CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE RELIEF.

BEFORE dealing with what were considered by the writer to be the leading obstacles and hindrances in the way of the elimination of evil, there were indicated four general spheres of action within which, or lines along which, the work of abating evil must be prosecuted. And now that we have finished our own task of pointing out these obstructions to the realisation of our ideals of the social good, of clearing away misconceptions, and of showing that what is often esteemed essential is only accidental, that what many regard as an end is often only a means liable to be perverted, and when so perverted itself becomes an evil of magnitude-now that this has been accomplished, these four fields of activity again appear before us to be entered upon and worked by those willing to labour for the abatement of evil in society, under the guidance and direction of two complementary precepts, which, as our contention is, must for ever govern all effective effort for the elimination of evil and the consequent amelioration of mankind, namely— First, AIM AT THE MINIMUM OF EXTRINSIC RESTRAINT AND THE

MAXIMUM OF LIBERTY FOR THE INDIVIDUAL.

Secondly, AIM AT THE MOST COMPLETE AND UNIVERSAL DEVE

LOPMENT OF THE ALTRUISTIC CHARACTER.

If I have succeeded in securing the interest of the reader up to this point, it may be a surprise to him, perhaps a disappointment, and probably it will be the occasion of adverse criticism, that I here bring to a close this treatise on the Problem of Evil. With so much that is negative and so little that is positive in the way of exhibiting particular measures for the relief against evil, it may appear that after the travail of a mountain only a mouse has been brought forth. But if we go on from this position which we have now reached, let us see what we have before us. We have been endeavouring to compass the whole subject of evil generally, and not any one of its special forms. Our thought thus pursued has now

brought us to the threshold of many sciences and arts, comprehending, indeed, the entire field of human activity. First we have industrial science, demanding the application of the practical ethical principles we have tried to justify to questions of economics in a thousand and one arts, with extensions into various theoretical sciences. In the second place there is political science, embracing all the topics relating to government, law, jurisprudence, and some of those concerning political economy. In the third place is presented with equal claims philanthropic science, which is still inchoate, its data and its laws with respect to its ends not having yet been co-ordinated. Finally, we note educational science, with its numerous relations and its various departments-physical, intellectual, moral, æsthetic, religious. Into which one of these four great divisions of practical science shall we enter? To treat them all would require not one but many volumes, and to deal with any one would injure the effect of the generalisations we have already made. Accordingly we shall, I think, be justified in contenting ourselves for the present with the results attained, the author hoping that the process of elimination pursued in this book may have yielded some little positive truth as a residuum which may be of value to others who are pursuing their own work in the great departments of practical activity just named. But before closing there are some further remarks called for upon the application of the principles and precepts enunciated.

These remarks chiefly concern the relative value of the four methods in the production of the altruistic and the subjugation of the egoistic character, which we have found to be the most important practical social question; and this also has a direct bearing upon the subject of the last two chapters.

It cannot be denied that activity in the philanthropic and educational spheres is likely to be the most purely altruistic in motive and directly altruistic in its results, inasmuch as within them there is afforded less opportunity for the schemes of egoistic ambition. The statesman and the soldier, the inventor, or even the commercial promoter, may indeed display a very high degree of self-abnegation and greatly encourage altruism; but the theatre of their efforts is in each case one which nominally furnishes the greatest stimulus to selfish desires. However great may be the benefits which mankind derives from their activity, those benefits usually are indirect, the direct end of the person's efforts being his own aggrandisement. This does not fulfil the moral law. Yet even

where a man is primarily anxious to do that which will promote his own super-eminence or pecuniary profit in a political career, whether civil or military, it not seldom happens that the individual is greatly inspired by ideals of the benefits to others which his labours may confer. The approbation of others depends upon this result; and this approbation ordinarily enters very largely into the emoluments of fame-a good reputation certainly is preferable to a bad one in the minds of most. Moreover, in all political organisation where competition rather than custom determines who shall fill the high places, it is indispensable that those whose ambition lies in the direction of the statesman's meeds should, avowedly at least, make the ends of their activity the good of the state. If they fail to do this wiser aspirants walk away with the coveted prizes. Hence, notwithstanding the inducements to and opportunities for egoism in the political creations, the counteracting restraints are also powerful.

Besides this, it must be noticed that, in the present state of civilisation, the highest success in the political career is not achieved without the possession of the genuine altruistic disposition, and that this disposition makes the chances of any success much better. Common observation about us confirms such a statement. The most successful men of the present age-men like Lincoln, Gladstone, and Grant-have been predominantly altruistic. Such characters do not always command political success, but when supported by powerful intellects they achieve a success that is not surpassed; whereas, though strong intellects, unaccompanied by the self-denying character, may come to the front transiently, their great deficiency is thereby rendered more conspicuous, and their fall is only made the greater; while, indeed, many who are able enough are so palpably governed by egoistic sentiments that people will not trust them. Even if they try to deceive they are generally soon found out. Who has not seen men gifted, possessed of good ideas on political themes, and anxious to utilise their talents, so weighted by an utterly selfish and thus worthless character that they are of no benefit to the community, and wholly unable to realise their own aspirations? Endeavouring to make the whole world revolve around them as the centre, they simply exclude themselves from the social movement, and this the quicker the more blatant they are. Other people will catch their ideas and suggestions, but want nothing further of them, because they are intrinsically unavailable. To give them power or places of trust

would be a dangerous experiment. The result is, that instead of producing anything in the political field as cultivators, they can only furnish the manure for another's crop.

The power for harm of active egoism in the political sphere is greatly heightened and enlarged by that passive egoism in the constituency which permits politics to become the trade of knaves who enter political life to make a living out of it by bargaining, bribery, and almost every form of corruption. Under an autocracy supported by bayonets, it is very difficult to find a remedy for abuses of any sort, so long as those who commit the wrong are faithful in their loyalty to the sovereign power. The evil continues until it becomes so intolerable as to occasion great upheavals. But in a country where the right of suffrage remains in the people, there exists an instrument of relief which is immediately available. If political evil prevail, it is not because there is no power to check or eradicate, but because there is neglect to use the power. It is precisely this neglect that passive egoism fosters, and in such disregard of the duties of a citizen the dangers pointed out in the last chapter are greatly enhanced.

Yet I do not share the feelings of pessimists, who behold as an omen of certain and speedy ruin to the governmental order that corruption which at some periods and in some places disgraces democratic communities. Indicative of disease such corruption undoubtedly is, and of disease which ought to be watched and cured. But the freedom of political action is so great through the universality of suffrage that it is difficult for abuses to remain long enough to become firmly fixed. Individualism, even if selfish, will act as a continual solvent of the most carefully planned combinations; and without co-operation on the part of many, no great degree of power can either be gained or maintained. Neither political parties nor political cliques for a very long period in American history have been able to preserve their sway, where their domination was at all obviously productive of evil consequences. At the very worst thieves will rise against thieves, and honest men be able to hold the balance of power.

That this last does not fulfil a very high ideal of social order may be freely admitted. And that it is possible for popular sentiment to become so debased in a community where everyone has by the constitution the protection of one vote that social chaos will come again, must also impress itself upon us. Again, no social order has yet become so good that it might not be made

better; and tendencies toward a worse state are apt to produce a worse state. Such considerations as these ought to be heeded by those who are too indolent and too much in love with their own comfort to pay any attention to public affairs. It is important always to be on the alert lest security may be imperilled. Often this is done very insidiously, and if security be lost all is lostto the sybarite and the ambitious alike.

The difficulties and dangers in the way of attempting to cure evils by legislation and governmental authority generally, should not allow us to weaken that authority within its legitimate bounds. Nor should we forget that circumstances and conditions are all the while changing; so that an exercise of governmental restraint, legislative or executive, may be required on the score of security at one time, which, tested by the same rule, may be wholly unnecessary at another. To discriminate between what is requisite for security and what is over-government, is a most delicate and perplexing matter. Some of the advocates of laissez-faire have carried their doctrine too far in restricting the sphere of governmental authority. The Post, for instance, can scarcely be said to be a necessity for security. It is maintained on grounds of convenience ; yet few would deem it advisable to abolish this department of governmental machinery. There can be no inflexible rule as to what government shall and shall not do. That extremes of theory should always be avoided is a truism. But though the doctrine of laissez-faire cannot in its strictness be adopted, yet the principle upon which it is founded, namely that the office of government is essentially negative, is the true one. I should qualify this by excepting education; though in reality this constitutes no exception, for education is the most efficient means of promoting security. Other positive functions demanded by public expediency must undoubtedly be conceded from time to time as circumstances vary, but in these days of socialistic agitation we shall do well to watch with some jealousy the conferring of powers and duties upon the government which go beyond the limits marked out by the demands of security. We may, indeed, examine with far-reaching care into what security requires, but those requirements should generally be the final test.

The most important economical question to be considered under existing conditions seems to me to be unquestionably that presented by the prevalence of poverty, and the contests between capital and labour. Appertaining to this, arises the problem how far legisla