Upon fome occafions, indeed, those paffions are restrained, not fo much by a fenfe of their impropriety, as by prudential confiderations of the bad confequences which might follow from their indulgence. In fuch cafes, the paffions, though restrained, are not always fubdued, but often remain lurking in the breast with all their original fury. The man whofe anger is restrained by fear, does not always lay afide his anger, but only referves its gratification for a more safe opportunity. But the man who, in relating to fome other perfon the injury which has been done to him, feels at once the fury of his paffion cooled and becalmed by fympathy with the more moderate fentiments of his companion, who at once adopts thofe more moderate fentiments, and comes to view that injury, not in the black and atrocious colours in which he had originally beheld it, but in the much milder and fairer light in which his companion naturally views it; not only restrains, but in fome measure fubdues, his anger. The paffion becomes really less than it was before, and lefs capable of exciting him to the violent and bloody revenge which at firft, perhaps, he might have thought of inflicting.

Thofe paffions which are restrained by the fenfe of propriety, are all in fome degree moderated and fubdued by it. But thofe which are reftrained only by prudential confiderations of any kind, are, on the contrary, frequently inflamed by the reftraint, and fometimes (long after the provocation given, and when nobody is thinking about it) burft out abfurdly and

unexpectedly, and with tenfold fury and vio- PART

lence.

other paffion,

Anger, however, as well as every may, upon many occafions, be very properly reftrained by prudential confiderations. Some exertion of manhood and felf-command is even neceffary for this fort of restraint; and the impartial fpectator may fometimes view it with that fort of cold efteem due to that fpecies of conduct which he confiders as a mere matter of vulgar prudence; but never with that affectionate admiration with which he furveys the fame paffions, when, by the fenfe of propriety, they are moderated and fubdued to what he himself can readily enter into. In the former fpecies of restraint, he may frequently discern fome degree of propriety, and, if you will, even of virtue; but it is a propriety and virtue of a much inferior order to those which he always feels with tranfport and admiration in the latter.

The virtues of prudence, juftice, and beneficence, have no tendency to produce any but the most agreeable effects. Regard to those effects, as it originally recommends them to the actor, fo does it afterwards to the impartial fpectator. In our approbation of the character of the prudent man, we feel, with peculiar complacency, the fecurity which he must enjoy while he walks under the fafeguard of that fedate and deliberate virtue. In our approbation of the character of the juft man, we feel, with equal complacency, the fecurity which all thofe connected with him, whether in neighbourhood,

VI.

VI.

PAR T fociety, or business must derive from his fcrupulous anxiety never either to hurt or offend. In our approbation of the character of the beneficent man, we enter into the gratitude of all those who are within the fphere of his good offices, and conceive with them the higheft fenfe of his merit. In our approbation of all those virtues, our fenfe of their agreeable effects, of their utility, either to the perfon who exercises them, or to fome other perfons, 'joins with our fenfe of their propriety, and conftitutes always a confiderable, frequently the greater part of that approbation.

But in our approbation of the virtues of selfcommand, complacency with their effects fometimes conftitutes no part, and frequently but a fmall part, of that approbation. Thofe effects may fometimes be agreeable, and fometimes difagreeable; and though our approbation is no doubt ftronger in the former cafe, it is by no means altogether deftroyed in the latter. The moft heroic valour may be employed indifferently in the cause either of juftice or of injuftice; and though it is no doubt much more loved and admired in the former cafe, it ftill appears a great and refpectable quality even in the latter. In that, and in all the other virtues of felf-command, the fplendid and dazzling quality feems always to be the greatnefs and fteadiness of the exertion, and the ftrong fenfe of propriety which is neceffary in order to make and to maintain that exertion. The effects are too often but too little regarded.

SEC

THE

THEORY

OF

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

PART VII.

Of Systems of MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Confifting of Four Sections.

SECTION I.

OF THE QUESTIONS WHICH OUGHT TO BE EX

AMINED IN A THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS.

IF

I.

F we examine the most celebrated and re- SECT. markable of the different theories which have been given concerning the nature and origin of our moral fentiments, we fhall find that almoft all of them coincide with fome part or other of that which I have been endeavouring to give an account of; and that if every thing which has already been faid be fully confidered, we shall be at no lofs to explain what was the view or afpect of nature which led each particular author to form his particular fyftem. From fome one or other of those principles which I have been endea.

нн 3

PART endeavouring to unfold, every fyftem of morality VII. that ever had any reputation in the world has, perhaps, ultimately been derived. As they are all of them, in this refpect, founded upon natural principles, they are all of them in fome meafure in the right. But as many of them are derived from a partial and inperfect view of nature, there are many of them too in fome respects in the wrong.

In treating of the principles of morals there are two questions to be confidered. First, wherein does virtue confift? Or what is the tone of temper, and tenour of conduct, which conftitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the character which is the natural object of esteem, honour, and approbation? And, fecondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us? Or in other words, how and by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenour of conduct to another, denominates the one right and the other wrong; confiders the one as the object of approbation, honour, and reward, and the other of blame, cenfure, and punishment?

We examine the firft queftion when we confider whether virtue confifts in benevolence, as Dr. Hutchefon imagines; or in acting fuitably to the different relations we ftand in, as Dr. Clarke fuppofes; or in the wife and prudent purfuit of our own real and folid happiness, as has been the opinion of others.

We