perties of numbers or to the heavenly motions, we may soon get beyond our depth, and confound the illusions of our own fancy, or even direct mistakes and false reasonings, with the marks of omniscient wisdom. So far as we follow the express teaching of scripture, we are safe. A little way we may perhaps venture, by analogy to those truths which are more clearly revealed. But the landmarks are soon lost, when we enter on the tempting field of numerical speculation. Nowhere is the strictness of the Baconian philosophy, and the practical caution of Newton, more eminently needed. When we have been able to assign an abstract reason why the year should be of the particular length 365,2422414 solar days, we may begin to venture, without presumption, to form or to fortify a system of chronology on abstract grounds. But if even this first step very far transcends our abilities, we do well to pause, before we dream of converting infidels, or think of magnifying God's omniscient wisdom, by such a course and order of investigation.

It may be safely affirmed that, hitherto at least, to attain certainty on the mere historic outlines of chronology has been the utmost extent of real progress, and it may well be doubted whether any have attained even thus far. Let us take, for instance, that part of sacred chronology which lies nearest ourselves, and where, if anywhere, we might expect sure grounds of conviction. Three authors have, quite of late, bestowed much pains on this subject, Mr. Cuninghame, Mr. Greswell, and the writer of the work here noticed. Three different years are assigned by them to the nativity, two to the baptism of John, three to our Lord's first passover, and three to the crucifixion. Besides these diversities, each is exposed to at least one palpable objection, when viewed as a complete system. The first is based on a complete rejection, on very slender and insufficient grounds, of the main contemporary witness, Josephus, as wilfully dishonest and corrupt. The second involves a hypothesis, demonstrably untrue, of an error in the week-day reckoning, in connexion with the solar and lunar tables. The last involves the entire rejection, against the judgment of all impartial critics, of two main notes of time in the gospel history, and the virtual contradiction of a third, besides other difficulties on which it is needless to dwell. While such is the pre

sent state of the sacred chronology in its most recent period, caution and reverence are eminently needed in those who address themselves to such inquiries. For assuredly the words of St. Paul apply with peculiar force to this vast and mysterious subject, the Divine ordination of times and seasons throughout all ages. "Now we see through a glass, darkly; but then, face to face; now we know in part, but then shall we know even as we are known."

II.

ON THE FIRST RESURRECTION.

THE time of the Second Advent, as unfolded in Chap. XVII. of the present work, involves naturally the doctrine of the First Resurrection. I have avoided, however, the direct introduction of this topic, partly from the abundant variety of other evidence; and partly, as having treated of it elsewhere, in one of the recent 'Lectures on the Advent.' Since then, a pamphlet has appeared, by the Rev. E. Garrard Marsh, expressly designed to refute the arguments of that discourse. It seems due to the character and courtesy of the author to notice his observations, and no occasion is likely to offer itself more suitable than the present. I will therefore, in a few pages, explain and confirm the disputed parts of the former argument.

Six reasons were advanced in the discourse to prove the literal nature of the first resurrection-the previous events, the subjects of the resurrection itself, the office assigned to them, the mention of the souls of the martyrs, the promise to the confessors, and the resurrection of the rest of the dead. Four of these, including some of the strongest and plainest, are left untouched by Mr. Marsh in his reply. He examines two only, the fourth and the sixth, and parts the former of these into several fragments. His observations on these shall now be carefully examined.

I. THE MENTION OF THE SOULS OF THE MARTYRS was alleged in the discourse as one proof of the literal sense. This, I was aware, might at first seem a paradox, since the words have been commonly reckoned the chief pillar of the figurative interpretation. The usual reasoning is of this kind. The spirits of the martyrs, and not their bodies, are here said to rise again. Ånd

therefore the prophecy relates, not to a bodily, but a spiritual resurrection, on which the spirits, or principles of the martyrs, are animated with new life in the person of their holy successors.

The reasoning opposed to this in the Lecture is the following. The souls, and not the spirits of the martyrs, are here mentioned. But the word soul is constantly used in connexion with whatever is most strictly personal; while the word spirit is commonly employed where there is a federal, or vicarious meaning. Thus John came in the spirit of Elias; but it would do violence to every rule of scripture language, to say that he came with or in the soul of Elias. The latter word occurs in the New Testament more than a hundred times, and, with two exceptions at the most, always denotes what is exclusively and strictly personal.

Again, the prophecy does not affirm a resurrection, but a life of the souls, or of the martyrs to whom they belong. Now by the life of the soul is meant, in the general usage of scripture, its natural life, or union with the body. Hence the life of the souls here mentioned must imply a bodily resurrection.

The first part of this argument Mr. Marsh concedes, and rather strangely affirms that no one, in his knowledge, has denied it. Yet the figurative exposition, in its most usual form, has rested mainly on assuming the opposite, that the text does not relate personally to the martyrs themselves. Nay, Mr. Marsh himself, after modifying the hypothesis so as to avoid the difficulty, relapses in another page into this very interpretation. "By the martyrs living again, is meant, I contend, the revival of the spirit they exhibited when on earth.' Yet this is precisely the view which is refuted by the strictly personal meaning of the word, soul; and which the respected author seems there to affirm no one has ever maintained.

Mr. Marsh himself, however, escapes the argument in another way. He interprets the passage thus, that the souls of the martyrs in paradise, by sympathy, rejoice in the triumph of holiness on earth, and thus may be said both to live and reign (p. 21.) Thus the metaphor, driven from its usual strong-hold in the word, souls, concentrates itself in the rest of the phrase, as a more tenable position.

To this new form of the hypothesis there are two or three decisive objections. First, since the passage is owned to describe some change that personally affects the martyrs, and they have beyond doubt, at some time or other, personally to live again by the reunion of soul and body, why not leave the term its natural meaning? Why have recourse to such a far-fetched interpretation, They lived again; that is, by sympathy, their joy in Paradise was increased; and they reigned, that is, their disembodied spirits in Paradise rejoiced that truth was reigning on earth? Surely it must be hard for a simple mind to acquiesce in such a strained and violent construction, when the personal living again of the martyrs at some time or other, is a fact of Divine revelation; and the only hindrance is, that to place it here does not suit our pre-conceived notions.

Again, on this view the prophecy tells us nothing of what occurs on earth, but only an occurrence in Paradise. How can this be possible, if we look for one moment at the context of the passage?

Thirdly, the martyrs' reign is clearly connected with the thrones in the vision. Hence if their living and reigning refers to an event in Paradise, the thrones must be in Paradise also. But the vision plainly teaches a different lesson, and implies that the thrones are on the earth. The personal meaning, therefore, of the word soul, conceded by our author, yields an argument fatal to the metaphorical construction, either under the old or the new form.

The life of the soul, I had further stated, consists in its union with the body, as the life of the spirit in its union with God. Hence the living again of the martyrs' souls must imply their bodily resurrection. Two texts are here quoted in reply. First, our Lord's address to the apostles. (Matt. x. 28.) But this is not applicable, for a plain reason. The question at issue is whether, in the scriptures, when souls are said to live, it has reference to natural and personal, or else to a federal or spiritual life. But here the death of the soul which our Lord speaks of is equally distinct from both, and is the the second death.

Next, the words of Luke xx. are alleged for the same purpose-" God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." But these seem clearly to prove the exact re