CHAP. IV.] CHARACTER OF THE TREATY. 145 mand, expressly instructed him to make no such stipulations. He wrote to him March 22d, 1805: "I feel it my duty to state explicitly that I must withhold my sanction to any convention or agreement committing the United States, or tending to impress on Hamet Bashaw [Hamet Caramalli] a conviction that we have bound ourselves to place him upon the throne. The consequences involved in such an engagement cannot but strike you forcibly, and a general view of our situation, in relation to the reigning bashaw and our unfortunate countrymen in Tripoli, will be sufficient to mark its inexpediency." In Eaton's reply (May 30), he urged that it would be impolitic and unjust to make peace without restoring Hamet, but he did not hint that he had entered into a stipulation to do so. He admitted that nothing could be accomplished without more "military talent and firmness" than was possessed by that prince and his followers. He described the latter as "rather a rabble than an army." His "convention" with Hamet stipulated that the United States "should use their utmost exertions for the restoration of the latter, "so far as comported with their own honor and interest," and this convention was to be submitted to the President for ratification. After the treaty of peace was concluded with Jussuf, Hamet wrote to General Eaton (June 29th, 1805): "On returning to your happy country, to which I wish you a safe passage, I request you will express to your sovereign my cordial thanks for his manifestations of friendship towards me. Had it been ordained that measures might have been carried forward to the attainment of my wishes, the restoration of my rightful domains to me, it would certainly have been cause of eternal gratitude. But, it is true, my own means were small. I know, indeed, that they did not answer your reasonable expectations. And this, I am ready to admit, is a good reason why you should not choose to persevere in an enterprise hazardous in itself and perhaps doubtful in its issue. I submit to the will of God, and thank the king of America, and all his servants, for their kind dispositions towards me.” Two months later, Hamet claimed that the restoration of his throne was guaranteed by the convention and by the verbal assurances of Eaton. The latter vaguely countenanced his pretensions, without, however, making any direct admission in regard to his own alleged personal promises, or attempting to show that he either had the right to make, or had made, such an official stipulation. If Hamet was misled (which is very doubtful), he owed it entirely to the indiscretion of Eaton, who equally exceeded the letter and spirit of his instructions. No foreign undertaking of the same magnitude in which the United States have ever been engaged, has been more proper, more useful, more creditably conducted, more brilliantly terminated, more pregnant with direct and incidental advantages to our country, than our war with the Barbary States during Mr. Jefferson's Administration. And it was no infringement of his peace policy. His peace policy did not extend to tolerating piracy or paying tribute. The purchase of Louisiana had roused the old jealousies of Spain towards the United States. She had made and withdrawn a protest against the transfer; but the arrangement of bounda ries stirred up new irritations. Her tone grew haughtier; and on the 7th of August (1805) the President wrote the Secretary of State, from Monticello, that "from the papers already received, he inferred a confident reliance, on the part of Spain, on the omnipotence of Bonaparte, but a desire of procrastination till peace in Europe should leave us without an ally." The Emperor Napoleon (he assumed the imperial title and dignity May 18th, 1804), had, indeed, adopted a very dictatorial tone towards us, and evinced a disposition to interfere directly in our disputes with Spain. Our contraband trade in the West Indies undoubtedly irritated him to some extent, but we had committed a greater sin than this. We had balked one of his projects; we had compelled him to do what he did not desire to do; the laugh of the world was against him in the affair. Since that period his fortunes had been successful; crowns had rained on his family. And he now was in close alliance with Spain. The President had without hesitation resolved to repel Napoleon's dangerous interference, and if this course would provoke war, to invite it at once, instead of waiting for a European peace. He wrote from home (August 7th) proposing to the Cabinet a provisional alliance with England. On receiving from the Secretary of State a letter of the French minister, undertaking to say how our Government must treat General Moreau, then an exile in the United States, he said "he confessed" it "excited in him both jealousy and offence," and he added: "The style of that Government, in the Spanish business, was calculated to excite indignation; but it was a case in which that might have done injury. But the pre CHAP. IV.] CONDITIONAL ALLIANCE WITH ENGLAND. 147 sent is a case which would justify some notice in order to let them understand we are not of those powers who will receive and execute mandates. I think the an swer should show independence as well as friendship. I am anxious to receive the opinions of our brethren after their review and consideration of the Spanish papers. I am strongly impressed with a belief of hostile and treacherous intentions against us on the part of France, and that we should lose no time in securing something more than a mutual friendship with England.” Two days later (August 27th) he made this full exposition of his views to the Secretary of State: "Considering the character of Bonaparte, I think it material at once to let him see that we are not of the powers who will receive his orders. "I think you have misconceived the nature of the treaty I thought we should propose to England. I have no idea of committing ourselves immediately or independently of our further will to the war. The treaty should be provisional only, to come into force on the event of our being engaged in war with either France or Spain during the present war in Europe. In that event we should make common cause, and England should stipulate not to make peace without our obtaining the objects for which we go to war, to wit: the acknowledgment by Spain of the rightful boundaries of Louisiana (which we should reduce to our minimum by a secret article); and 2, indemnification for spoliations, for which purpose we should be allowed to make reprisals on the Floridas, and retain them as an indemnification. Our cooperation in the war (if we should actually enter into it) would be sufficient consideration for Great Britain to engage for its object; and it being generally known to France and Spain that we had entered into treaty with England, would probably ensure us a peaceful and immediate settlement of both points. But another motive, much more powerful, would indubitably induce England to go much further. Whatever ill-humor may at times have been expressed against us by individuals of that country, the first wish of every Englishman's heart is to see us once more fighting by their sides against France; nor could the king or his ministers do an act so popular as to enter into an alliance with us. The nation would not weigh the consideration by grains and scruples. They would consider it as the price and pledge of an indissoluble friendship. I think it possible that for such a provisional treaty their general guarantee of Louisiana and the Floridas. At any rate, we might try them. A failure would not make our situation worse. If such a one could be obtained, we might await our own convenience for calling up the casus fœderis. I think it important that England should receive an overture as early as possible, as it might prevent her listening to terms of peace." The following, to same (September 16th), discloses all that is further necessary to exhibit the President's policy towards the powers named: "The inclosed letter from General Armstrong furnishes matter for consideration. You know the French considered themselves entitled to the Rio Bravo, and that Laussa declared his orders to be to receive possession to that limit, but not to Perdido; and that France has to us been always silent as to the western boundary, while she spoke decisively as to the eastern. You know Turreau agreed with us that neither party should strengthen themselves in the disputed country during negotiation; and Armstrong, who says Monroe concurs with him, is of opinion, from the character of the Emperor, that were we to restrict ourselves to taking the posts on the west side of the Mississippi, and threaten a cessation of intercourse with Spain, Bonaparte would interpose efficiently to prevent the quarrel from going further. Add to these things the fact that Spain has sent five hundred colonists to St. Antonio, and one hundred troops to Nacogdoches, and probably has fixed or prepared a post at the Bay of St. Bernard, at Matagordo. Supposing, then, a previous alliance with England to guard us in the worst event, I should propose that Congress should pass acts, 1, authorizing the Executive to suspend intercourse with Spain at discretion; 2, to dislodge the new establishments of Spain between the Mississippi and Bravo; and 3, to appoint commissioners to examine and ascertain all claims for spoliation that they might be preserved for future indemnification. I commit these ideas merely for consideration, and that the subject may be matured by the time of our meeting at Washington, where I shall be myself on the 2d of October." But new events were suddenly to change the current of our foreign relations. The battle of Trafalgar was fought October 21st, 1805. This left Napoleon in no condition to dictate terms. to trans-oceanic powers. England had formed a close alliance with Russia, and the "conquest" of Trafalgar made her absolute and undisputed on the seas. She now less needed the kind of assistance the United States could render her, and had no apprehension of any injury they could inflict upon her. Nor could an alliance or coöperation of the United States with France and Spain thenceforth in the least either endanger, or hold in check, her overwhelming naval supremacy. Since the peace of Amiens, American commerce had rapidly increased. The recent European war had enormously swelled our carrying trade. The last was at the expense of English shipping interests. England, therefore, had two inducements to fall on our commerce-the one, to gather the harvest of present plunder, the other to destroy competition then and in future. To secure these objects was more important to her than our friendship or our enmity, and therefore it was unhesitatingly determined upon. Henceforth Spain was comparatively powerless against the United States; Napoleon could not reach us with his arms; and England assumed the position of our most encroaching and dreaded enemy. The former posture of things was exactly reversed. Even before the battle of Trafalgar, Great Britain had be 1 Lord Nelson was wont to thus term his far less decisive victory of the Nile. CHAP. IV.] MEETING OF NINTH CONGRESS. 149 gun to revive old pretensions-those she had set up in the Seven Years' war-against neutral commerce. A number of our vessels had been condemned in her Admiralty courts on strained constructions of maritime law. If we had been compelled to ask her alliance against Napoleon, it may be regarded as doubtful whether we could then have secured it without the most injurious maritime concessions. Our commerce had suffered annoyances, during 1805, from other quarters besides England. The character and extent of these will be found sufficiently adverted to in the President's message at the meeting of Congress. But towards the close of that year, we had no further serious maritime difficulties to apprehend from any power but the haughty and now undisputed mistress of the seas. The ninth Congress assembled on the 2d of December, 1805. In the Senate, Nicholas Gilman became the successor of Olcott from New Hampshire; James Fenner of Ellery, from Rhode Island; Aaron Kitchell of Dayton, from New Jersey; James Turner of Franklin, from North Carolina; Buckner Thurston of Brown, and John Adair of Breckenridge, froin Kentucky; and Daniel Smith of Cocke, from Tennessee. All the new members were Republicans, and two of them, Gilman and Kitchell, succeeded Federal incumbents, so that the latter party retained but seven representatives in the Senate. Nearly all the leading Republican members of the late Congress had been reëlected. Among the new ones on the same side, were Daniel D. Tompkins, afterwards Governor of New York and Vice-President of the United States; George Clinton, Jr., a nephew of the Vice-President; and Gurdon S. Mumford, all of New York. Tompkins did not, however, take his seat, having been appointed a judge of the Supreme Court of his State. The Federalists had not more than twenty-five members, and these were mostly from New England. But they had suffered material losses in New England-ten of the seventeen Massachusetts representatives now belonging to their opponents. They had, however, again carried the Boston district, and elected Josiah Quincy as the successor of Doctor Eustis. Dana, John Cotton Smith, and Davenport appeared from Connecticut; and these, with Quincy, were the most prominent Federalists in the House. |