The

will however be apparent that this, as I said before, does not change the relation of the parties either to each other or to God. The wrong exists as before. The individual act is wrong. law which protects it is wrong. The whole society, in putting the law into execution, is doing wrong. Before, only the individual, now, the whole society becomes the wrong-doer, and for that wrong both the individual and the society are held responsible in the sight of God.

I have thus endeavored as clearly as possible to illustrate my views upon the question-is slavery a moral evil? understanding by these terms, wrong, or violation of moral law. The consideration of the second meaning of the phrase I must reserve for another occasion.

It may, perhaps, be proper for me here to state, once for all, that in these remarks and those that may follow, I speak as the organ of no party and of no sect. I belong to none. I am not and I never have been connected with any abolition society, and I believe that I have read as much on one side of this question as on the other. I write what seem to me the simple dictates of my individual understanding and conscience, enlightened I hope by the teachings of the Holy Scriptures. Nay, I may claim that the doctrines which I have advanced are by necessity involved in the character which I hold as an American citizen. I do not know that I have uttered a single sentiment which is not comprehended in the notable words which form the introduction to our Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident," (that is, so evident that they are, from the

principles of the human mind, admitted as soon as they are stated,) "that all men are created equal,' (that is, equal in right to use the endowments of the Creator as they choose, though not equal in endowments,) "that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights," (that is, rights from which they cannot be rightfully alienated,) "and that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." I do not know how else in so few words I could express my opinions on this subject.

I am, my dear brother, yours with every sentiment of regard,

THE AUTHOR OF THE MORAL SCIENCE.

LETTER III.

TO THE REV. RICHARD FULLER, D. D.

MY DEAR BROTHER

In my last letter, I endeavored to show that the right of slavery, if it exists, is not only the right "to oblige another to labor for our benefit, without his contract or consent," but also the right to use all the means necessary for the establishment and perpetuity of this right. Wherever slavery is established by law, I believe this power is conferred by society upon the master, and therefore it would be absurd to suppose that it is not generally exercised. I also attempted to show that when we

assert or deny that slavery is a moral evil, the terms "moral evil," are susceptible of two very dissimilar meanings. They may mean either wrong, violation of right, transgression of moral law; or they may mean the guilt that attaches to the person doing the wrong. I endeavored also to show that, taken in the first of these senses, slavery is, from the very nature of the case, essentially a moral evil—that it is a violation of the rights of man, and a transgression of that law under which all human beings are created, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself;" and that the moral character of the relation is the same, whether the master be the captor or the purchaser of the slave; whether his power be upheld by his own individual prowess, or by the combined authority of society.

I proceed now to consider the second meaning of the assertion-slavery is or is not a moral evil. We now mean by this assertion, that whoever holds a fellow-man in bondage is guilty of sin. To this assertion let us now direct our attention.

Supposing a moral law to exist, our guilt in violating it, as well as our virtue in obeying it, depends in the first place upon our knowledge of its existence. If we have never known that such a law has been enacted, we may be free from guilt though we violate it. If, on the other hand, we know of its existence, and, with adequate knowledge of our duty, violate it, we incur, without mitigation, the guilt of our transgression.

Again, the guilt of violating a moral law must depend not only upon our knowledge, but upon our opportunities for the acquisition of knowledge. Two men may both violate a law in ignorance,

but the one may have had every opportunity for acquiring a complete knowledge of his duty; the other may have been deprived of all such opportunities whatever. Their guilt will, in these cases, be very dissimilar. He who refuses to be informed concerning his duty, is voluntarily ignorant. His ignorance is his own fault, and he is justly responsible for all the consequences of his own act. The maxim in law clearly applies to this case-"No man may take advantage of his own wrong;" in other words, no man may plead ignorance as an excuse, when ignorance rather than knowledge is his own deliberate choice.

I am prepared to go further than this. Know. ledge of my duty may be offered to me, but offered so commingled with error, and in a manner so repulsive to all my feelings of self-respect, that I instinctively reject it. In this case the guilt of rejecting knowledge of my duty is obviously less than it would have been if the same truth, unmixed with error, and clothed in the charity of the gospel, had been presented to my understanding. For instance, I am an instructor. In the discharge of my duties I may unwittingly adopt unsound principles. Suppose a stranger wishes to correct my errors, and introduces himself by stating as facts what I know to be exaggerations, and by loading me with gross and offensive personal abuse. I know that I ought to bear it calmly, and, carefully discriminating between the good and the bad, to use both as a means of self-improvement. I fear, however, that I should be, at the best, prejudiced against such instructions, and that some time would elapse before this discrimination could

take place. I grant that I should do wrong in allowing my judgment to be biased by this abuse. But it is certainly as true that he did wrong in abusing me. It is his abuse that has rendered me unwilling to be convinced, when I might have been convinced on the instant, if he had treated me with Christian courtesy. My ignorance is therefore the combined result of his unchristian want of kindness and my unchristian want of meekness. The responsibility clearly attaches to both of us. Which of us will bear the larger portion of it, can only be known when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed.

I see not why these principles do not apply to the present case. And hence, among those who, as I believe, in violation of right, hold human beings in bondage, there may be found every possible gradation of guiltiness. There may be many persons in our Southern states who have been reared in the midst of slavery, who have uniformly treated their slaves humanely; and who, having always seen the subject discussed in such a manner that they have been instinctively repelled from it, have never yet deliberately investigated it as a question of duty. Slaves have been held by those whom the slaveholders most venerate among the dead, and by those whom they most respect among the living. It is surprising to observe how long even a good man, under such circumstances, may continue in the practice of wrong, without ever suspecting its moral character. Of this fact the temperance reformation has furnished a thousand remarkable instances. It is only a few years since many of our most estimable citizens were acquiring their wealth by the manufacture and