doned without committing a crime de- of the government operated with consiserving the severest punishment. But derable power. I urged then, and still that negotiation, we have been told, was urge, that the question of the stability or entered into, not so much from any instability of the government ought not pacific inclination on the part of his ma- to be treated as of great consequence. I jesty's ministers, as in compliance with recalled to the recollection of the House, the sentiments of the public. We have that none of the convulsions or changes more than once heard them rejoice in its of the French revolution, none of the failure, and avow that they recurred to it shocks and contentions of the different for the purpose of facilitating the adop- parties, had produced any material altetion of a solid system of finance. Such a ration in the relations which France estamotive operates now no longer. At blished with foreign powers. She had, length, in January 1800, the chief consul at an early period, made peace with of France makes a direct overture of Prussia, and with that power she sedupeace. What answer did we return? | lously preserved that peace during all the Why, that the most effectual mode of stormy times that succeeded the ratificafacilitating peace would be to restore the tion of it. But, Sir, we were told by Bourbons; that, indeed, was not the only his majesty's ministers to pause. We did means, but it was left to the French pause from January 1800 to October government to suggest any other. Was 1801, and we have added 73 millions of it the most likely method to prove our debt since the impertinent answer, for I pacific wishes to ask Buonaparté to cut can call it by no other name, returned to his own throat; for the first effect of the the overtures of the chief consul. In restoration of the Bourbons would, in all other words, Sir, we have added as much probability, have been the sacrifice of his to our national debt in that short period, life? But were the other means at which as the whole of our debt consisted of we hinted, the possession of Ceylon and from the period of the Revolution to the Trinidad? Would not Buonaparté at seven years' war. This pause of his mathat time have given us up both these jesty's ministers cost five times as much islands-aye, and the Cape into the bar- as all the duke of Marlborough's camgain? We might then have had Egypt paigns. by the convention of El-Arish. The gallant Abercromby would not, indeed, have fallen covered with laurels in the lap of victory, nor would our brave army have acquired such immortal honour; but we should at least have had Egypt without the loss of blood or of treasure. And what would then have been the case in Europe? The chief consul might not perhaps have relinquished the Netherlands, nor the left bank of the Rhine. But in Italy he had only the Genoese territory we had nothing then to resist to the south-eastward of the Alps, and the forces of our allies were victorious to the frontiers of France. Then did the right hon. gentleman ransack the English language for epithets of severity and invective against the man whom he now contends we ought to treat with such decorum. But here I must do that right hon. gentleman the justice to acknowledge, that he confessed he indulged in that invective because it pleased him, but that it would be no obstruction in his mind to any other negotiation which circumstances might render it proper to enter into with him. At that time the consideration of the want of the stability

But it is said, that the case was altered by the defection of our allies; and the noble lord asks us, whether we would trust to the chance of reviving a third coalition, and the consequent expenditure of blood and treasure? Sir, I say the experience of the first coalition would have been quite sufficient to have deterred me from attempting any other, and the argument would have applied with as much strength many years ago, as it does at the present moment. The noble lord next alludes to the principles and power of France. For my own part, I never had much dread of French principles, though I certainly have no slight apprehension of French power. Of the influence of France upon the continent, I am as sensible as any man can be; but this is an effect which I do not impute to the peace but to the war. It is the right hon. gentleman himself who has been the greatest curse of the country by this aggrandisement of France. To France we may apply what that gentleman applied formerly on another occasion-we may say,

Me Tenedon, Chrysenque, et Cyllan
Apollinis urbes,
Et Scyron cepisse.

in connexion with France. In the Medi

mixture of delicacy and firmness, let me ask what delicacy there was in the burn-terranean, we did not then stipulate for ings and massacres? The noble lord has been incautious in the selection of his words; he has spoken of indulgences to be granted to the people in consequence of the peace. Is the substitution of common law for martial law, or the restoration of the Habeas Corpus, to be considered as an indulgence? Sir, there were times in which these were considered as sacred pillars of the constitution, not as indulgencies. If they are restored to vigour, I shall receive them as a right. I cannot be grateful for them as a boon. Sir, I have nothing more to say, but to thank the House for the attention with which they have honoured me, and to beg pardon for having trespassed on them so long. I rejoice at the peace-cordially, sincerely, heartily rejoice at it. I hope it will be lasting. I believe it will; but to the last hour of my life I shall never cease lamenting that it was not made years ago, when we might perhaps have had better terms, but when we could certainly have had as good as those which have been submitted to us this day.

Mr. Chancellor Addington said, that after the able arguments that had been advanced in favour of the question, it was difficult to find any topics that had not before been alluded to. It had always appeared to him, as well as to many others, that the duty of negotiation commenced when all hopes of continental aid in checking the power of France were at an end. His predecessors had been of this opinion, and had twice sought a negotiation, though their efforts had been unsuccessful. As soon, therefore, as his majesty had been graciously pleased to deliver the authority of the country into the hands of the present ministers, they had thought it necessary to follow the same example. They had commenced a negotiation, and their efforts had been crowned with success. A comparison had been made between the terms which were proposed at Lisle, and those which had now been agreed upon; but it should be recollected, that since the negotiation at Lisle, the national debt of this country had increased no less than 150 millions. At that negotiation it was proposed to restore to France and her allies all that had been taken from them; a measure that must have been more dangerous to us at that time than it could be at present, because Tippoo Sultaun was then in force, and

the establishment of the republic of the Seven Islands, which now form a barrier to Turkey on the eastern side. In the West Indies we were in possession of Cape Nicola Mole and Jeremie, in addition to our other conquests; them we agreed to give up, keeping only the Cape and Trinidad. Upon the whole, he was decidedly of opinion that the terms now obtained were more favourable for the country than those proposed at Lisle.He then entered into an examination of the present articles, which he contended were calculated very much to effect the security of our Eastern and Western possessions. To those who wished to continue the war for the purpose of reducing the power of France, he wished to state, that another campaign could not be made at a less expense than forty millions, and a perpetual annuity (except for the operation of the sinking fund) of two mil. lions per annum, in addition to our other burthens. Even certain success would not have been worth such a price. He perfectly concurred with his noble friend in thinking that we ought to watch with care any tendency to increase the colonial system of this country. He was by no means satisfied of the wisdom of those whose object seemed to be to prevent France from becoming a commercial power. He wished to see France possessed of commerce; he wished to see her possessed of interests which would make her conscious of our maritime power. He wished to see her possessed of interests which, in the case of an unfortunate rupture, we might have the means of attacking. A right hon. friend of his used to say, that in this contest we had gained all which we had not lost; but in concluding this treaty we had acted with the greatest honour and good faith to our allies; we had preserved all our ancient dominions, and had made important acquisitions both in the East and in the West. Independent of all this, an arrangement had been made with the powers of the North, by which our rights had been fully recognised and secured; and finally, that great and most beneficial measure, the union with Ireland, had been carried into complete effect. We had closed the contest with consoli dated power, and with augmented means, which he was convinced would make the power of this country equal to that of

"

of France, was by stemming the torrent of her military progress; but he did not now think it in the power of this country to prevent the acquisitions of France upon the continent. He was of opinion, that the glorious achievements of our navy had placed this country in a situation of honour; and considered that the exertions we had made, would be viewed by history as highly meritorious. Although he had given his vote for the preliminaries, yet, when he considered the state of France, he could not rejoice at the peace without a mixture of anxiety and apprehension:and in giving his vote, he had done it in full confidence that ministers would continue the military and naval strength of the country, upon that establishment which would prevent France from suddenly making any attempt against us; and that they would also keep a strict watch to prevent the effect of those principles which he considered the most serious evil against which we had to contend.

France. He was ready, however, to owledge, that it depended upon the Fisdom of government and of that House, whether this peace should be a blessing or a misfortune. On the part of the king's present ministers, he could only say, that the peace which had been made honestly, should be kept faithfully. No encouragement should be given to any persons, whatever their character might be, to subvert the present government of France. It would require the utmost caution to accomplish all the objects which they had in view; they ought to adopt a line of conduct, not of suspicion and jealousy, but of prudence and circumspection; and he was bound in candour and fairness to state, that it would be necessary to provide new means of security, such as were never before known in time of peace. If he were asked, whether this was founded upon a suspicion of the sincerity of the enemy? he would answer, No; but he could not look upon the map of Europe, without being convinced that such was the conduct which their duty prescribed to them. The system to be adopted must be one plainly directed to the security of the country; not calculated to promote patronage or to excite jealousies. He flattered himself that when the subject came to be investigated, it would not be found difficult to adopt a system of defence, which would be fully adequate to the security of the country. He could not help expressing, upon this occasion, his sense of the danger to which this country would be exposed, if proper measures were not adopted for its security. There were many other points necessary to be provided for, but which it was unnecessary to enter into at present; nor would he, at that late hour, have troubled the House with his sentiments, but for the imputation which had been thrown out against him for keeping an improper silence.

The motion was agreed to without a division; and the House adjourned at half past three in the morning.

Nov. 4. Sir Edmund Hartopp brought up the Report of the Address to his majesty, on the preliminaries of peace with

France.

Mr. Windham* rose and said :-Sir; in the present stage of this business, and in a House so little numerous, I am not disposed to take up the subject in the way in which I should have wished to cunsider it, had I been able, with tolerable satisfaction to myself, to deliver my sentiments in the debate of last night. Something, however, I wish to say, founded in a great measure on what then took place. All that I heard, and all that I saw, on that occasion, tends only to confirm more and more the deep despair in which I am plunged, in contemplating the probable consequences of the present treaty.

Notwithstanding some lofty talk which we heard of dignity and firmness, and which I shall be glad to see realized, and a happy quotation, expressive of the same sentiments, from my right hon. friend not

in 1801, the new ministers settled prelimi"During the prorogation of parliament naries of peace with France and her allies. This measure Mr. Windham regarded, not less in the terms than in the principle, as highly dangerous to the interests of the country. On the first discussion of this subject, which was upon an Address of thanks to his majesty, he was unable to deliver his sentiments; but on the following day, when the report of the Address was brought up, he

Mr. Henry Lascelles said, that as he pronounced the celebrated speech which he afterwards published in the form of a pamhad supported the war, it became his duty phlet, by subjoining to it an Appendix, which to give his reasons for voting in favour of is valuable for the information it contains, He had always considered, as well as for the vigour with which it is comthat the beat way of opposing the politics posed." Amyot's Life of Mr. Windham, p. 48.

the

peace.

now present (Mr. Pitt), the real amount of what was said, seems to be little more than this-that France has, to be sure, the power of destroying us, but that we hope she will not have the inclination; that we are under the paw of the lion, but that he may happen not to be hungry, and, instead of making a meal of us, may turn round in his den, and go to sleep. This is not stated in so many words; but it will be difficult to show, that it is not the fair result of the arguments.

That I should have lived to see the day, when such arguments could be used in a British House of Commons!-that I should have lived to see a House of Commons, where such arguments could be heard with patience, and even with complacency! The substance of the statement is this. We make peace, not from any necessity actually existing (my hon. friends, with great propriety, reject that supposition), but because we foresee a period, at no great distance, when such a necessity must arise; and we think it right that provision for such a case should be made in time. We treat, or, to take at once the more appropriate term, we capitulate, while we have yet some ammunition left. General Menou could do no more. General Menou could do no more in one sense; but in another hedid, I fear, a great deal more, a point to which I must say a word hereafter: he did not abandon to their fate those whom he had invited to follow his fortunes, and to look up to him as their protector. Both, however, capitulated; and upon the plain and ordinary grounds of such a proceeding, namely, that their means of resistance must soon come to an end, and that they had no such hopes of any fortunate turn in their favour, as to justify a continuance of their resistance in the mean time. The conduct of both in the circumstances supposed, was perfectly rational; but let us recollect, that those who stand in such circumstances, be they generals or be they nations, are, to all intents and purposes, conquered! I know not what other definition we want of being conquered, than that a country can say to us, “we can hold out, and you cannot; make peace, or we will ruin you :" and that you

It would have been too much to have urged the plea of poverty in a country, which was at that moment exciting the envy and jealousy of all the world by its exorbitant wealth.

in consequence, make peace, upon terms which must render a renewal of hostilities, under any provocation, more certainly fa tal than a continuation of that war, which you already declare yourselves unable to bear.

If such be the fact, we may amuse our selves with talking what language we please; but we are a conquered people. Buonaparté is as much our master, as he is of Spain or Prussia, or any other of those countries, which, though still permitted to call themselves independent, are, as every body knows, as completely in his power, as if the name of department was already written upon their foreheads. There are but two questions: Is the relation between the countries such, that France can ruin us by continuing the war? and will that relation in substance remain the same, or rather will it not be rendered infinitely worse, by peace, upon the terms now proposed?-If both these questions are answered in the affirmative, the whole is decided, and we live henceforward by sufferance from France.

Sir, before we endeavour to estimate our prospects in this new and honourable state of existence, I wish to consider, for a moment, what the reasonings are, that have determined our choice, as to the particular mode of it; and why we think that ruin by war must be so much more speedy and certain, than ruin by peace. And here I will take pretty much the statement given by the hon. gentlemen who argue on the other side.

I agree, that the question is not, whe ther this peace be good or bad, honourable or dishonourable, adequate or inade quate; whether it places us in a situation better or worse, than we had reason to expect, or than we were in before the war. All these are parts of the question, and many of them very material parts; but the question itself is, whether the peace now proposed, such as it is, be better, or not, than a continuation of hostilities?Whether, according to a familiar mode of speech, we may not go farther and fare worse?-Whether, to take the same form in a manner somewhat more developed and correct, the chances of faring better, compared with the chances of faring worse, and including the certainty of the intermediate evils, do not render it adviseable upon the whole that we should rest contented where we are.

This I take to be the statement of the question, on the present, and on all simi