I.

We examine the fecond queftion, when we SEC T confider, whether the virtuous character, whatever it confifts in, be recommended to us by felf-love, which makes us perceive that this character, both in ourselves and others, tends most to promote our own private intereft; or by reafon, which points out to us the difference between one character and another, in the fame manner as it does that between truth and falfehood; or by a peculiar power of perception, called a moral sense, which this virtuous character gratifies and pleafes, as the contrary difgufts and difpleafes it; or laft of all, by fome other principle in human nature, fuch as a modification of fympathy, or the like.

I fhall begin with confidering the fyftems which have been formed concerning the first of these questions, and fhall proceed afterwards to examine those concerning the fecond.

PART
VII.

SECTION II.

OF THE DIFFERENT ACCOUNTS WHICH HAVE BEEN GIVEN OF THE NATURE OF VIRTUE.

INTRODUCTION.

'HE different accounts which have been

THE

given of the nature of virtue, or of the temper of mind which conftitutes the excellent and praife-worthy character, may be reduced to three different claffes. According to fome, the virtuous temper of mind does not confist in any one fpecies of affections, but in the proper government and direction of all our affections, which may be either virtuous or vicious according to the objects which they pursue, and the degree of vehemence with which they purfue them. According to these authors, therefore, virtue confifts in propriety.

According to others, virtue confifts in the judicious purfuit of our own private intereft and happiness, or in the proper government and direction of thofe felfish affections which aim folely at this end. In the opinion of these authors, therefore, virtue confifts in prudence.

Another fet of authors make virtue confift in thofe affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in those which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, difinterefted benevolence is the only motive which can ftamp upon any action the character of virtue.

The

II.

The character of virtue, it is evident, muft S E C T. either be afcribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and direction; or it must be confined to fome one clafs or divifion of them. The great divifion of our affections is into the selfish and the benevolent. If the character of virtue, therefore, cannot be afcribed indifferently to all our affections, when under proper government and direction, it must be confined either to thofe which aim directly at our own private happiness, or to those which aim directly at that of others.. If virtue, therefore, does not confift in propriety, it must confift either in prudence or in benevolence. Befides these three, it is fcarce poffible to imagine that any other account can be given of the nature of virtue. I fhall endeavour to show hereafter how all the other accounts, which are feemingly different from any of thefe, coincide at bottom with fome one or other of them,

CHAP. I.

Of thofe Systems which make Virtue confift in

A

Propriety.

CCORDING to Plato, to Aristotle, and to Zeno, virtue confifts in the propriety of conduct, or in the fuitablenefs of the affection

PART from which we act to the object which excites VII. it.

I. In the fyftem of Plato* the foul is confidered as fomething like a little state or republic, compofed of three different faculties or orders.

The firft is the judging faculty, the faculty which determines not only what are the proper means for attaining any end, but also what ends are fit to be purfued, and what degree of relative value we ought to put upon each. This faculty Plato called, as it is very properly called, reason, and confidered it as what had a right to be the governing principle of the whole. Under this appellation, it is evident, he comprehended not only that faculty by which we judge of truth and falfehood, but that by which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of defires and affections.

The different paffions and appetites, the natural fubjects of this ruling principle, but which are fo apt to rebel against their master, he reduced to two different claffes or orders. The first confifted of thofe paffions, which are founded in pride and refentment, or in what the schoolmen called the irafcible part of the foul; ambition, animofity, the love of honour, and the dread of shame, the defire of victory, fuperiority, and revenge; all thofe paffions, in fhort, which are fuppofed either to rise from, or to denote what, by a metaphor in our language, we commonly call fpirit or natural fire. The

*See Plato de Rep. lib. iv.

fecond

fecond confifted of thofe paffions which are s founded in the love of pleasure, or in what the fchoolmen called the concupifcible part of the foul. It comprehended all the appetites of the body, the love of eafe and fecurity, and of all fenfual gratifications.

It rarely happens that we break in upon that plan of conduct, which the governing principle prescribes, and which in all our cool hours we had laid down to ourfelves as what was most proper for us to purfue, but when prompted by one or other of those two different sets of paffions ; either by ungovernable ambition and refentment, or by the importunate folicitations of prefent eafe and pleasure. But though these two orders of paffions are fo apt to mislead us, they are still confidered as neceffary parts of human nature: the firft having been given to defend us against injuries, to affert our rank and dignity in the world, to make us aim at what is noble and honourable, and to make us diftinguifh those who act in the fame manner; the fecond, to provide for the fupport and neceffities of the body.

In the strength, acutenefs, and perfection of the governing principle was placed the effential virtue of prudence, which, according to Plato, confifted in a juft and clear difcernment, founded upon general and fcientific ideas, of the ends which were proper to be purfued, and of the means which were proper for attaining them.

When the first fet of paffions, thofe of the irafcible part of the foul, had that degree of ftrength

E c T.

II.