'It seems clear to me, if I do not deceive myself, that the desire of domination and of possessing superiority over their fellows is so natural to men, that, as a general rule, those are few indeed in number who really love liberty so well that, if they had the opportunity of making themselves lords or masters of their fellow citizens, they would not seek to do so. . . . If, then, you will consider attentively the conduct of those who live together in one and the same city, and will observe the dissensions which arise among them, you will find that the object in view is superiority over each other rather than liberty. . . Thus, those who fill the foremost social positions in a city do not strive after liberty, but are ever seeking to increase their own power and to insure their own superiority and pre-eminence. They endeavour, indeed, so far as it is in their power, to conceal their ambition under this plausible name of liberty; because, inasmuch as there are in any city many more who fear to be oppressed than those are who can hope to become oppressors, he has many more adherents who seems to stand forward as the champion of equality than he who should openly aim at superiority.' GUICCIARDINI, Del Reggimento di Firenze. 'Act according to that maxim whose universality as law thou canst at the same time will.'-KANT, Metaphysic of Ethics. CHAPTER XXIV. THE EGOISTIC IDEAL. THE course of our discussions has been gradually bringing us back to the point from which we set out. We originally found the source of moral evil to be the choices of individuals (Chapter III.). The problem which then presented itself, in addition to questions of the avoidance of physical evil, was how to affect the choices of individuals so as to cause them to pursue and promote good rather than evil. We endeavoured to show wherein the inculcation of a belief that every man stands justly condemned in the sight of an All-Perfect Being, instead of being efficacious for such a purpose, is positively mischievous, and itself productive of more evil than it can prevent. We in like manner contended that a sentiment of inherent authority in any social institution is a harm rather than a help. Again, we essayed to point out that systems of cooperation, unless established and maintained with important limitations, are productive of more evil than good, and at best cannot of themselves secure the good-will, which Kant asserted to be the only unconditioned Good. But in all this discussion, though we declared the doctrine of sin to be a superstition, the notion of authority in institutions to be a fetich, and the co-operative idea in its extremes to be a fallacy, and throughout all strenuously urged the paramount value, and indeed necessity, of the independence and autonomy of the individual; yet I do not think we have ever obscured the truth that egoism in the individual character is the root of all moral evil. Now, after the adverse criticisms passed upon doctrines and measures which are avowedly proposed as means for the reduction of evil in the world, it is incumbent upon us to emphasise once more our own notion of where lies the greatest obstruction in the way of the elimination of evil, and to say what we can as to the relief. That obstruction is the individual egoistic disposition and character. It must have occurred to the reader, in perusing the last two preceding Parts of this work especially, that everywhere the most alarming development of egoism is found in a lust of dominion. Historically, the worst egoists have been the patriarchs, emperors, kings, princes, and popes-those in power; and the effort to secure and preserve power has led to more woe in the world than anything else we can observe. It may be worth our while, therefore, for a moment to trace the course of development of this eagerness for supremacy over one's fellows. Since the beginning and the continuance of life depend upon incessant motion and resistance to motion, it is unavoidable that the exercise of force should be the primary idea connected with the preservation of individual existence. Thence this idea extends to development, for the preservation of an organism subsists only in its development. Activity must be put forth; and inasmuch as there is always resistance, the overcoming of obstacles is the first lesson to be learned. To live, it is necessary to work; while work means struggle. Primarily, man is prompted to subdue material nature and utilise natural forces for his ends. This activity, this work, this struggle, an abundance of vitality makes to a very considerable degree pleasurable. The social state of mankind, indeed, creates another sphere for individual activity, but still one in which the exercise of force and the idea of resistance are primitive notions. If we suppose a first man, who never had seen another of his kind, what would be his emotions and inclinations upon such a sight? Our actual knowledge of man under primitive conditions does not allow us to suppose that they would be social. It is more probable that they would be of such a nature as to impel him to catch, appropriate, and use the newcomer in the same manner as he would use inanimate objects, or, better, other animal life, assuming him to be familiar with this at best. Resistance would provoke conflict, so that war would in all likelihood be the earliest experience of human beings. with each other. This supposition is borne out by what facts we possess. Yet a modifying influence must have come in very early. The social desires would soon make their appearance, especially in connection with sexual promptings. They would arise even from captivity of slaves; and in these two classes of appetites, the Predatory and the Social, are found the germs from which springs the whole growth of super-organic evolution. The inclinations towards social life are so strong that they prevent human beings from living in isolation. But still the value of society to the individual is originally dependent almost wholly upon his ability to use others for his own happiness. Thus his social activity becomes directed toward essentially selfish purposes, qualified only by the inability to obtain society at all without some concessions to others. Social life is a necessity, but it nevertheless is a life of struggle and contention of man with his fellows. After such considerations as these the genesis of an egoistic. ideal is not mysterious. As intellect emerges from its embryonic existence, with the increase of reminiscent power goes an increased ability and disposition to form ends of attainment. They grow more and more comprehensive and far-reaching, and contemplate action extending over longer and longer periods. Thus there is evolved with greater or less distinctness an ideal of life, with its attendant notions of what constitutes good, and what ought to be the objects of effort and activity; succeeding in the attainment of which, life is constituted a success; failing in which, life, in the judgment of the individual cherishing such an ideal, becomes a failure. Under the circumstances just referred to this ideal naturally becomes one of power attained, or to be attained, in some one of various forms. Begotten of experiences of activity put forth and resistance met with, of this resistance overcome, and enjoyments of the fruits of victory, the desirable in the social sphere comes to be associated with imaginations of self as triumphing over one's fellows, transcending them, surpassing them, capturing them, controlling them, using them for one's own ends, irrespective of their own status as persons. Under such an ideal, success in life means overcoming other men and securing power over them. This is not, however, the only form of the egoistic ideal. Man does not always nor for ever covet activity. The desire for action alternates with that for repose, and as life proceeds the latter often becomes decidedly ascendant. Sometimes it is so from the beginning. When it is supervened upon the egoistic ideal of activity, it satisfies itself in the results of its triumphs, and finds its end in preserving and enjoying what it has gained, regardless still of the welfare of others, near or far. Devotion to sensual enjoyments from the outset works the same result. An ideal of life is created whose chief end is ease, luxury, and satiety. To its devotees, 'Eat, drink, and be merry' comprises their 'theory of practice.' To such toil seems a waste, the incurring of peril a foolishness, the |