CHAPTER IV.

THE EVOLUTION OF PAIN.

In its simplest forms pain is the sentient appreciation of disorganisation in the physical system. A cut, a bruise, a sting at the periphery, is followed by sensations of pain; so also an ento-peripheral lesion produces sensations of internal distress. The disorganisation may be positive or negative. The cases just instanced are of the first variety; but pain may also ensue from the lack of organising assimilating force. The creature which lies dying of starvation suffers from sensations of disorganisation as truly as one which is perishing from a wound. Life is a process of adjustment and adaptation of organism to environment. Where this adjustment is incomplete or imperfect, there is a tendency to dissolution and disintegration of the organism, more or less marked in the ratio that the imperfection of adjustment is exhibited. Wherever this disorganisation is initiated or continued, pain is present as the mental concomitant of physical degeneracy, until death ensues and the veil is drawn through which we cannot see.

Sensational pain varies in quantity. Its distinctive varieties, however, are not so much indicated by quantitative differences as by differences in the localities to which we ascribe the bodily source of the pain. A pain at the end of my finger, a sharp pang in my eye, pinch upon the skin, a headache, a stomach-sickness are varieties. of the indefinite number and kinds of painful sensations. But let us not fail to note that the heterogeneity so far as it exists depends upon the increase of intelligence. The more the mind distinguishes and defines, the greater the variety of pains we apprehend. This distinguishing and defining, however, is the exercise of intellectual power. The increase of such power depends upon an increase in complexity of the nervous system. A more complex nervous apparatus implies a relatively greater complexity of the whole organism in structure and function. The truth then becomes apparent that in all those things which concern quality, pain varies

with the degree of intelligence; that is, it is less definite, less heterogeneous, and less complex as intelligence is low. Respecting quantity, we are not so sure. How far intensity or pervasiveness of feeling can subsist with a minimum of cognition is not yet made certain; but with a limited range there appears to be a greater quantity with a less discrimination, and conversely. Below these indefinite limits I am inclined to believe that feeling is itself greatly lessened as intelligence is diminished.

The control of action by pleasure and pain as motives depends upon representation, which in turn requires discrimination and defining. I must remember the object to which I ascribed my pain, and in order to do this I must have had an originally definite perception of that object. Now the development of the representative powers is the index of the development of intelligence. So that it is as mental action increases in definiteness, complexity, and heterogeneity that pain as a factor in the determination of conduct is more certain, definite, and calculable.

It is in the process of this development that emotional pain comes to play its part. The most conspicuous form is fear, with its many varieties from diffidence and suspicion to the extremes of terror. Fear, however, springs from intellectual action. Our past experience may, when remembered, cause us to anticipate a recurrence of definite evils, or it may furnish us with the material out of which our imaginations may construct terrible phantoms to frighten us. Such apprehensions affect our actions, often controlling our conduct for long periods of time, sometimes changing the whole course of life. The anticipation of ills to occur in the future is certainly the cause of the most depressing feelings of emotional life. Anger also has an element of pain, but this even is rather from the admixture of fear-of the consequences, either of conflict or of abstinence from conflict, or both.

As intellectual development proceeds in the order of evolution the springs of emotional pain are multiplied as the objects which may become causes of pain become multifold. Association and representation reach farther, intellectual vision has a longer and a wider range. We see danger afar off, we connect more closely and more accurately present circumstances with evils to come. Alongside of this increase in power of association goes an increased power of prevision which enables men to avoid in a greater degree the harm they dread. The prudential virtues become more largely developed. In the course, however, that form of pain known as

care, solicitude, anxiety appears to a greater extent and exercises a powerful influence upon mental life. Terror and superstitious fear are lessened, but these other forms of fear, of which I have just been speaking, become prominent.

With the greater power of forecasting the future there arises in the course of mental evolution an increased susceptibility to that class of pains which may be indicated under the general term of disappointments. The more the mind anticipates the future, the more it constructs ideals for realisation in time to come, the more it dwells in a region of hope; so correspondingly it must suffer more keenly from the defeat of its plans, and the failure of its cherished expectations :

Of all sad words of tongue or pen,

The saddest are these 'It might have been.'

The memory of such failures is peculiarly depressing, and tends to lower the vitality, especially as old age comes on, and there appears no further opportunity to repair the errors of the past or build upon the ruins of earlier constructions:

Despair exemplifies both disappointment over the past, and fear for the future.

Once more, a very important group of pains which appear in mental life as intelligence increases in definiteness, heterogeneity and complexity, are those which arise from the sympathies. Sympathy springs from the primitive pleasure of society, but sympathetic sentiments are not conspicuous where the intellectual development is at a low point. At the bottom in the scale of mental evolution antipathetic sentiment are in the ascendant; and, indeed, in human life where the militant spirit prevails sympathy is much deadened and blunted, sometimes nearly extirpated. But, generally speaking, when the representative power enables the mind to perceive the organic connection of society, the cognition of fellowship is enlarged. In the beginning the family life is certain to develop sympathetic sentiments to a high degree of intensity, though perhaps within a narrow range. When the coherences of the community, the tribe, the nation are established sympathetic feelings are extended. But whatever may be the part the sympathies play in the mental life of the individual, as they increase in potency, of course the ability to feel another's pain.

as one's own is enhanced. We are more inclined to be moved, and may be made ourselves miserable by the woes of others. The mother's love is perhaps the most remarkable example of this; but it is also found in the sorrow and griefs of a friend, or even in the misfortunes or the death of a public benefactor or hero whom we have never seen.

We must not fail to consider that the same progress of intelligence which multiplies the sources of emotional pain also provides new modes of relief and mitigation. This is, of course, implied. The conquest of pain indeed proceeds more rapidly than its development. This is merely saying that mankind grows wiser as the race grows older. In this fact lies all hope of progressive improvement, and the final reduction of both physical and moral evil to its lowest terms. Some of the methods of accomplishing this result we hope to indicate in subsequent pages.

Without other specific references, in conclusion it may be said that the evolution of pain as feeling proceeds from the presentative to the representative and re-representative as intelligence grows in definiteness, heterogeneity and complexity. Upon sensational pain is superinduced reproduced sensational and emotional pain, the extent, variety and degree of both the latter being dependent upon development of the representative power in its reminiscent, conceptive, discursive and constructive exercises.

CHAPTER V.

THE OFFICES OF EVIL.

The part

THE final cause of pain humanity is not competent to know, and a search therefor would be wholly barren of results. which pain plays in mental experience we are able to ascertain to some extent. The office of sensational pain, at least, is to give information of disintegration and dissolution in the physical system. Its effect is to stimulate action to remove the cause of the pain; but if the efforts at removal are unsuccessful, and the pain continues, it depresses the vitality and extinguishes motion. Pain is first a warning friend, then a tyrannical master. In short, pain is the mental concomitant of disintegration and dissolution of the organism while life lasts. It is a motive to action to remove the pain or cause of pain.

Life may be painlessly extinguished. This is usually done suddenly by violent means, or by the slow action of anaesthetics. In either of these cases pain gives no warning of approaching death. But in the normal and natural movement of the forces of evolution and dissolution it is an efficient monitor of danger to the bodily integrity. It shows the absence of that adjustment of organism to environment upon which the maintenance of life depends, and stimulates to an attempted attainment of the necessary harmony.

The cases in which pain is itself a benefit, as for instance when producing pleasure through stimulation, do not militate against this view. A bitter taste in the mouth is certainly disagreeable, but the quinine which caused it tones up the whole system. Yet in all such instances the pain as pain is still a mark of lack of assimilation, which must be followed by expulsion or by disorganisation, if continued. When, however, the lack of assimilation is succeeded by a better assimilation, all we can say is to repeat the very old truth that it is not safe to trust wholly to first appearances. A moderate degree of pain in one quarter may be useful to prevent a greater somewhere else. The disorganisation at the surface caused by a mustard plaster is not any the less disorganisation,