ideas, and destroys the order of it's reasonings. There is too in the nature of this science above all others what is peculiarly attractive, and draws on the mind as it were by a kind of violence, in the pleasing satisfaction that it derives from the gradual unfolding and discovery of truth, as well as in the certainty of it's conclusions. While in every other walk of science doubt and uncertainty more or less prevail, the mind reposes on the deductions of mathematical investigation with the most unlimited confidence. Even in history, which ought to record with truth and impartiality, as professing to instruct by example, to communicate knowledge and wisdom to future generations by the experience of the past, the cautious reader is afraid of giving full credence to the tale that it unfolds. He is aware how many facts are destitute of foundation, how many are misrepresented by prejudice and passion, how many are totally suppressed by ignorance or design; aware how little we can enter into the mo tives of the agents, from which the very colour and character of their actions is derived; how little we know of many of those subordinate causes, that have operated to produce important changes, and are necessary to their complete elucidation. Had we full information in all these respects, in what a different light should we contemplate many of the events of history, and what opposite conclusions should we deduce from them! Again, what are all the objects of metaphysical inquiry but at best ingenious speculations, on which the difference of opinion that prevails sufficiently demonstrates the insufficiency of the evidence, with which they present themselves to the mind? Many of them are confessedly beyond the reach of human comprehension: in our inquiries upon these subjects, therefore, we are wandering only in uncertainty, and if at any time a gleam appear to break in upon us, it is only to render more visible the darkness, with which we are surrounded. The lucubrations of classical learning will scarcely admit of a competition. In comparison with these noble theories they are acknowledged, by one the most competent to decide*, to be but mean and grovelling, undignified and destitute of beauty. If the encouragement to these studies therefore be thus inviting, and the labours thus recompensed, no wonder that the mathematician pursues them with a more than ordinary zeal; for what can be a more sublime object of inquiry, more worthy of our ra tional faculties, more suited to the dignity of our natures, than the investigation and discovery of truth? and truth of the noblest form, that can present itself to the mind of man; that discloses to us the primary and fundamental laws, on which the economy of the material universe depends, and from which all the order and variety of motion proceed, and to which above all we are indebted for that true system of philosophy, which is the boast of modern times, and which represents all the conjec * See Life of Gilbert Wakefield, tures tures of the wisest ancients as but the in fancy of human genius. Those sublime discoveries, which have raised the human intellect to such a height of glory, which have afforded the noblest proof of what the mind of man can do, are founded on the laws of mathematics, those original truths, which owe not their existence to secondary causes, but are fixed in their very essence, eternal and immutable, on the basis of which alone therefore true philosophy can stand, and whence all our certain knowledge can alone be derived; they may therefore be considered as immediate emanations from the divine mind, imparted to us by God, that we might not altogether wander in doubt and darkness, but discern something of the manner in which he operates in nature, and trace his stupendous power and greatness in the creation and government of the universe. It is a weakness incident to man, to overrate the importance of that to which he is particularly devoted; but the mathematician may may perhaps be exempted from this charge, when the superior dignity and usefulness of his science are considered, and the services which it has rendered to all the elegant, convenient, and useful arts of life. In this world of proportion, number, and mechanism, in which we are placed, there is scarcely an object to which our attention can be directed, that the comprehensive science of mathematics does not include within it's range. But independently of it's practical utility in the business of life, mathematical knowledge, though it should never be applied to the arts and sciences, cannot be admitted to the mind, without contributing to it's most valuable improvement. The more enlarged conceptions, which it gives us of the things around us, invigorate our intellectual powers, train our minds to order, to clearness, to précision in our ideas, habituate us to close and solid reasoning, teach us to guard against the illusions of fancy, to break through the entanglements of sophistry, and to seek for and to rest in conviction; but f. conviction VOL. I. |