I.

Loison, with four thousand infantry, should proceed CHAP to Almeida, and from thence co-operate with Bessieres in the event of an insurrection taking place in Spain.

Genaral Thiebault complains of this order as injurious to Junot, ill combined, and the result of a foolish vanity that prompted the emperor to direct all the armies himself; yet it would be difficult to show that the arrangement was faulty. Avril's division, if he had not halted at Tavora, for which there was no reason, would have ensured the capture of Seville, and if Dupont's defeat had not rendered the victory of Rio Seco useless, Loison's division would have been eminently useful in controlling the country behind Bessieres, in case the latter invaded Gallicia; and it was well placed to intercept the communication between the Castilian and the Estremaduran armies. Thus the emperor's combinations, if they had been fully executed, would have brought seventy thousand men to bear on the defence of Portugal.

1808.

in Las

Such was the military attitude of the French in May; their political situation was far from being so favourable. Junot's natural capacity was very considerable; but it was neither enlarged by study, nor strengthened by mental discipline. Of intemperate Napoleon habits, indolent in business, yet prompt and brave in Casas. action, quick to give offence, ready to forget an in- Foy. jury; at one moment a great man, the next below mediocrity, Junot was at all times unsuited to the task of conciliating and governing a people like the Portuguese, who, with passions as sudden and vehement as his own, retain a sense of injury or insult with incredible tenacity; otherwise, although he had many difficulties to encounter, and his duty towards France was in some instances incompatible with good

1808.

BOOK policy towards Portugal, he was not without reII. sources for establishing a strong French interest. But he possessed neither the ability nor disposition to soothe a nation that, without having suffered a defeat, was suddenly bowed to a foreign yoke.

Foy.

The pride and the poverty of the Portuguese, and the influence of ancient usages, interfered with Junot's policy. The monks and friars, and most of the nobility, were inimical to his sway; and all the activity of the expelled British factory, and the secret warfare of spies and writers in the pay of England, were directed to undermine his plans, and to render him and his nation odious; but on the other hand, he was in possession of the government and of the capital, he had a fine army, and he could offer novelty so dear to the multitude, and he had the name and the fame of Napoleon to assist him. The promises of power are always believed by the many; and there were abundance of grievances to remedy, and wrongs to redress in Portugal. And such a strong feeling existed among the best educated men (and especially at the universities) of dislike to the Braganza family, and in favour of a reformed system, that steps were actually taken to have prince Eugene declared king of Portugal; and we shall find hereafter, that this spirit was not extinguished at a much later date.

With these materials, and the military vanity of the Portuguese to work upon, Junot might have established a powerful French interest; and under an active government, the people would not long have regretted the loss of an independence that had no wholesome breathing amidst the corrupt stagnation of the old system. But the arrogance of a conqueror, and the necessities of an army, which was to be subsisted and paid by an impoverished people, soon gave

1.

1808.

rise to all kinds of oppression; private abuses followed CHAP. close upon the heels of public rapacity, and insolence left its sting to rankle in the wounds of the injured. The malignant humours broke out in quarrels and assassinations, and the severe punishments that ensued, many of them unjust and barbarous in the highest degree, created rage, not terror; for the nation had not tried its strength in battle, and would not believe that it was weak.

The ports were rigorously blockaded by the English fleet, the troubles in Spain interrupted the commerce Thiebault. in grain, by which Portugal had been usually supplied from that country, and the unhappy people suffered under the triple pressure of famine, warcontributions, and a foreign yoke. With all external aliment thus cut off, and a hungry army gnawing at its vitals, the nation could not remain tranquil; and although the first five months of Junot's government was, with the exception of a slight tumult at Lisbon (when the arms of Portugal were taken down), undisturbed by commotion, the whole country was soon ripe for a general insurrection. The harvest, however, proved remarkably fine, and Junot hailed the prospect of returning plenty, as a relief from his principal difficulty; but as one danger disappeared, another presented itself. The Spanish insurrection excited the hopes of the Portuguese; agents from the neighbouring juntas communicated secretly with the Spanish generals in Portugal. The capture of the French fleet in Cadiz became known, assassinations multiplied; the pope's nuncio fled on board the English fleet, and all things tended to a general explosion. The English agents were of course actively engaged in promoting this spirit; and the appearance of two English fleets at different points of the coast,

II.

BOOK having troops on board, produced great alarm among the French, and augmented the impatient fierceness of the Portuguese.

1808.

Among the various ways in which the people discovered their hatred of the invaders, one was very characteristic: an egg was marked with certain letters by a chemical process, and then placed in a nest; being taken from thence, it was exhibited, and created a great sensation; the letters were interpreted to indicate the speedy coming of don Sebastian, king of Portugal, who, like Arthur of romantic memory, was supposed to be hidden in a secret island, waiting for the destined period when he was to re-appear and restore his country to her ancient glory. The trick was turned against the contrivers; other eggs prophesied in the most impatriotic manner, but the belief of the Sebastianists lost nothing of its zeal; many people, and those not of the most uneducated classes, were often observed upon the highest points of the hills, casting earnest looks towards the ocean, in the hopes of descrying the island in which their long lost hero was detained.

CHAPTER II.

II.

1808.

THE first serious blow was struck at Oporto; the CHAP. news of what had taken place all over Spain was known there in June. General Bellesta, the chief Spanish officer, immediately took an honourable and resolute part. He made the French general Quesnel, with his staff, prisoners; after which, calling together the Portuguese authorities, he declared that they were free to act as they judged most fitting for their own interests, and then marched to Gallicia with his army and captives.

The opinions of the leading men at Oporto were divided upon the great question of resistance; but, after some vicissitudes, the boldest side was successful, and the insurrection, although at one moment quelled by the French party, was finally established in Oporto, and soon extended along the banks of the Duero and the Minho, and to those parts of Beira which lie between the Mondego and the sea-coast.

Junot being informed of this event, perceived that no time was to be lost in disarming the Spanish regiments quartered in the neighbourhood of Lisbon: but this was not an easy operation. Carraffa's division was above six thousand men, and without employing the garrisons of the citadel and forts of Lisbon, it was difficult to collect an equal force of French. The suspicions of the Spanish regiments had been already excited, they were reluctant to obey the French generals, and one quartered at Alcacer de Sal had Thiebault. actually resisted the orders of the general-in-chief

himself. To avoid a tumult was the great object, be