other things, especially such as relate to the Godhead, transcend the powers of our comprehension; so also are we unable to comprehend the nature and mode of the distinction which subsists between the Son, who became man, and the Father, by whom he is "well beloved;" or the nature and mode of the distinction between the Holy Spirit on the one hand, and the Father and Son, from whom the Spirit was sent and proceeded forth to the apostles, on the other (John 15: 26); and that therefore we are unable fully to express this distinction by any word or phrase (1). It is this inability to comprehend the precise nature of the distinction between Father, Son and Holy Spirit, which renders it impossible for us to explain how this distinction coincides with the unity of God, a doctrine to which we inflexibly adhere: [but, on the other hand, this same inability also renders it equally impossible for any one to prove, that the unity of God is inconsistent with this distinction.] (2). ILLUSTRATION 1. On the incomprehensibility of the distinction in the persons of the Trinity, the reader may consult the work (of Dr. Storr) on the Object of the Gospel and epistles of John ;1 Griesbach's theological disquisition, might be mentioned a number of the first divines of the age, not excepting Hunnius and even Luther himself. Yet, to prevent the charge of Arianism or Socinianism, which he knew his enemies would eagerly seize the least pretext to prefer against them, Luther yielded to Melancthon's wishes, and in the Augsburg Confession, the doctrine of the Trinity is couched in the old scholastic terms. On this subject, the sentiments of the ablest divines of the present day have been thus expressed by the Rev. Dr. Miller: "We found it in use; and not knowing a better term for the purpose intended, we have cheerfully adopted and continue to use it still. We by no means understand it, however, in a gross or carnal sense." S.] p. 470. (see above § 44. Illust. 5). Introduction to the study of popular Dogmatics (§ 62—64); Schlegel's "Doctrine of the Trinity in God, again considered;" Augustine, de Trinitate;2 [Professor Stuart, On the Divinity of Christ; and Dr. Miller's Letters on Unitarianism].4 gy The doctrine of the Trinity, in the ecclesiastical terminolo of dogmatics, is expressed in the following terms: (1) “In una indivisibili Essentia [ovora], subsistunt tres Personae consubstantiales [coessentiales quoovocol], Pater, Filius, et Spiritus Sanctus.-(2) Tres in Divinitate Personae vere et realiter differunt." [On the important and difficult subject of this Illustration, the translator cannot deny himself the pleasure of inserting some of the remarks of Professor Stuart. The excellence of the quotation will render superfluous any apology for its length. S. "What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction, is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can I define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal ? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, that there are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained;) that there is a distinction which affords ground for 1 Pt. II. sect. II. p. 89. 2 Lib. V. cap. 9. Opp. Basil, 1543, T. III. p. 321. 3 Letters to Mr. Channing, on the divinity of Christ, p. 35—38, 3d ed. 4 See Letters on Unitarianism &c. by Dr. Miller, Professor in the Theo. logical Seminary, Princeton, p. 70—88. the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he; which renders it proper, to speak of sending and being sent; of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature; and yet, that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation. "Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact, that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding that God possesses an underived existence ? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. Here we must rest. The boundaries of human knowledge can never be extended beyond this. "The distinction in the Godhead, which I have now mention ed, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character, are founded upon it and connected with it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and consolations administered by it. "In regard to this distinction, we say, It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake, (at least, the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquainted, undertake,) not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of self-existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it. "I may ask, moreover, What is the eternity of God? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time, when he did not exist, and never can be one, when he will not exist. True; but then, what was time, before the planetary system, which measures it, had an existence? And what will time be, when these heavens and this earth shall be blotted out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity; you deny certain things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet because you cannot affirmatively describe eternity, you would not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why then should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot affirmatively define it? "I do not admit therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism, and absurdity, when we aver that there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we are utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer some time since composed and published, in a periodical work then edited at Cambridge, a piece in which he laboured, with no small degree of acuteness, to show that no man can believe a proposition, the terms of which are unintelligible, or which he does not understand. His object in doing this, appears to have been, to fix upon a belief in the doctrine of the Trinity, the charge of ab surdity. But it seems to me, the whole argument of that piece is founded on a confusion of two things, which are in themselves very diverse; viz. terms which are unintelligible, and things which are undefinable. You believe in the fact, that the divine existence is without cause; you understand the fact that God exists uncaused, but you cannot define underived existence. I believe, on the authority of the Scriptures, that there is a real distinction in the Godhead; but I cannot define it. Still, the proposition that there is a real distinction, is just as intelligible, as the one that God is self existent. A multitude of propositions, respecting diverse subjects, resemble these. We affirm, that gravitation brings a body thrown into the air, down to the earth. The fact is perfectly intelligible. The terms are perfectly understood, so far as they are the means of describing this fact. But then, what is gravitation? An affirmative definition cannot be given, which is not a mere exchange of synonymes. Nor can any comparison define it; for to what shall we liken it ?"1] ILLUSTRATION 2. This distinction cannot be proved inconsistent with the divine unity. The very same cause, which renders it impracticable for us to prove the harmony between this distinction and the divine unity, also renders it impossible to prove, that the assertion of a threefold distinction in the one divine Being, involves a contradiction. "Whenever we find a real contradiction between this distinction and the unity of the divine Being, it only follows, that in every such instance, we have an erroneous idea of the internal distinction in the Godhead, or it may be, an incorrect idea of the one divine Being himself; and from this erroneous 1 Stuart's Letters to Wm. E. Channing, p. 35-38, 3d ed. See also Storr's Sonn- und Festtags-Predigten, Vol. I. No. 35, Tüb. 1806. |