IV. 1808. BOOK and with respect to the former accusation, a better explanation may be found in the peculiar disposition of this extraordinary man, who was notoriously indolent, and unlearned in the abstract science of war. It was necessary for him to see, in order to act; his character seemed to be asleep until some eminent danger aroused all the marvellous energy and fortitude with which nature had endowed him. The success at Tudela fell short of what Napoleon had a right to expect from his previous dispositions, but it sufficed to break the Spanish strength on that side, and to lay the kingdoms of Aragon and Navarre, and the province of New Castille, as bare as the northern part of Spain was laid by the victory of Espinosa. From the frontiers of France to those of Portugal, from the sea-coast to the Tagus, the country was now overwhelmed. Madrid, Zaragoza, and the British army, indeed, lifted their heads a little way above the rising waters, but the eye looked in vain for an efficient barrier against the flood, which still poured on with unabated fury. The divided, weak state of the English troops led the emperor to conclude that sir John Moore would instantly retire into Portugal. Lasnes he commanded to pursue Palafox, to seize the important position of Monte Toreño, to summon Zaragoza, and to offer a complete amnesty to all persons in the town, without reservation, thus bearing testiS. mony to the gallantry of the first defence. His own Operations, attention was fixed on Madrid. That capital was the rallying point of all the broken Spanish, and of all his own pursuing divisions, and it was the centre of all interests, a commanding height from whence a beneficial stream of political benefits might descend to allay, or a driving storm of war pour down to extinguish, the fire of insurrection. Journal of MS. CHAPTER II. II. 1808. THE French patroles sent towards the Somosierra CHAP. ascertained, on the 21st, that above six thousand men were entrenching themselves in the gorge of the mountains; that a small camp at Sepulveda blocked the roads leading upon Segovia; and that general Heredia was preparing to secure the passes of the Guadarama. Napoleon, however, having resolved to force the Somosierra, and reach the capital before Castaños could arrive there, ordered Ney to pursue the army of the centre without intermission, and directed the fourth corps to continue its march from Carion by Palencia, Valladolid, Olmedo, and Segovia. The movement of this corps is worthy of the attention of military men. We shall find it confusing the spies and country people; overawing the flat country of Leon and Castile; protecting the right flank of the army; menacing Gallicia and Salamanca; keeping the heads of Moore's and Baird's columns from advancing, and rendering it dangerous for them to attempt a junction; threatening the line of Hope's march from the Tagus to the Guadarama; dispersing Heredia's corps, and finally turning the pass of Somosierra, without ever ceasing to belong to the concentric movement of the great army upon Madrid. S. Journal of MS. The time lost in transmitting the intelligence of the victory at Tudela was productive of serious con- Operations, sequences. The officer despatched with these fresh instructions, found Ney and Moncey (Lasnes remained sick at Tudela), each advanced two days' march in the wrong direction. BOOK 1808. The first, as we have seen, was at Mallen, preparing to attack Zaragoza; the second was at Almunio, near Calatayud, pursuing Castaños. They were consequently obliged to countermarch, and during the time thus lost, the people of Zaragoza recovering from the consternation into which they were at first thrown by the appearance of the flying troops, made arrangements for a vigorous defence. Castaños also escaped to Siguenza, without any further loss than what was inflicted in a slight action at Burvieca, where general Maurice Mathieu's division came up with his rear-guard. The emperor quitted Aranda on the 28th with the guards, the first corps, and the reserve, and marched towards Somosierra. Head-quarters were at Boucequillas on the 29th. A detachment sent to attack the camp at Sepulveda failed, with a loss of fifty or sixty men; but the Spaniards, struck with a panic after the action, quitted their post, which was very strong, and fled in disorder towards Segovia. The 30th, the French advanced guard reached the foot of the Somosierra. General St. Juan, whose force now amounted to ten or twelve thousand men, was judiciously posted; sixteen pieces of artillery, planted in the neck of the pass, swept the road along the whole ascent, which was exceedingly steep and favourable for the defence. The infantry were advantageously placed on the right and left, in lines, one above another, and some entrenchments made in the more open parts strengthened the whole position. PASSAGE OF THE SOMOSIERRA. At day-break, three French battalions attacked St. Juan's right, three more assailed his left, and as many marched along the causeway in the centre, six guns II. 1808. supported the last column. The French wings soon CHAP. spread over the mountain side, and commenced a warm skirmishing fire. At this moment Napoleon arrived. He rode into the mouth of the pass, and attentively examined the scene before him. The infantry were making no progress; a thick fog mixed with smoke hung upon the ascent; suddenly, as if by inspiration, he ordered the Polish lancers of his guard to charge up the causeway, and seize the Spanish battery. The first squadron was thrown into confusion, by a fire which levelled the foremost ranks. General Krazinski rallied them in a moment, and under cover of the smoke, and the thick vapours of the morning, the regiment, with a fresh impetus, proceeded briskly up the mountain, sword in hand. As those gallant horsemen passed, all the Spanish infantry fired, and fled from the entrenchments on each side, towards the summit of the causeway; so that, when the Poles fell in among the gunners, and took the battery, the whole Spanish army was in flight, abandoning arms, ammunition, baggage, and a number of prisoners. This surprising exploit, in the glory it conferred upon one party, and the disgrace it heaped upon the other, can hardly be paralleled in the annals of war. It is indeed almost incredible, even to those who are acquainted with Spanish armies, that a position, in itself nearly impregnable, and defended by twelve thousand men, should, without any panic, but merely from a deliberate sense of danger, be abandoned, at the wild charge of a few squadrons, which two companies of good infantry would have effectually stopped. Yet some of the Spanish regiments so shamefully beaten here, had been victorious at Baylen a few months before; and general St. Juan's dispositions at Somosierra were far better than Reding's at the BOOK former battle; but thus absolutely does Fortune govern in war! IV. 1808. Col. Graham's Correspondce. The charge of the Poles, viewed as a simple military operation, was extravagantly foolish, but taken as the result of Napoleon's sagacious estimate of the real value of Spanish troops, and his promptitude in seizing the advantage, offered by the smoke and fog that clung to the side of the mountain, it was a felicitous example of intuitive genius. The routed troops were pursued towards Buitrago by the French cavalry. St. Juan himself broke through the French on the side of Sepulveda, and gained the camp of Heredia at Segovia; but the cavalry of the fourth corps approached, and the two generals crossing the Guadarama, united some of the fugitives from Somosierra, on the Madrid side of the mountains, and endeavoured to enter that capital. The appearance of a French patrole terrified the vile cowards that followed them; the multitude once more fled to Talavera de la Reyna, and there consummated their intolerable villany by murdering their unfortunate general, and fixing his mangled body to a tree; after which, dispersing, they carried dishonour and fear into their respective provinces. The Somosierra being forced, the imperial army came down from the mountains; the sixth corps hastened up from the side of Alcala and Guadalaxara; the central junta fled from Aranjuez; and the remnant of the forces under Castaños, being intercepted on the side of Madrid, and pressed by Ney in the rear, turned towards the Tagus. The junta, while flying with indecent haste, spread a thousand false reports, and with more than ordinary pertinacity, endeavoured to deceive the people and the English general; a task, in which they were strongly aided by the weak credulity |