V.

PART we imagine must be the heart of a parent who could injure that weakness which even a furious enemy is afraid to violate? Yet the expofition, that is, the murder of new-born infants, was a practice allowed of in almoft all the ftates of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the circumftances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it to hunger, or to wild beafts, was regarded without blame or cenfure. This practice had probably begun in times of the most favage barbarity. The imaginations of men had been firft made familiar with it in that earliest period of fociety, and the uniform continuance of the custom had hindered them afterwards from perceiving its enormity. We find, at this day, that this practice prevails among all favage nations; and in that rudeft and lowest ftate of fociety it is undoubtedly more pardonable than in any other. The extreme indigence of a favage is often fuch that he himfelf is frequently expofed to the greatest extremity of hunger, he often dies of pure want, and it is frequently impoffible for him to fupport both himself and his child. We cannot wonder, therefore, that in this cafe he fhould abandon it. One who, in flying from an enemy, whom it was impoffible to refift, fhould throw down his infant, because it retarded his flight, would furely be excufable; fince, by attempting to fave it, he could only hope for the confolation of dying with it. That in this ftate of fociety, therefore, a parent should be allowed to judge whether he can bring up his

II.

child, ought not to furprise us fo greatly. In CHAP. the latter ages of Greece, however, the fame thing was permitted from views of remote intereft or conveniency, which could by no means excuse it. Uninterrupted custom had by this time fo thoroughly authorised the practice, that not only the loofe maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of philofophers, which ought to have been more juft and accurate, was led away by the established cuftom, and upon this, as upon many other occafions, inftead of cenfuring, fupported the horrible abufe, by far-fetched confiderations of public utility. Aristotle talks of it as of what the magiftrate ought upon many occafions to encourage. The humane Plato is of the fame opinion, and, with all that love of mankind which feems to animate all his writings, no where marks this practice with disapprobation. When cuftom can give fanction to fo dreadful a violation of humanity, we may well imagine that there is fcarce any particular practice fo grofs which it cannot authorife. Such a thing, we hear men every day faying, is commonly done, and they feem to think this a fufficient apology for what, in itself, is the most unjuft and unreasonable conduct.

There is an obvious reafon why custom fhould never pervert our sentiments with regard to the general ftyle and character of conduct and behaviour, in the fame degree as with regard to the propriety or unlawfulness of particular ufages. There never can be any fuch cuftom.

V.

PART No fociety could fubfift a moment, in which the ufual ftrain of men's conduct and behaviour was of a piece with the horrible practice I have juft now mentioned.

THE

THEORY

OF

MORAL SENTIMENTS.

PART VI.

Of the CHARACTER of VIRTUE.

Confifting of Three Sections.

INTRODUCTION.

WHEN we confider the character of any individual, we naturally view it under two different afpects; firft, as it may affect his own happiness; and fecondly, as it may affect that of other people.

SECTION I.

OF THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIVIDUAL, SO

FAR AS IT AFFECTS HIS OWN HAPPINESS; OR OF PRUDENCE.

TH

I.

HE prefervation and healthful ftate of the s E C T. body feem to be the objects which Nature firft recommends to the care of every individual.

VOL. I.

BB

The

VI.

PART The appetites of hunger and thirft, the agreeable or difagreeable fenfations of pleasure and pain, of heat and cold, &c. may be confidered as leffons delivered by the voice of Nature herfelf, directing him what he ought to chufe, and what he ought to avoid, for this purpose. The firft leffons which he is taught by those to whom his childhood is entrusted, tend, the greater part of them, to the fame purpose. Their principal object is to teach him how to keep out of harm's way.

As he grows up, he foon learns that fome care and forefight are neceffary for providing the means of gratifying thofe natural appetites, of procuring pleasure and avoiding pain, of procuring the agreeable and avoiding the disagreeable temperature of heat and cold. In the proper direction of this care and forefight confifts the art of preferving and increasing what is called his external fortune.

Though it is in order to fupply the neceffities and conveniences of the body, that the advantages of external fortune are originally recommended to us, yet we cannot live long in the world without perceiving that the refpect of our equals, our credit and rank in the fociety we live in, depend very much upon the degree in which we poffefs, or are fuppofed to poffefs, thofe advantages. The defire of becoming the proper objects of this refpect, of deferving and obtaining this credit and rank among our equals, is, perhaps, the ftrongest of all our defires, and our anxiety to obtain the advantages of fortune