which is the bane of all armies, is engendered and fomented; a want of confidence ensues; and there is no character, however meritorious, and no action, however glorious, which can have justice done to it. I have hitherto been so fortunate as to keep down this spirit in this army, and I am determined to persevere.

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"I beg to draw your attention to the orders which I have given this day respecting the private correspondence of the officers of the army. I was astonished some time ago to see in the English newspapers, an accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz and on the Isla, with the number of guns, and of what calibre each was to contain,

and their distance from each other, and from the enemy's works. This information must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If officers wish to give their friends this description of information, they should request them not to publish their letters in the newspapers."

Meantime the crisis of the campaign was approaching. Massena moved on Viseu, and Wellington retired by the left bank of the Mondego, and, fixing his cavalry at Celerico, established his head-quarters at Gouvea. On the 22nd, the French concentrated their forces at the former place. The designs of Massena were soon ascertained. His movements were evidently directed on Coimbra by the north of the Mondego, towards the heights of Busaco or Murcella.

The

The Sierra de Busaco is a high ridge, which extends from the Mondego, in a northerly direction, about eight miles. At the highest point of the ridge, about two miles from its termination, is the convent and garden of Busaco. Sierra de Busaco is connected by a mountainous tract of country with the Sierra de Caramula, which extends in a north-easterly direction beyond Viseu, and separates the valley of the Mondego from the valley of the Douro. On the left of the Mondego, nearly in a line with the Sierra de Busaco, is another ridge of the same description, called the Sierra de Murcella, covered by the river Alva, and connected by other mountainous parts with the Sierra d'Estrella. All the roads to Coimbra, from the eastward, lead over the one or other of these sierras. They are very difficult for the passage of an army, the approaches to the top of the ridge on both sides being mountainous.*

Massena's advance being now certain, and Reynier's corps, which had been opposite to that of Hill, in the valley of the Tagus, having moved rapidly towards the Mondego, obliged Hill to cross the river at Villa Velha, and unite himself with Wellington by the defile of Espinosa. On the 23rd the French passed the Criz in force, having repaired the bridges which Pack had destroyed on the preceding day; and the British leisurely retired. On the 24th, some smart skirmishing took place between the British pickets and the French light troops, which, being repeated on the 25th, had * Extracts from despatch to Lord Liverpool, Coimbra, 30th September, 1810.

nearly brought on a very serious affair. Disregarding the rapid advance of the enemy in overpowering numbers, Craufurd obstinately maintained the position he had taken up in the morning with the Light Division. The French cavalry were swarming round on every side, and their heavy columns of infantry marching at their best pace, with the evident design of cutting him off; but still the British general refused to give ground. "The cavalry skirmishers were already exchanging pistol-shots, when Lord Wellington suddenly arriving, ordered the division to retire, and, taking the personal direction, covered the retreat with the 52nd and 95th, the cavalry, and Ross's troop of horse artillery."* Although the French came up rapidly, the Light Division was steadily withdrawn; and it crowned the ridge of Busaco, as the immense masses of the enemy displayed their imposing numbers upon the opposite heights.

The French numbered nearly 70,000 combatants, commanded by three marshals of France, one of them of great and deserved renown. The British force, consisting of 25,000 men, lay upon the backward slope of the sierra, by the rocky ridge of which their disposition and numbers were concealed. At two o'clock on the morning of the 27th, the sentinels, on their picquet posts, could hear the stir of preparation in the French camp, and the British line stood. silently to arms in the order of battle. Hill occupied the right, Leith the left, and the Lusitanian Legion was in reserve; next in order stood the third division, under Picton. The first was formed near the convent, with the brigade of Pack posted considerably in advance on the descent. The light division was formed on the left of Pack. At some distance from their post was placed a brigade of German cavalry, exposed to the full view of the enemy, and apparently the only body opposed to them. The fourth division, under Cole, held the left of the ridge. The British cavalry were drawn up in reserve. Whilst the French were waiting for Massena, who was ten miles in the rear, the British army had, with full deliberation, taken its ground, and this delay sealed, in all probability, the fortunes of the day.

The French attack was made in five columns, and on two distinct points, about a league apart from each other. Rey

* Napier.