Edinburgh, and their authors should receive all the protection which the law already provides for the works which are imported to this country from those capitals. The Repeal of the Union would create a numerous resident class of readers, and the contention of political principles, an unavoidable publication of works relating to such controversies; and whether the foundation were laid upon pamphlets or poetry, the rapid advance of national literature would be the consequence. The opportunity to revive the literature of Ireland has been allowed to pass; and the successful example of Burns has been unheeded by Moore. The adhesion of our Irish authors to the London publishers appears to have sealed the fate of Irish literature, and to have precluded almost the possibility of its re-establishment by any other means than a repeal of the Union.

As far as the improved taste of the people is favourable to such an object, the indications are encouraging to a degree; and the avidity with which national themes are now sought for and enjoyed by all ranks, gives promise that the long-neglected treasures of our country will not want admirers when her talented sons have sufficient enterprise to explore and exhibit them. The increasing consciousness of political importance is creating a corresponding national vanity, and subjects which were too gloomy to dwell upon in the days of our degradation, we can now afford to enjoy for their melancholy beauty in the buoyancy of spirit which is the companion of our enfranchise

ment.

PARLIAMENTARY PLEDGES.

SOME circumstances of recent occurrence, connected with the approaching general election, have induced us to notice the subject of parliamentary pledges, sooner and more hastily than we desired. It has been discussed with much warmth in England, since the passing of the Reform Bill; but, until lately, it seems to have excited very little public attention in Ireland. It is not undeserving of remark, that the controversy in England has been principally maintained by those politicians and journalists most distinguished for their advocacy of Reform, and of popular rights generally: and that in Ireland, also, it is confined at present to the liberal party. The question appears to be first, Whether it be consistent with the spirit of the constitution, and the deliberative character of the House of Commons, for electors to require pledges from their representatives, to pursue a particular course of policy upon any specified measures, in Parliament; and next, Whether it be expedient or necessary to exact such pledges at the present period. The London Journals have shed much ink to little purpose upon these simple, but important points; they have disputed fiercely enough the principle involved, but have shunned any decisive declaration respecting the practice to be recommended. The most ardent anti-pledgist does not deny the occasional utility of the proposed system, while the firmest pledgist seems willing to dis

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pense with it, under certain circumstances. This inconclusive state of opinion, in authorities sufficiently dogmatic, in general, must appear strange to those unacquainted with the peculiar powers that govern the London press, and so shamefully shackle its sentiments. The truth is, that the leading Whigs and the holiday Radicals, are as much averse to give pledges to the people, as the Tories; but they perceive, that the people seem bent upon obtaining this species of security from them, and hence the temporising, indecisive tone of their organs on the subject. In Ireland, on the contrary, where the liberal journals are less subject to the sinister influence of patronage, and, therefore, more fearless and consistent advocates of the interests of the community, we find every one, whose opinions deserve the slightest respect, concurring in the propriety and necessity of pledges. But while the political casuists in England have been debating the punctilio to be observed upon the point, the people, in their Unions, and Electoral Committees, have been resolving to enforce compliance with their wishes; and we believe the real difficulty, in both countries, is now to determine upon such pledges as will most extensively, and efficiently, combine the strength of the popular party. We suspect, moreover, that the horror of many anti-pledgists would be much mitigated, could they hope to modify the pledges according to their own personal interests, or those of their party, and lessen a responsibility regarded as exceedingly inconvenient and obnoxious by them at all times. We cannot yet estimate the favour such easy morality may find with English electors in this age of reform, but we anticipate that their Irish compeers will spurn with indignation any attempt to evade the tests they deem essential. There are, however, some men, in the class of candidates, whose motives are not to be lightly impugned, who express a sincere repugnance to the system, and, therefore, we think it necessary to vindicate its justice, and convince them, if possible, of its advantages.

No species of superstition has clung more obstinately to the human mind, than an overweening reverence for certain political institutions. This feeling is generally powerful in proportion to the antiquity of its object; and it is maintained by an absurd reliance upon what is termed, the wisdom of our ancestors. Many men who would justly ridicule the slightest respect for the opinions of their predecessors on other important subjects, are still weak enough to surrender up their judgment to them in politics, as if their knowledge on this matter transcended all experience, and their laws should bind all ages.They will gravely tell us, that when the world was two, or six, centuries younger, politicians were much wiser than at present, forgetting that the men who armed for MAGNA CHARTA, and wrung the BILL OF RIGHTS from their tyrants, have left us examples infinitely more valuable than their services. There is another error still more common, and equally injurious, in the assumption, that our institutions fulfil the functions attributed to them; and this, combined with the fiction of their supreme excellence, renders every attempt to improve them a work of difficulty, blame and risk, such as few men will undertake. Hence have defects and abuses continued to accumulate, sanctified by the time that multiplied them. But the nations are no

longer in their nonage; they will not, in future, submit to be swaddled like infants; they are not to be led by the notions of the nursery; they are breaking its toys, and laughing at its bugbears. More enlarged and correct ideas of the rights and duties of men are now springing up, and extending throughout society, and this must lead to important changes throughout our system. Things will no longer be respected for the mere fact of their existence, but for their general utility. A plausible theory will not justify an injurious practice. Custom will not sanction error. Already one great step towards improvements of this nature has been made in the reform of our representative system; but does any rational man consider that reform as sufficient? No!-the very fact of the demand of pledges on particular questions from our representatives, proves that real representation is not yet attained; and no man who desires to see popular interests exercise a wholesome and effective control in the legislature, can be satisfied until every individual entitled to the privilege of representation has reason to feel that he is really represented. We cannot, therefore, concur in the opinion of those who oppose the system of pledges, as inconsistent with the character of a member of parliament, and as an unusual and unnecessary restriction on his free will; on the contrary, we think it essential to the safety and satisfaction of the country, under existing circumstances. If the House of Commons were constituted in a thoroughly popular manner, and if its members did really fulfil the intention of their return, then, indeed, pledges might be unnecessary; but as long as its constitution is subject to the irregular, undue, and corrupt influence, to which even the reform bill leaves it exposed, and as long as its members evince the failings and are actuated by the vicious motives common to human nature, so long must we require greater securities than we at present possess. Those who demand precedent on a question like this reject a higher authority-reason; but we assert that even precedent is in favour of the practice of pledges. Mankind seldom suggest or adopt innovations in their laws or customs, but such as are calculated to remedy some defect or evil in their condition. This is, indeed, a law of nature universal in its application. The philosophic mind must, therefore, regard the demand for pledges as a proof that circumstances have required such a security for the conduct of the representives generally; and the fact will in itself justify the demand without reference to the sanction of custom. The more general the demand is, the more complete will be the justification; and for this reason, even though the constitution did not heretofore recognise the principle of the proposed system, that which is the true basis of all law, the universal fixed desire of the community, for whose advantage it is designed, should establish its abstract propriety. It is not to be denied, that wherever the public mind is in a state of political activity, and the subject of pledges has been considered, there is an anxiety, a firm resolution, to enforce them. But how is it shewn that constitutional principle is opposed to them? By the silence of the authorities, and the novelty of the practice. Practice !-We have the authority of the united nation, and the king, for saying that the practice by which a majority of the House of Commons was returned for cen

turies, was a flagitious violation of the constitution. For authority, let us consultour ancestors"-not to consecrate their errors, and excuse our own by imitating them, but to learn that which they can best tell us their design in establishing suffrage and representation. When society began to emerge from that which is termed the savage state, and the supremacy of mere force gave place to civil rights; and before the artificial distinctions of rank, accompanied by power and privilege of which the abuse is to have made them hereditary-had subverted the natural equality of man, all the affairs in which the members of the community had a common interest, were regulated by the general will of the people at large, expressed at assemblies held for such purposes. In the progress of time, and of that which is termed civilization-which is always rapid in proportion to the increase of population, relatively to the extent of territorythe objects of legislation became more numerous, and the duty, of course, more complicated. The difficulty of ascertaining satisfactorily the will of a populous community, or of guiding it towards any desired end, where every man had an equal right to decide on any particular question of policy, naturally led (as in England, for instance,) to a more simple and efficient plan of legistation. Besides this, the institution of a privileged class created in its members interests and views distinct from those of the rest of the community, and frequently conflicting with them; and as their opponents were the more numerous class, they found their projects of aggrandisement disagreeably controlled by the power of the many. Hence arose the limitation of the legislative right, and the separation of the threefold powers of the state, under the denominations of regal, noble, and commonal, which together constitute the sovereign power, and of which the two former, as might be expected, when freed from the restraint of the latter, continued for a long time to monopolize, and use, both the legislative and the executive authorities for their own exclusive advantage. It was necessary, however, to include the unprivileged class, at least nominally, in this subdivision of power, and the House of Commons was accordingly established. In the constistitution of this body it was determined to shun the inconvenience attending the deliberations of large assemblages of the people; but as every man in the community had an interest in its decisions, it was essential to give him an influence and control over it, and for this purpose the obvious mode of representation was suggested. Therefore the commons received the right of selecting members of their own class in the different districts, towns, and other portions of the community throughout the country, to represent their interests and wishes in the great council which governed the commonwealth. But as in these times, when feudalism exercised its atrocious tyranny over the realm, great numbers of the people were under the direct control of the privileged class, and as they unhappily possessed very little knowledge of the affairs of government, it was found necessary to secure sufficient independence and intelligence in the constituency to ensure the free appointment of men fitted to discharge the duties of representatives, and hence the necessity of a property qualification for the right of suffrage. It was for these reasons, and these only,

that the legislative authority was transferred from the people at large to representatives elected by them, and that the right of choosing these representatives was restricted by liability to undue influence, or incapacity of judgment in the electors. It is manifest, therefore, that the original design of the constitution was to give every commoner a voice in the selection of the members of the House of Commons, provided the individual were not disqualified by the direct coercive controul of the powerful and wealthy over his will, or by deficiency of judgment, arising either from natural imperfections, or from ignorance-which is still improperly estimated by poverty. It must be assumed, in consonance with this design, that the members elected should be competent, and disposed, to represent truly and efficiently the wants and interests of their particular constituents, and to assist, by their advice and exertions, their associates, and the other estates of parliament, in the management of all affairs connected with the government and security of the realm. This was certainly the intention of the constitution; but unhappily it was never yet realised-it was frustrated by the despotic usurpations of the monarchy, and the more cautious but equally criminal encroachments of the aristocracy, upon the privileges of the people. It is true that of late ages the power of the Commons has been increasing, but no man who examines the origin and objects of their power, can maintain that it is even at present equally free and vigorous as at first, or adequate to fulfil its real design. But the day is not far distant, when the cumbrous and corrupting system opposed to its growth will sink into dust, like those unwholesome plants that wither and perish from the very exhaustion created by their own existence. It is to be expected that every honest patriot will aid to clear away the vicious and impoverishing rubbish, and to restore and cherish the healthy energies of popular liberty. It is the desire of every rational upright man to remove the evils of our condition legally, and it is the peculiar duty of our representatives to render the laws sufficient for this purpose. There is no doubt that there are many candidates for the office of representative, who are sincerely disposed to promote this change, and some among them are justly regarded as the most efficient and devoted advocates of it; but the experience of centuries has taught men to distrust the motives and professions of members of parliament as they would those of other men capable of deceit, and exposed to temptation; and thus has arisen the demand for further control over their conduct in Parliament than is afforded by their discretionary sense of duty. This demand is met by some well-meaning men with fierce opposition-the result of that superstitious repugnance to innovation, with which, as we have noticed, shallow and timid politicians reject every popular measure not sanctioned by their "ancestors." Now, we think that no man who admits that the House of Commons was constituted, or should be constituted, in the manner and for the purposes we have stated, and who will not deny the past and prospective corruption of the representative class, can conscientiously refuse to sanction the proposed security, novel though it be. It is a futile and foolish pretext, that it is inconsistent with the character of a representative, to bind himself to obey the will of his