II.

fuccefs or prefervation of this other perfon may CHA P. juftly be more interesting than their own; but it cannot be fo to themselves. When to the intereft of this other perfon, therefore, they facrifice their own, they accommodate themfelves to the fentiments of the fpectator, and by an effort of magnanimity act according to thofe views of things which they feel, muft naturally occur to any third perfon. The foldier who throws away his life in order to defend that of his officer, would perhaps be but little affected by the death of that officer, if it should happen without any fault of his own; and a very small difafter which had befallen himself might excite a much more lively forrow. But when he endeavours to act fo as to deferve applaufe, and to make the impartial fpectator enter into the principles of his conduct, he feels, that to every body but himself, his own life is a trifle compared with that of his officer, and that when he facrifices the one to the other, he acts quite properly and agreeably to what would be the natural apprehenfions of every impartial byftander.

It is the fame cafe with the greater exertions of public fpirit. When a young officer expofes his life to acquire fome inconfiderable addition to the dominions of his fovereign, it is not because the acquifition of the new territory is, to himself, an object more defireable than the preservation of his own life. To him his own life is of infinitely more value than the conqueft of a whole kingdom for the ftate which he ferves.

PART ferves. But when he compares those two objects IV. with one another, he does not view them in the

light in which they naturally appear to himself, but in that in which they appear to the nation he fights for. To them the fuccefs of the war is of the highest importance; the life of a private person of fcarce any confequence. When he puts himself in their fituation, he immediately feels that he cannot be too prodigal of his blood, if, by fhedding it, he can promote so valuable a purpose. In thus thwarting, from a sense of duty and propriety, the strongest of all natural propenfities, confifts the heroifm of his conduct. There is many an honest Englishman, who, in his private station, would be more feriously disturbed by the lofs of a guinea, than by the national lofs of Minorca, who yet, had it been in his power to defend that fortrefs, would have facrificed his life a thousand times rather than, through his fault, have let it fall into the hands of the enemy. When the first Brutus led forth his own fons to a capital punishment, because they had confpired against the rifing liberty of Rome, he facrificed what, if he had confulted his own breaft only, would appear to be the ftronger to the weaker affection. Brutus ought naturally to have felt much more for the death of his own fons, than for all that probably Rome could have fuffered from the want of fo great an example. But he viewed them, not father, but with thofe of a Roman citizen. He entered fo thoroughly into the fentiments of this laft character, that he

with the eyes of a

II.

paid no regard to that tie, by which he himself C HA P. was connected with them; and to a Roman citizen, the fons even of Brutus feemed contemptible, when put into the balance with the fimalleft intereft of Rome. In these and in all other cafes of this kind, our admiration is not fo much founded upon the utility, as upon the unexpected, and on that account the great, the noble, and exalted propriety of fuch actions. This utility, when we come to view it, beftows upon them, undoubtedly, a new beauty, and upon that account ftill further recommends them to our approbation. This beauty, however, is chiefly perceived by men of reflection and speculation, and is by no means the quality which first recommends fuch actions to the natural fentiments of the bulk of mankind.

It is to be obferved, that fo far as the fenti ment of approbation arifes from the perception of this beauty of utility, it has no reference of any kind to the fentiments of others. If it was poffible, therefore, that a perfon fhould grow up to manhood without any communication with fociety, his own actions might, notwithstanding, be agreeable or difagreeable to him on account of their tendency to his happiness or difadvan tage. He might perceive a beauty of this kind in prudence, temperance, and good conduct, and a deformity in the oppofite behaviour: he might view his own temper and character with that fort of fatisfaction with which we confider a well-contrived machine, in the one cafe; or with that fort of distaste and diffatisfaction with

PART which we regard a very awkward and clumfy

IV.

contrivance, in the other. As thefe perceptions, however, are merely a matter of taste, and have all the feeblenefs and delicacy of that species of perceptions, upon the juftnefs of which what is properly called taste is founded, they probably would not be much attended to by one in his folitary and miferable condition. Even though they should occur to him, they would by no means have the fame effect upon him, antecedent to his connexion with fociety, which they would have in confequence of that connexion. He would not be caft down with inward fhame at the thought of this deformity; nor would he be elevated with fecret triumph of mind from the consciousness of the contrary beauty. He would not exult from the notion of deferving reward in the one cafe, nor tremble from the fufpicion of meriting punishment in the other. All fuch fentiments fuppofe the idea of fome other being, who is the natural judge of the person that feels them; and it is only by fympathy with the decifions of this arbiter of his conduct, that he can conceive, either the triumph of self-applaufe, or the fhame of felfcondemnation.

FASHION upon the Sentiments of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.

Confifting of One Section.

CHAP. 1.

Of the Influence of Cuftom and Fashion upon our notions of Beauty and Deformity.

TH

I.

'HERE are other principles befides thofe P ART already enumerated, which have a con- V. „С НА Р. fiderable influence upon the moral fentiments of mankind, and are the chief caufes of the many irregular and difcordant opinions which prevail in different ages and nations concerning what is blamable or praise-worthy.

These principles