however, all such laws are simply the infinitely wise methods by which God regulates our physical conditions, their violation or suspension, as in miracles, argues a departure from his ordinary and otherwise uniform practice, and the application of other laws or modes of acting, whether superior or inferior, for accomplishing particular results, such as accrediting the testimony of prophets and apostles. Accordingly, as the necessities which occasion the intervention of supernatural agencies have ceased, the violation or suspension of natural laws in the recovery of the sick are neither to be asked nor expected in answer to believing prayers, for these laws are, as we have said, simply the infinitely wise methods by which God regulates our physical condition in health and disease, recovery and death. In extraordinary providences they may be interfered with and suspended; but such interferences are miraculous occurrences, and now the ages of miracles are past. In ordinary providences they are God's uniform mode of action, and cannot be departed from at the instance of creatures, for in exact proportion to their wisdom would be the unwisdom of violating or suspending them.

Moreover, viewing disease as a punishment for wrong-doing, or as a means of moral discipline, would it not be presumptuous for us, who are necessarily ignorant of all the circumstances of the case, to pray for its removal ?18 Will not the good God withdraw the afflictive rod of his own accord without any solicitation on our part, when it has effected its benevolent purposes? And can we ask or expect him to remove it before that object has been accomplished? In either case prayer looks like an impertinence.19

(4) According to the theory of divine suggestion, it is supposed that God communicates directly with the human spirit, and accomplishes his purposes without the intervention of any miraculous agency what

ever.

Now, in praying for the recovery of the sick on this principle, we must believe that God, in answer to our prayers, will communicate directly with the intelligence of the physician, the clergyman, or the other friends in attendance upon the sufferer, suggesting the appropriate remedy to be employed for the specific disease. This would no doubt be a very comfortable doctrine for the medical faculty, as well as for myriads of sufferers who are languishing on beds of pain for want of the necessary means of relief. But in the first place we do not understand how the Almighty can obtain access to those minds which are closed against him, at whose doors he is represented in scripture as standing without knocking, and of whom it is said "God is not in all

18 This question gives us a glimpse into what, after all, must be in the heart of every holy desire. There will be confidence in the wisdom of God, and distrust in human ability to discover what would be best as regards multitudes of details, more especially in things material.

19 But holy prayer is never in reality an impertinence. It cannot be. It would be an impertinence, indeed, if it assumed the form of dictating to God, or of intimating the precise details of things which would need to be done ere satisfaction of spirit could be enjoyed. But it can never be an impertinence to have holy desires heaving in the soul, and to carry these holy and heaving desires to God.

their thoughts."20 (2) Even supposing that the Almighty has succeeded in introducing the divine suggestion, we do not see how those persons thus favoured are to discriminate between the heavenly thoughts and multitudes of other and earthly thoughts which have got into their minds they know not when or how.21 (3) But assuming that they have satisfactorily discovered and recognised the divine suggestion, will they not be justified in proclaiming it to the world as a divine thought, a supernatural illumination, an infallible remedy for a specific disease? 22 (4) Will that physician, minister, or sick nurse, to whom the divine revelation has been made, not be as truly inspired in that matter as any of the inspired prophets and apostles of God in spiritual things ? 23 (5) Will the inspired communications of the former not be as authoritative and obligatory on the world in regard to bodily diseases, as those of the latter are for the sins of the soul? And, finally, should these inspired suggestions be collected, arranged, and published, would they not make a divine medical guide book-a Bible for medical practice, as sacred in its own department as the Book of God—the Holy Scriptures ?24

Such are the difficulties which occur to us as pertaining to this theory of divine suggestion, which, with the perplexities previously referred to, strongly tempt us to believe, that, perhaps after all, the true province of prayer lies within the moral and spiritual hemisphere of things, for, notwithstanding the difficulties with which even this view of the subject is invested, we feel as if we could nowhere else discover that "region of the illimitable" in which all those wide universalities of promises and strong assurances of answers to prayer so frequently referred to, find their justification and fulfilment. Spiritual benefits are conditioned on the moral character of the suppliant. Wherever the spiritual conditions of prayer are wanting, prayer is in vain; but

20 We should suppose that it is impossible for any to shut God out of their hearts absolutely. The utmost that the most ungodly can do, will be to shut God out of their affections, and, so far as will can control the matter, out of their thoughts. But if God is thus shut out, in so far as he is recognisable and lovable as Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer, he cannot be shut out in so far as his legislative relation is concerned, in virtue of which he utters his imperative in the conscience; neither can be shut out in so far as his retributive relation is concerned, in virtue of which he works out the inner penal consequences of rebellion. Neither can he be shut out in so far as power to touch the springs of thought is concerned,-while it is true, nevertheless, that in a moral system he pleases to put limits to his exercise of this power. 21 It may not be necessary for them to make a formal discrimination.

22 It might be a divine thought—as in a sense every true thought is; it might thus be supernatural illumination in a sense; and yet not an infallible remedy for a specific disease; for specific diseases are always more or less complicated with idiosyncratic conditions, which must modify, in each particular case, the action of remedies.

23 There might be no self-conscious inspiration,-nothing beyond what is spoken of by Elihu, when he said, "the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding" -Job. xxxii. 8; or nothing beyond that which was exemplified in Bezaleel, of whom it is written,- -"I have filled him with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, and in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning works, to work in gold, and in silver, and in brass, etc." Exod. xxxi. 3, 4.

24 By and by perhaps the chief of God's thoughts regarding diseases will be reached, and then, as we may not unreasonably suppose, it will no more be said—“I am sick."

wherever these conditions are supplied, prayer is effectual. Prayer is spiritual exercise, and thus has to do with spiritual things. It is a christian duty, but christianity has to do with the moralities of things. May it not then be the case, now that supernatural or miraculous events have ceased, that our prayers should be supplications for spiritual benefits, and for these alone? 25 Whether this be so or not, we cannot at this moment undertake to say, and shall conclude with the renewed expression of a very sincere desire for assistance to help us out of this obscurity.20

26

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY THE EDITOR OF THE E. R.

FRATER.

The difficulties expressed by our brother once existed in our own mind, and occasioned no little perplexity. They have now vanished. They took their flight when we noticed that there cannot possibly be in a holy soul an unconditional desire for any material blessing. All desires for material blessings are subtended by other elements of desire, which spread out wider and draw deeper. These subtending desires, moreover, when comprehensively considered,-are seen to be but partial aspects of one great element of desire, which absorbs within itself all details of desires, so that no minute details of desires are in themselves absolute desires. They are never detached. They are but partial aspects of one great desire. That great desire is ultimately this-that God's will should be done. In a less ultimate form it is this-that God should do in any given case or conjuncture what it would be best for him to do, all things being considered, all interests being taken fully into account. There is thus in every holy heart a vast ocean of desire, that turns itself to God. On the surface of this ocean there are waves of great generic desires. On the surface of these great waves, there are minor waves of specific desires; and on these minor waves there are multitudes of minute wavelets of desire for multitudes of minute things. Whatever, however, be the direction of these minute wavelets of desire, they are never detached. They are never absolute. There is always, subtending them, a much larger wave, which rises up to God. And this larger wave is, in its turn, but the partial upheaving of a still mightier wave of desire, which comprehends within itself the smaller waves and wavelets. Then, underneath the whole, is the great deep ocean of the soul's desire-absolutely undisturbed by all the little surface occurrences, that produce wavelets and waves, and absolutely at rest in itself,-conscious of no tides but what are simply responsive to the attractive power of the infinite will-the infinite good-will—of God.

If, for instance, a holy man prays for the restoration of a sick child, he cannot pray for such an object with absolute desire. The restoration

25 It cannot be the case, we should suppose, that prayer should be exclusively confined in its range to things spiritual; for prayer is desire lifted up to God. It is impossible for us to divest ourselves of desires in reference to things material. And if we would have all our desires, even our desires in reference to things material, linked on to holiness, we must lift them up to God; that is, we must pray.

26 We feel profound sympathy with our inquiring brother, and thank him most sincerely for the ingenuous manner in which he has stated his difficulties.

of the child might be a curse to the parents, a curse to society at large, a curse to the child itself. His prayer, therefore, for the child's restoration, is but a wavelet of conditional desire, that is subtended by a far larger element of desire which is never omitted, and which never can be omitted, from holy prayer. That far larger element is the desire that God should do what will be best for the child, and for the child's parents, and for all others that are concerned. The prayer will be

answered.

Does the same holy man pray for the conversion of a prodigal son? He cannot present even that prayer absolutely. The desire does not and cannot exist absolutely in his heart. How could it? Would he desire that the prodigal child should be saved although he should not abandon his prodigality? Surely, no. Would he desire that God should force the prodigal to abandon his prodigality ?—should lay violent hands on the soul's moral agency and break it down into ruins? Surely, no. What then? The desire that is expressed in the prayer, is after all a mere wavelet of a wave. It is nothing separate and detached from the wave; and the wave is nothing separate and detached from the great ocean of desire that is heaving beneath. The holy man's prayer, when really understood, is found to be really this, that God should do all that he wisely can for the rescue of the prodigal. And God hearkens and answers. He does what he wisely can; and it is a delightful reality that he can wisely do more, when prayer is presented, than it would be possible or consistent for Him to do were prayer to be withheld.

EDITOR.

AN INAUGURATOR OF A NEW ERA IN PHILOSOPHY !* HALF a year ago, we gave in our pages, at the request of Mr. Robertson himself, a critical notice of his book entitled The Philosophy of the Unconditioned. We were sincerely sorry that we could not take the same view of the merits of the work which the author, not unnaturally, entertained. We said as much, indeed, in commendation, as conscience would permit. And we assured Mr. Robertson that he had our heartiest sympathy in his efforts to know and to do good. But unhappily

or happily-the office of a critic imposes upon him the duty of exercising his thinking faculty, as well as of expressing his kindly feelings. And in the exercise of our thinking faculty, we could not come to the conclusion that Mr. Robertson understood "the Philosophy of the Unconditioned," or that he had succeeded, -as he claims to have done,— in "inaugurating a new era in philosophy." We e were sorry that we could not come to such a conclusion; but we could not help it. And we do think that we might have been excused for our unfortunate

*Evangelical Theology! A reply to the Rev. Dr. Morison, Professor of Exegetical Theology to the Evangelical Union. By Alexander Robertson, author of "The Laws of Thought," "Philosophy of the Unconditioned," etc. Glasgow. 1867.

inability, inasmuch as it must really take a very great mind, we should imagine, to "inaugurate a new era in philosophy."

Whether or not, however, it requires a very great mind to achieve so momentous a revolution, Mr. Robertson is convinced that his is the mind, and that he is the man. "Formerly," says he, "philosophers, theologians, and jurists, based their ratiocinations on a conjecture, a petitio principii, postulation, or hypothesis; but their fabric was liable to be overthrown by a sceptic or sophist doubting or denying their original premise." But "now," he adds,-"now," since "truth is presented" by him "in a truly logical form,"-"now they may proceed without danger of attack from either, as the existence of God is placed beyond the possibility of rational doubt or denial." It is thus a very high achievement which Mr. Robertson believes himself to have performed. And he takes it much amiss of us that we have not cried io-triumphe, or said something tantamount in laudation.

One, uninitiated in Mr. Robertson's laws of thought,-might have imagined that it would be possible enough to differ from Mr. Robertson, and yet not be guilty of any grave offence, still less of philosophical and theological scepticism! But no, it would appear. That is not to be. That must not be. To differ from Mr. Robertson, even when Mr. Robertson differs from all philosophers and theologians, and "inaugurates a new era in thought, is, and must be, scepticism! Whosoever thus differs must take his place side by side with "G. J. Holyoake." That is consequently our proper position. Nothing remains for us, -if we are desirous of being parted from the companionship assigned us, but "at once to retract what we have advanced, frankly admit our error, and openly affirm the truth without frivolity, or be manful enough to meet it with an open denial."

It is a sad predicament into which we have got fixed! And our readers, we hope, will have due compassion on us. We have no alternative, it seems, but to be tossed between too most formidable horns, -the horn of accepting Mr. Robertson's "inauguration of a new era in philosophy," or the other dreadful horn of being an un-" manful" sceptic, like G. J. Holyoake. We are really much to be commiserated. What shall we do?

We are not disposed, we must frankly confess, to stand side by side with "G. J. Holyoake." We believe in God. We believe in Jesus. We believe in God as He is in Jesus. We adore Him. We love Him, "because he first loved us." We hope, therefore, that Mr. Robertson will have mercy on us, and not cruelly insist that we should be contented to be pitched on the left-hand horn of a companionship with "G. J. Holyoake." But then, on the other hand, we cannot get to be disposed, we are sorry to say it,-to take our place at the footstool of Mr. Robertson as proclaiming himself to be the great champion of Theism, and the inaugurator of the golden age of philosophy. Our intellect, somehow or other, has a troublesome trick of asserting its right to think for itself. And when this same intellect finds Mr. Robertson, notwithstanding all his assumptions and assumption, not so much as understanding what philosophers mean by "the unconditioned,"—not so much as understanding even, what they mean by a priori argumentation,