VI. 1808. successful, but against the British it must always fail, CHAP. because the English infantry is sufficiently firm, intelligent, and well disciplined, to wait calmly in lines for the adverse masses, and sufficiently bold to close upon them with the bayonet. 11o. The column is undoubtedly excellent for all movements short of the actual charge, but as the Macedonian phalanx was unable to resist the open formation of the Roman legion, so will the close column be unequal to sustain the fire and charge of a good line aided by artillery. The natural repugnance of men to trample on their own dead and wounded, the cries and groans of the latter, and the whistling of the cannon-shots as they tear open the ranks, produce the greatest disorder, especially in the centre of attacking columns, which, blinded by smoke, unstedfast of footing, and bewildered by words of command coming from a multitude of officers crowded together, can neither see what is taking place, nor make any effort to advance or retreat without increasing the confusion: no example of courage can be useful, no moral effect can be produced by the spirit of individuals, except upon the head, which is often firm, and even victorious at the moment when the rear is flying in terror. Nevertheless, well managed columns are the very soul of military operations; in them is the victory, and in them also is safety to be found after a defeat. The secret consists in knowing when and where to extend the front. ARMISTICE. CONVENTION. 1o. It is surprising, that Junot having regained Torres Vedras, occupied Mafra, and obtained an armistice, did not profit by the terms of the latter to prepare for crossing the Tagus and establishing the BOOK II. 1808. war on the frontiers. Kellerman ascertained during his negotiation, that sir John Moore was not arrived; and it was clear, that until he did arrive the position of Montechique could neither be attacked nor turned. There was nothing in the armistice itself, nor the way in which it had been agreed to, which rendered it dishonourable to take such an advantage. The opening thus left for Junot to gain time, was sir Arthur Wellesley's principal objection to the preliminary treaty. 2o. With regard to the convention, although some of its provisions were objectionable in point of form, and others imprudently worded, yet taken as a whole, it was a transaction fraught with prudence and wisdom. Let it be examined upon fair military and political grounds; let it even be supposed for the sake of argument, that sir Arthur unimpeded by sir Harry Burrard, had pursued his own plan, and that Junot, cut off from Lisbon and the half of his forces had been driven upon the Tagus, he was still master of flying to Almeida or Elvas: the thousand men left in Santarem would have joined him in the Alemtejo, or fallen down to the capital; and what then would have been the advantages that could render the convention undesirable? The British army, exclusive of sir John Moore's division, had only provisions, or transport for provisions, sufficient to last for ten or twelve days, and the fleet was the only resource when that supply should be exhausted. But a gale from any point between the southward and north-west, would have driven the ships away or have cast them on a leeshore. Hence an indispensable preliminary measure would have been to open the mouth of the Tagus as a security for the fleet; but without occupying Cas VI. 1808. caes, Bugio, and St. Julians, that was impossible. To CHAP. take the last-named fort would have required ten days' open trenches at the least, and the heavy artillery must have been landed in some of the small creeks, and Proceedings of the dragged by force of men over the mountains, because Board of the artillery horses were scarcely able to draw the Inquiry. field guns, and the country was incapable of supplying assistance of that kind. In the mean time, the French troops in Lisbon, and those upon the heights of Almada and in the men-of-war, retiring tranquilly through the Alemtejo, would have united with Junot; or if he had fallen back upon Almeida, they could have retired upon Elvas and La-Lyppe. In this argument the Russians have not been considered, but whatever his secret wishes might have been, Siniavin must have joined the French or surrendered his squadron in a disgraceful manner. This would have increased Junot's force by six thousand men; and it may here be observed, that even after the arrival of sir John Moore, only twenty-five thousand Appendix, British infantry were fit for duty. Let it be supposed that the forts were taken, the English fleet in the river, the resources of Lisbon organized, and the battering guns and ammunition necessary for the siege of Elvas transported to Abrantes by water. Seventy miles of land remained to traverse, and then three months of arduous operations in the sickly season, and in the most pestilent of situations, would have been the certain consequences of any attempt to reduce that fortress. Did the difficulty end there? No! Almeida remained, and in the then state of the roads of Portugal, and taking into consideration only the certain and foreseen obstacles, it is not too much to say, that six months more would have been wasted before the country could be entirely freed from the No. 22. 268 BOOK invaders. II. 1808. HISTORY OF THE PENINSULAR WAR.. The But long before that period Napoleon's eagles would have soared over Lisbon again. conclusion is inevitable; the convention was a great and solid advantage for the allies, a blunder on the part of the French. With the momentary exception of Junot's threat to burn Lisbon if his terms were not complied with, we look in vain for any traces of that vigour which urged the march from Alcantara; we are astonished to perceive the man, who, in the teeth of an English fleet, in contempt of fourteen thousand Portuguese troops, and regardless of a population of three hundred thousand souls, dared, with a few hundred tired grenadiers, to seize upon Lisbon, so changed in half a year, so sunk in energy, that, with twenty-five thousand good soldiers, he declined a manly effort, and resorted to a convention to save an army which was really in very little danger. But such and so variable is the human mind, the momentary slave of every attraction, yet ultimately true to self-interest. When Junot entered Portugal, power, honours, fame, emolument, nay, even a throne, was within his reach, and toil and danger were overlooked in such gorgeous society; but when he proposed the convention he was only with the latter companions; fame flitted at a distance, and he easily persuaded himself that prudence and vigour could not be yoked together. A saying attributed to Napoleon perfectly describes the convention in a few words. 66 I was going to send Junot before a council of war, but, fortunately, the English tried their generals, and saved me the pain of punishing an old friend!" BOOK III. CHAPTER I. I. 1808. THE convention of Cintra being followed by the CHAP. establishment of a regency at Lisbon, the plans of the bishop and junta of Oporto were disconcerted, and Portugal was restored to a state of comparative tranquillity; for the Portuguese people being of a simple character, when they found their country relieved from the presence of a French army, readily acknowledged the benefit derived from the convention, and refused to listen to the pernicious counsels of the factious prelate and his mischievous coadjutors. Thus terminated what may be called the convulsive struggle of the Peninsular war. Up to that period a remarkable similarity of feeling and mode of acting betrayed the common origin of the Spanish and Portuguese people. A wild impatience of foreign aggression, extravagant pride, vain boasting, and at passionate reckless resentment, were common to both nations; but there the likeness ceased, and the finer marks of national character which had been impressed upon them by their different positions in the political world, became distinctly visible. Spain, holding from time immemorial a high rank among the great powers, and more often an oppressor than oppressed, haughtily rejected all advice. Unconscious of her actual weakness and ignorance, and |