II.

the second anfwer be the proper one, virtue SEC T. muft confift in propriety, fince the ground of our obligation to obedience is the fuitableness or congruity of the fentiments of humility and fubmiffion to the fuperiority of the object which excites them.

That fyftem which places virtue in utility, coincides too with that which makes it confift in propriety. According to this fyftem, all thofe qualities of the mind which are agreeable or advantageous, either to the perfon himself or to others, are approved of as virtuous, and the contrary disapproved of as vicious. But the agreeableness or utility of any affection depends upon the degree which it is allowed to fubfift in. Every affection is useful when it is confined to a certain degree of moderation; and every affection is disadvantageous when it exceeds the proper bounds. According to this fyftem therefore, virtue confifts not in any one affection, but in the proper degree of all the affections. The only difference between it and that which I have been endeavouring to establish, is, that it makes utility, and not sympathy, or the correspondent affection of the spectator, the natural and original measure of this proper degree.

CHAP.

PART
VII.

A

CHAP. IV.

Of licentious Syfiems.

LL thofe fyftems, which I have hitherto given an account of, fuppofe that there is a real and effential diftinction between vice and virtue, whatever thefe qualities may confift in. There is a real and effential difference between the propriety and impropriety of any affection, between benevolence and any other principle of action, between real prudence and fhort fighted folly or precipitate rafhnefs. In the main too all of them contribute to encourage the praifeworthy, and to difcourage the blamable dif pofition.

It may be true, perhaps, of fome of them, that they tend, in fome measure, to break the balance of the affections, and to give the mind a particular bias to fome principles of action, beyond the proportion that is due to them. The ancient fyftems, which place virtue in propriety, feem chiefly to recommend the great, the awful, and the respectable virtues, the virtues of felf-government and self-command; fortitude, magnanimity, independency upon fortune, the contempt of all outward accidents, of pain, poverty, exile, and death. It is in these great exertions that the noblest propriety of conduct is difplayed. The foft, the amiable, the gentle virtues, all the virtues of indulgent humanity

are,

are, in comparison, but little infifted upon, and s feem, on the contrary, by the Stoics in particular, to have been often regarded as mere weakneffes, which it behoved a wife man not to harbour in his breast.

The benevolent fyftem, on the other hand, while it fofters and encourages all thofe milder virtues in the highest degree, feems entirely to neglect the more awful and refpectable qualities of the mind. It even denies them the appellation of virtues. It calls them moral abilities, and treats them as qualities which do not deferve the fame fort of efteem and approbation, that is due to what is properly denominated virtue. All thofe principles of action which aim only at our own intereft, it treats, if that be poffible, ftill worse. So far from having any merit of their own, they diminish, it pretends, the merit of benevolence, when they co-operate with it and prudence, it is afferted, when employed only in promoting private interest, can never even be imagined a virtue.

That fyftem, again, which makes virtue confift in prudence only, while it gives the highest encouragement to the habits of caution, vigilance, fobriety, and judicious moderation, feems to degrade equally both the amiable and refpectable virtues, and to ftrip the former of all their beauty, and the latter of all their grandeur.

But notwithstanding these defects, the general tendency of each of those three fyftems is to encourage the best and most laudable habits of the human mind and it were well for fociety,

E c T.

II.

PART if, either mankind in general, or even those few

VII.

who pretend to live according to any philofo-
phical rule, were to regulate their conduct by
the precepts of any one of them.
We may
learn from each of them fomething that is both
valuable and peculiar. If it was poffible, by
precept and exhortation, to infpire the mind
with fortitude and magnanimity, the ancient
fyftems of propriety would feem fufficient to do
this. Or if it was poffible, by the fame means,
to foften it into humanity, and to awaken the
affections of kindness and general love towards
those we live with, fome of the pictures with
which the benevolent fyftem prefents us, might
feem capable of producing this effect. We
may learn from the fyftem of Epicurus, though
undoubtedly the most imperfect of all the three,
how much the practice of both the amiable and
refpectable virtues is conducive to our own in-
tereft, to our own eafe and fafety and quiet even in
this life. As Epicurus placed happiness in the
attainment of ease and security, he exerted him-
felf in a particular manner to fhow that virtue
was, not merely the beft and the fureft, but the
only means of acquiring those invaluable poffef-
fions. The good effects of virtue, upon our in-
ward tranquillity and peace of mind, are what
other philofophers have chiefly celebrated. Epi-
curus, without neglecting this topic, has chiefly
infifted upon the influence of that amiable quality
on our outward profperity and fafety. It was
upon this account that his writings were fo much
ftudied in the ancient world by men of all dif-
ferent

ferent philofophical parties. It is from him that S Cicero, the great enemy of the Epicurean system, borrows his most agreeable proofs that virtue alone is fufficient to fecure happiness. Seneca, though a Stoic, the fect moft oppofite to that of Epicurus, yet quotes this philofopher more frequently than any other.

There is, however, another fyftem which feems to take away altogether the diftinétion between vice and virtue, and of which the tendency is, upon that account, wholly pernicious: I mean the fyftem of Dr. Mandeville. Though the notions of this author are in almoft every refpect erroneous, there are, however, fome appearances in human nature, which, when viewed in a certain manner, feem at firft fight to favour them. Thefe, defcribed and exaggerated by the lively and humorous, though coarfe and ruftic eloquence of Dr. Mandeville, have thrown upon his doctrines an air of truth and probability which is very apt to impose upon the unfkilful.

Dr.Mandeville confiders whatever is done from a fenfe of propriety, from a regard to what is commendable and praife-worthy, as being done from a love of praife and commendation, or as he calls it from vanity. Man, he obferves, is naturally much more interested in his own happiness than in that of others, and it is impoffible that in his heart he can ever really prefer their profperity to his own. Whenever he appears to do fo, we may be affured that he impofes upon us, and that he is then acting from the fame felfifh

VOL. I.

NN

E C T.

II.