I.

tion of his joy could in him excite no new joy, CHA P. nor that of his forrow any new forrow, though the confideration of the causes of those paffions might often excite both. Bring him into society, and all his own paffions will immediately become the causes of new paffions. He will obferve that mankind approve of fome of them, and are difgufted by others. He will be elevated in the one cafe, and caft down in the other; his defires and averfions, his joys and forrows, will now often become the caufes of new defires and new averfions, new joys and new forrows: they will now, therefore, intereft him deeply, and often call upon his most attentive confideration.

Our firft ideas of perfonal beauty and defor mity, are drawn from the shape and appearance and of others, not from our own. We foon become fenfible, however, that others exercife the fame criticism upon us. We are pleased when they approve of our figure, and are difobliged when they feem to be difgufted. We become anxious to know how far our appearance deferves either their blame or approbation. We examine our perfons limb by limb, and by placing ourselves before a looking-glafs, or by fome fuch expedient, endeavour as much as poffible, to view ourselves at the distance and with the eyes of other people. If, after this examination, we are fatisfied with our own appearance, we can more eafily fupport the most difadvantageous judgments of others. If, on the contrary, we are fenfible that we are the natural objects of diftafte, every appearance of their disapprobation mortifies us

beyond

PAR T beyond all measure. A man who is tolerably III. handfome, will allow you to laugh at any little irregularity in his person; but all fuch jokes are commonly unfupportable to one who is really deformed. It is evident, however, that we are anxious about our own beauty and deformity, only upon account of its effect upon others. If we had no connexion with fociety, we should be altogether indifferent about either.

In the fame manner our first moral criticisms are exercised upon the characters and conduct of other people; and we are all very forward to obferve how each of thefe affects us.. But we foon learn, that other people are equally frank with regard to our own. We become anxious

to know how far we deferve their cenfure or applaufe, and whether to them we must neceffarily appear thofe agreeable or difagreeable creatures which they reprefent us. We begin, upon this account, to examine our own paffions and conduct, and to confider how thefe must appear to them, by confidering how they would appear to us if in their fituation. We fuppofe ourselves the fpectators of our own behaviour, and endeavour to imagine what effect it would, in this light, produce upon us. This is the only looking-glafs by which we can, in fome measure, with the eyes of other people, fcrutinize the propriety of our own conduct. If in this view it pleases us, we are tolerably fatisfied. We can be more indifferent about the applause, and, in fome measure, defpife the cenfure of the world; fecure that, however mifunderfood

2

I.

derstood or misrepresented, we are the natural CHA P. and proper objects of approbation. On the contrary, if we are doubtful about it, we are often, upon that very account, more anxious to gain their approbation, and, provided we have not already, as they fay, fhaken hands with infamy, we are altogether distracted at the thoughts of their cenfure, which then strikes us with double feverity.

When I endeavour to 'examine my own conduct, when I endeavour to pafs fentence upon it, and either to approve or condemn it, it is evident that, in all fuch cafes, I divide myself, as it were, into two perfons; and that I, the examiner and judge, represent a different character from that other I, the perfon whofe conduct is examined into and judged of. The firft is the fpectator, whofe sentiments with regard to my own conduct I endeavour to enter into, by placing myself in his fituation, and by confidering how it would appear to me, when feen from that particular point of view. The fecond is the agent, the perfon whom I properly call myself, and of whofe conduct, under the character of a fpectator, I was endeavouring to form fome opinion. The firft is the judge; the fecond the perfon judged of. But that the judge fhould, in every respect, be the fame with the perfon judged of, is as impoffible, as that the caufe fhould, in every refpect, be the fame with the effect.

To be amiable and to be meritorious; that is, to deferve love and to deferve reward, are the

VOL. I.

great

PAR T great characters of virtue; and to be odious and III. punishable, of vice. But all these characters

*

have an immediate reference to the fentiments of others. Virtue is not faid to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but because it excites thofe fentiments in other men. The consciousness that it is the object of fuch favourable regards, is the fource of that inward, tranquillity and felf-fatisfaction with which it is naturally attended, as the fufpicion of the contrary gives occafion to the torments of vice. What fo great happiness as to be beloved, and to know that we deferve to be beloved? What fo great mifery as to be hated, and to know that we deferve to be hated?

CHAP. II.

Of the love of Praife, and of that of Praifeworthiness; and of the dread of Blame, and of that of Blame-worthiness.

ΑΝ

MAN naturally defires, not only to be loved,

but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He defires, not only praife, but praife-worthinefs; or

to

II.

to be that thing which, though it fhould be CHA P. praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praife. He dreads, not only blame, but blame-worthinefs; or to be that thing which, though it fhould be blamed by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of blame.

The love of praife-worthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. Those two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many refpects, diftinct and independent of one another.

The love and admiration which we naturally conceive for those whofe character and conduct we approve of, neceffarily difpofe us to defire to become ourselves the objects of the like agreeable fentiments, and to be as amiable and as admirable as thofe whom we love and admire the moft. Emulation, the anxious defire that we ourselves fhould excel, is originally founded in our admiration of the excellence of others. Neither can we be fatisfied with being merely admired for what other people are admired. We must at leaft believe ourselves to be admirable for what they are admirable. But, in order to attain this fatisfaction, we must become the impartial fpectators of our own character and conduct. We muft endeavour to view them with the eyes of other people, or as other people are likely to view them. When feen in this light, if they appear to us as we wish, we are happy

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