V.

great, fhould he be weak, or unjuft, or barba- c HAP. "rous? Because men are little, ought they to "be allowed either to be diffolute without "punishment, or virtuous without reward? O "God! if this is the character of your Supreme

Being; if it is you whom we adore under fuch "dreadful ideas; I can no longer acknowledge you for my father, for my protector, for the' "comforter of my forrow, the fupport of my "weakness, the rewarder of my fidelity. You "would then be no more than an indolent and “fantastical tyrant, who facrifices mankind to "his infolent vanity, and who has brought them "out of nothing, only to make them ferve for "the fport of his leifure and of his caprice."

When the general rules which determine the merit and demerit of actions, come thus to be regarded as the laws of an All-powerful Being, who watches over our conduct, and who, in a life to come, will reward the obfervance, and punish the breach of them; they neceffarily acquire a new facrednefs from this confideration. That our regard to the will of the Deity ought to be the fupreme rule of our conduct, can be doubted of by nobody who believes his existence. The very thought of difobedience appears to involve in it the moft fhocking impropriety. How vain, how abfurd would it be for man, either to oppofe or to neglect the commands that were laid upon him by Infinite Wifdom, and Infinite Power! How unnatural, how impiously ungrateful not to reverence the precepts that were prefcribed to him by the infinite goodness of his Creator, even though

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PART though no punishment was to follow their violaIII. tion. The fenfe of propriety too is here well

fupported by the strongest motives of felf-interest. The idea that, however we may escape the obfervation of man, or be placed above the reach of human punishment, yet we are always acting under the eye, and expofed to the punishment of God, the great avenger of injuftice, is a motive capable of reftraining the most headftrong paffions, with those at least who, by constant reflection, have rendered it familiar to them.

It is in this manner that religion, enforces the natural fenfe of duty: and hence it is, that mankind are generally difpofed to place great confidence in the probity of those who seem deeply impreffed with religious fentiments. Such perfons, they imagine, act under an additional tie, befides those which regulate the conduct of other men. The regard to the propriety of action, as well as to reputation, the regard to the applaufe of his own breaft, as well as to that of others, are motives which they fuppofe have the influence over the religious man, as over the man of the world. But the former lies under another restraint, and never acts deliberately but as in the prefence of that Great Superior who is finally to recompenfe him according to his deeds. A greater truft is repofed, upon this account, in the regularity and exactnefs of his conduct. And wherever the natural principles of religion are not corrupted by the factious and party zeal of fome worthlefs cabal; wherever the first duty which it requires, is to fulfil all the obligations

of

V.

of morality; wherever men are not taught to CHA P. regard frivolous obfervances, as more immediate duties of religion, than acts of juftice and beneficence; and to imagine, that by facrifices, and ceremonies, and vain fupplications, they can bargain with the Deity for fraud, and perfidy, and violence, the world undoubtedly judges right in this refpect, and juftly places a double confidence in the rectitude of the religious man's behaviour.

CHAP. VI.

In what cafes the Senfe of Duty ought to be the fole principle of our conduct; and in what cafes it ought to concur with other motives.

RE

VI.

ELIGION affords fuch ftrong motives to CHA P. the practice of virtue, and guards us by fuch powerful restraints from the temptations of vice, that many have been led to fuppofe, that religious principles were the fole laudable motives of action. We ought neither, they said, to reward from gratitude, nor punish from refentment; we ought neither to protect the helplessnefs of our children, nor afford fupport to the infirmities of our parents, from natural affection. All affections for particular objects, ought to be extinguished in our breaft, and one great affection take the place of all others, the love of the Deity,

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III.

PART Deity, the defire of rendering ourselves agreeable to him, and of directing our conduct, in every refpect, according to his will. We ought not to be grateful from gratitude, we ought not to be charitable from humanity, we ought not to be public-fpirited from the love of our country, nor generous and juft from the love of mankind. The fole principle and motive of our conduct in the performance of all thofe different duties, ought to be a fenfe that God has commanded us to perform them. I fhall not at present take time to examine this opinion particularly; I fhall only obferve, that we fhould not have expected to have found it entertained by any feet, who profeffed themselves of a religion in which, as it is the first precept to love the Lord our God with all our heart, with all our foul, and with all our ftrength, fo it is the fecond to love our neighbour as we love ourselves; and we love ourfelves furely for our own fakes, and not merely because we are commanded to do fo. That the fenfe of duty should be the fole principle of our conduct, is no where the precept of Chriftianity; but that it fhould be the ruling and the governing one, as philofophy, and as, indeed, common fenfe directs. It may be a question, however, in what cafes our actions ought to arife chiefly or entirely from a fenfe of duty, or from a regard to general rules; and in what cafes fome other fentiment or affection ought to concur, and have a principal influence.

The decifion of this question, which cannot, perhaps, be given with any very great accuracy,

VI.

will depend upon two different circumftances; CHAP first, upon the natural agreeableness or deformity of the fentiment or affection which would prompt us to any action independent of all regard to general rules; and, fecondly, upon the precision and exactnefs, or the loofenefs and inaccuracy, of the general rules themselves.

I. First, I fay, it will depend upon the natural agreeableness or deformity of the affection itself, how far our actions ought to arife from it, or entirely proceed from a regard to the general rule.

All thofe graceful and admired actions, to which the benevolent affections would prompt us, ought to proceed as much from the paffions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct. A benefactor thinks himself but ill requited, if the perfon upon whom he has bestowed his good offices, repays them merely from a cold fenfe of duty, and without any affection to his perfon. A husband is diffatisfied with the most obedient wife, when he imagines her conduct is animated by no other principle befides her regard to what the relation she stands in requires. Though a fon fhould fail in none of the offices of filial duty, yet if he wants that affectionate reverence which it fo well becomes him to feel, the parent may juftly complain of his indifference. Nor could a fon be quite fatisfied with a parent who, though he performed all the duties of his fituation, had nothing of that fatherly fondnefs which might have been expected from him. With regard to all fuch benevolent and focial

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