IV. 1808. now regained the true line, and was rapidly passing the CHAP. right flank of the position. The French general, seeing that the day was lost, commenced a retreat by alternate masses, protecting his movements by vigorous charges of cavalry. At the village of Zambugeira he made another desperate stand, but the English troops bore on him too heavily to be resisted, and thus disputing the ground, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera, there he halted until his detachments on the side of Segura had rejoined him, and then taking to the narrow pass of Ruña he marched all night to gain the position of Montechique, leaving three guns on the field of battle, and the road to Torres Vedras open for the victors. The loss of the French was six hundred killed and Thiebault. wounded; among the latter was Laborde himself. The British also suffered considerably; two lieutenant-colonels and nearly five hundred men being Appendix, killed, taken, or wounded, and as not more than four thousand men were actually engaged, this hard fought action was very honourable to both sides. The firing ceased a little after four o'clock, and sir Arthur getting intelligence that Loison's division was at Bombaral, only five miles distant, took up a position for the night in an oblique line to that which he had just forced, his left resting upon a height near the field of battle, and his right covering the road to Lourinham. Believing that Loison and Laborde had effected their junction at the Quintade Bugagliera, and that both were retiring to Montechique, he resolved to march the next morning to Torres Vedras; but before night-fall he was informed that general Anstruther's and general Acland's divisions, accompanied by * The ministers were so intent upon occupying Cadiz, and so little acquainted with the state of public feeling in Andalusia, that one of those generals carried with him his appointment as governor of that city. No. 19. II. BOOK a large fleet of store ships, were off the coast, the dangerous nature of which rendered it necessary to 1808. provide for their safety by a quick disembarkation. He therefore changed his plans, and resolved to seek for some convenient post, that, being in advance of his present position, would likewise enable him to cover the landing of these reinforcements. The vigour of Laborde's defence had also an influence Wellesley's evidence. upon this occasion; before an enemy so bold and skilful no precaution could be neglected with impunity. Sir A. Court of Inquiry. The 18th sir Arthur marched to Lourinham, and Junot at the same time quitting Cercal with Loison's division, crossed the line of Laborde's retreat, and pushed for Torres Vedras, which he reached in the evening of the same day. The 19th being joined by Laborde, and the 20th by his reserve, he re-organized his army, and prepared for a decisive battle. CHAPTER V. THE day on which the combat of Roriça was fought the insurgents attacked Abrantes, and the feeble garrison being ill commanded, gave way, and was destroyed. The 19th sir Arthur Wellesley took up a position at Vimiero, a village near the sea-coast, and from thence sent a detachment to cover the march of general Anstruther's brigade, which had, with great difficulty and some loss, been that morning landed on an open sandy beach called the bay of Maceira. The French cavalry scoured the neighbouring country, carried off some of the women from the rear of the camp, and hemmed the army round so closely that no information of Junot's position could be obtained. In the night of the 20th, general Acland's brigade was also disembarked, and this reinforcement increased the army to sixteen thousand fighting men, with eighteen pieces of artillery, exclusive of Trant's Portuguese and of two British regiments, under general Beresford, which were with the fleet at the mouth of the Tagus. Estimating Junot's whole force at eighteen thousand men, sir Arthur Wellesley judged, that after providing for the security of Lisbon, the French general could not bring more than fourteen thousand into the field; he designed, therefore, not only to strike the first blow, but to follow it up, so as to prevent the enemy from rallying and renewing the campaign upon the frontier. In this view he had, before CHAP. |