ALIWAL AND SIR HARRY SMITH.

WITH A PORTRAIT.

If anybody should wish to detract from the fame of Sir Harry Smith as a skilful general, by urging that he has seen service, and had hard fighting enough to make him one, while we doubted the correctness of such objector's conclusion, we should be unable to deny the facts upon which he arrived at it.

Sir Harry Smith was at the capture of Monte Video; at the attack upon Buenos Ayres; he served during the first campaign of the Peninsular war, from the battle of Vimiera to that of Corunna; he was at the battles of Sabajal and Fuente d'Onor; at the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos; at the battles of Salamanca, Vittoria, Orthes, the Pyrenees, and Toulouse. He was at Washington and New Orleans, and he was at Waterloo.

In all these actions Sir Harry Smith approved himself a gallant officer. But it is not as a brave soldier, but as a distinguished commander, we would at present view him; and, accordingly, by way of refreshing the reader's memory, we give as an accompaniment to a portrait of "the hero of Aliwal," a brief sketch of those operations in India of which he had the conduct, that have conferred enduring lustre upon his name.

It will be remembered that when the British army first advanced to meet the invasion of the Sikhs, it was deemed necessary to withdraw a great part of the forces which were assembled with the view of protecting Loodiana, for the purpose of effecting a combination with that portion of the army which was advancing from Umballah, and thereby to be in a position to meet the Sikhs at Ferozepore with a larger and more concentrated force. The effect of this step was, unquestionably, to leave Loodiana open to an attack by any force the Sikhs might bring to bear in that quarter; but the chief object being to attack their main army at Ferozepore, points of secondary importance were for the moment neglected. The great present object was to concentrate a powerful army at all events, and with these combined forces to strike a decisive blow.

No sooner, however, had the enemy been driven across the Sutlej, after the battles of the 21st and 22nd December 1845, and our army placed in a position unassailable by the enemy on the opposite side, than it was thought advisable to strengthen our force at Loodiana, not only to provide against any contingencies, but to displace any force of the enemy that might then be, or that might make its appearance, in that direction. It was not expected, indeed, that any force the enemy could collect at Loodiana would amount to such a force as he had on the lower part of the Sutlej, yet, nevertheless, the position he might occupy on that point would be such as to cause extreme inconvenience by cutting off our communications, by intercepting detached reinforcements, but chiefly by compelling to diverge, if not capturing, the heavy battering-train, the arrival of which at the camp of the commander-in-chief was absolutely indispensable to the carrying on of his projected operations.

Accordingly, it was decided to detach a force to Loodiana for the

purpose of accomplishing that object, and Sir Harry Smith was selected to command that force. On the 7th of January several corps had moved in the direction of Ferozepore and other points; and by the 15th a large force was assembled there, and was quite prepared against any sudden attack of the enemy. But at this time an intimation was received at head-quarters to the effect that the enemy had collected a very large force at Phullor, opposite Loodiana, a force stronger than had been supposed, that it was moving across the river, and that it was conjectured he would ent uch himself in a position between the main body of our army and the reinforcements in the fort. These new circumstances necessitated further measures to increase our forces, and, accordingly, the 53rd regiment of infantry, which was moving up, was ordered to join Sir Harry Smith's division, which was subsequently increased by a body of cavalry. This force was directed to attack a fort called Dhurrumkote, which interrupted the communication between our position on the Sutlej and Loodiana. Sir Harry Smith proceeding to execute this movement, the enemy abandoned the fort immediately, that is to say, after the exchange of a few shots, and some guns and a quantity of grain fell into our hands.

And now the general advanced in the direction of Loodiana. He was to be joined on his way by the 53rd regiment and a corps of native troops, which was arriving from another point and expected to be in that vicinity by the 22nd of January. It was further decided to despatch to the general another division, viz. the brigade under Brigadier Wheeler. Proceeding in his march, the 53rd regiment was found at the appointed place, and the native troops were also advancing according to the calculations which had been made; and on the 21st he continued his march from Jugraon to Loodiana.

Meanwhile, the enemy was making a forced movement towards Loodiana, and it was likewise ascertained that he had taken up a position at the village of Buddowal, which was situated on the direct road to Loodiana. That road passes through several villages, all defensible; and, occupying that position, the enemy had placed himself exactly on the line of march between Jugraon and Loodiana. When he arrived at a certain distance from the latter place, he found them in position, moving in a line parallel to that he had taken.

It was now that Sir Harry Smith sustained that check which some through ignorance, and others from envy or malice, endeavoured at the time to magnify into a serious reverse. Let us have the general's own version of the affair. Writing to Sir Hugh Gough just after he had succeeded in relieving Loodiana, he said that he had accomplished that object, but under circumstances not quite so fortunate as he had desired (the loss of his baggage, which was carried away by the enemy); and adds: "When within a mile and a half to my left of Buddowal, moving parallel with my column (which was right in front ready to wheel into line), and evidently for the purpose of interrupting my advance, I saw the enemy. Nothing could be stronger for the enemy than the continued line of villages which were in his front.

"He was moving by roads, while I was moving over very heavy sand-beds. He was in advance far beyond, on my right flank; so far did he extend, and so numerous did he shew his infantry and

guns, and so well chosen for him was the line of villages, that with all my force he was not to be assailed: and he opened a furious cannonade of from thirty-five to forty guns of very large calibre, and, as usual, right well served. My object being to unite myself with the force from Loodiana, which every moment I expected to appear in sight, for it was nine o'clock, I moved parallel with the enemy, wishing to attack the moment the Loodiana troops reached me. He, however, so pressed upon me, that I opened in one body my eleven guns upon him with considerable effect, and moved up the 31st, and was preparing to form line upon this regiment, when the enemy most rapidly formed a line of seven regiments, with their guns, between, at right angles with the line I was about to attack, while a considerable force was moving round my right and front. Thus enveloped, and overbalanced by numbers, and such a superiority of guns, I had nothing for it but to throw back my line on its right, which represented a small line on the hypothenuse of a triangle.

"The enemy thus outflanked me and my whole force. I therefore gradually withdrew my infantry in echellon of battalions, the cavalry in echellon of squadrons, in the direction of Loodiana, momentarily expecting to see the approach of that force,-viz. one regiment of cavalry, five guns, and four regiments of infantry, when I would have made a vigorous attack. The ground was very deep and sandy, and therefore very difficult to move on. The enemy continued to move on as described for upwards of an hour, and until I knew that the Loodiana force was moving, not a musket was fired. Nothing could exceed the steadiness of the troops. The line was thrown back, under this cannonade, as if on parade, Native as well as British; and the movements of the cavalry under Brigadier Cureton were, without any exception, the most perfect thing I ever saw, and which I cannot describe."

The truth is, Sir Harry Smith knew that he must maintain the communication with Loodiana at all events; he resolutely adhered to the object he had in view, and although the enemy was much more numerous than our troops, and strong enough, had they concentrated their whole strength, to have enveloped them, he was not dismayed. With obstinate persistance he pursued his point, which he accomplished with comparatively trifling loss, concentrating his force at Loodiana.

The general had now placed himself in a position almost in the rear of that of the enemy at Buddowal; and, therefore, although he had avoided an action, and sustained comparatively no loss, he had so placed himself with regard to the enemy's force, that it was almost impossible they could maintain themselves without fighting him in the position of Buddowal. Meanwhile, Brigadier Wheeler had advanced to join him, and having been informed that on the 21st an action had been fought in which the British troops had been entirely successful, and that the enemy had been driven back, he proceeded on the direct road from Dhurrumkote to Loodiana. Having advanced some distance, he received intelligence of a directly opposite tendency, that is to say, tidings of an action and a defeat; upon which, deeming it impossible to push on in that direction, inasmuch as by so doing, he might fall into the midst of the enemy's army, he took a more circuitous route. But this movement, arising from erroneous information, brought the heads of his column so far to the