PAR T deceive us fo grofsly, nor depart fo very far from

VII.

all refemblance to the truth. When a traveller gives an account of fome diftant country, he may impofe upon our credulity the most groundlef's and abfurd fictions as the most certain matters of fact. But when a perfon pretends to inform us of what paffes in our neighbourhood, and of the affairs of the very parith which we live in, though here too, if we are so careless as not to examine things with our own eyes, he may deceive us in many refpects, yet the greatest falfehoods which he impofes upon us muft bear fome refemblance to the truth, and muft even have a confiderable mixture of truth in them. An author who treats of natural philofophy, and pretends to affign the causes of the great phanomena of the universe, pretends to give an account of the affairs of a very diftant country, concerning which he may tell us what he pleases, and as long as his narration keeps within the bounds of feeming poffibility, he need not defpair of gaining our belief. But when he proposes to explain the origin of our defires and affections, of our fentiments of approbation and disapprobation, he pretends to give an account, not only of the affairs of the very parish that we live in, but of our own domeftic concerns. Though here too, like indolent mafters who put their truft in a steward who deceives them, we are very liable to be impofed upon, yet we are incapable of paffing any account which does not preferve fome little regard to the truth. Some of the articles, at least, must be juft, and

II.

even those which are moft overcharged muft SECT. have had some foundation, otherwise the fraud would be detected even by that carelefs infpection which we are difpofed to give. The author who fhould affign, as the cause of any natural fentiment, fome principle which neither had any connexion with it, nor refembled any other principle which had fome fuch connexion, would appear abfurd and ridiculous to the most injudicious and unexperienced reader.

SEC.

PART
VII.

SECTION III.

OF THE DIFFERENT SYSTEMS WHICH HAVE BEEN FORMED CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLE OF APPROBATION.

INTRODUCTION.

AFTER the inquiry concerning the nature

of virtue, the next queftion of importance in Moral Philofophy, is concerning the principle of approbation, concerning the power or faculty of the mind which renders certain characters agreeable or disagreeable to us, makes us prefer one tenour of conduct to another, denominate the one right and the other wrong, and confider the one as the object of approbation, honour, and reward; the other as that of blame, cenfure, and punishment.

Three different accounts have been given of this principle of approbation. According to fome, we approve and difapprove both of our own actions and of thofe of others, from selflove only, or from fome view of their tendency to our own happiness or difadvantage: according to others, reafon, the fame faculty by which we distinguish between truth and falfehood, enables us to diftinguish between what is fit and unfit both in actions and affections: according to others, this distinction is altogether the effect of immediate fentiment and feeling, and arifes from the fatisfaction or difguft with which the

view of certain actions or affections infpires us. SECT. Self-love, reafon, and fentiment, therefore, are III. the three different fources which have been affigned for the principle of approbation.

Before I proceed to give an account of those different fystems, I must observe, that the determination of this fecond queftion, though of the greatest importance in fpeculation, is of none in practice. The queftion concerning the nature of virtue neceffarily has fome influence upon our notions of right and wrong in many particular cafes. That concerning the principle of approbation can poffibly have no fuch effect. To examine from what contrivance or mechanism within, thofe different notions or fentiments arife, is a mere matter of philofophical curiofity.

CHAP. I.

Of thofe Syftems which deduce the Principle of Approbation from Self-love.

TH

HOSE who account for the principle of approbation from felf-love, do not all account for it in the same manner, and there is a good deal of confufion and inaccuracy in all their different systems. According to Mr. Hobbes, and many of his followers*, man is

* Puffendorff, Mandeville.

PART driven to take refuge in fociety, not by any VII. natural love which he bears to his own kind, but

because without the affiftance of others he is incapable of fubfifting with ease or fafety. Society, upon this account, becomes neceffary to him, and whatever tends to its fupport and welfare, he confiders as having a remote tendency to his own intereft; and, on the contrary, whatever is likely to disturb or destroy it, he regards as in fome measure hurtful or pernicious to himfelf. Virtue is the great fupport, and vice the great disturber of human fociety. The former, therefore, is agreeable, and the latter offenfive to every man; as from the one he forefees the profperity, and from the other the ruin and diforder of what is fo neceffary for the comfort and fecurity of his existence.

That the tendency of virtue to promote, and of vice to disturb the order of fociety, when we confider it coolly and philofophically, reflects a very great beauty upon the one, and a very great deformity upon the other, cannot, as I have obferved upon a former occafion, be called in question. Human society, when we contemplate it in a certain abftract and philofophical light, appears like a great, an immenfe machine, whofe regular and harmonious movements produce a thousand agreeable effects. As in any other beautiful and noble machine that was the production of human art, whatever tended to render its movements more fmooth and easy, would derive a beauty from this effect, and, on the contrary, whatever tended to obstruct them would