that nature to the United States, or that fecret emiffaries may be employed to delude and deceive: In order to extinguish ill-founded hopes, to fruftrate infidious at tempts, and to manifeft to the whole world the purity of the intentions, and the fixed unalterable determination of the United States, that fuch perfons do not abufe their privileges, but be refrained from all intercourse with the country and inhabitants, which is not neceflary for tranfacting the pub. lic bufinefs on which they may be fent: and laftly, it is recommended to the feveral States, that no fubject of his Britannic Majesty, coming directly or indirectly from any part of the Britifu dominions, be admitted into any of the United States during the war. A Refolved unanimously, That Congrefs are fincerely defirous of an honourable and permanent peace: that as the only means of.. obtaining it, they will inviolably adhere to the treaty of alliance with his Moft Chriftian Majefty, and conclude neither a feparate peace nor truce with Great Britain; that they will profecure the war with vigour until, by the bleffing of God on the united arms, a peace fhall be happily accomplished; by which, the full and abfolute fovereignty and independence of thefe United States having been duly affured, their rights and interefts, as well as thofe of their allies, fhall be effectually provided for and fecured. That Congrefs will not enter into the difcuffion of any overtures for pacification, but in confidence and in concert with his Moft Christian Majesty. That to guard against the fecret artifices and machinations of the enemy, it be, and hereby is recommended to the refpective States, to be vigilant and active in detecting and feizing all British emiffaries and fpies, that they may be brought to condign punishment: that it be enjoined on all officers of departments charged with perfons coming from the enemy under the protection of flags of truce, to take special care CHA. THOMPSON, Sec. A FRENCH STATE PAPER. Letter from Monfieur du Portail, Monfeigneur, Nov. 12, 1778. HAVE had the honour of giv ing you an account of the battles of Brandywine and GermanTown, and of fending you the plans, with that of Philadelphia and its environs, within five leagues, to enable you to judge of the fituation of General Howe. I hope you have received them. Till now General Howe has not taken the two forts on the river, which hinder veffels coming up to the city, and deprive him of all communication with them, but by the little pallage which I have marked on the map, and from which we can easily cut him off this winter, when we have received a reinforcement of victorious troops troops from the north. We reckon on ftriking a ftroke on the other fide of Schuylkil. There are already troops in the Jerfeys on the left-hand bank of the Delaware. On this plan, General Howe will be obliged to remain in Philadelphia, and run a great risk of dying by hunger; but, in truth, we do not hope for fo much. He will furely take the forts, if he attacks them well, and then he will have a communication with his fleet. You fee, Monfeigneur, that for people that have been beat twice, we are in no very bad pofture; we owe this to the Englith having but little cavalry, fo that they were incapable of purfuing their victory: we owe it yet more to the woods and obftacles of every fort, with which this country is defended. In the mean time it is natural enough, after the experience of this campaign, to afk this queftion, Will the Americans fucceed in making themselves free or not? In France, without doubt, they can only judge by what is paft; they will hold the affirmative. As for us, who have been witnesses of the whole, it is another affair. To make fhort of the matter, it is not the good conduct of the Americans that enabled them to make a campaign on the whole fufficiently fortunate. It is the fault of the English. It was an enormous fault of the British government to require General Burgoyne to traverse more than 200 leagues of a country replete with difficulties, almost defert, and of confequence, very useless to take, and that only to join Generals Howe and Clinton in the middle of the country. This project might appear very VOL. XXV. magnificent in the cabinet of Loudon; but to those who know the country it was highly defective. This judgment on my part is, not after the event. You may remember, perhaps, Monseigneur, that I was in very good humour with the English for oppofing to us only ten thoufand men here, and that I greatly hoped General Burgoyne would not arrive here till the field could no longer be kept; that his army would be half deftroyed by hunger, mifery, and defertion, together with daily loffes fuffered from our militia, fcattered through the woods, who fighting thus in a manner peculiar to themselves, the event has been more happy than I could have even hoped. If the English, instead of making fo many diverfions, which have been all too much at the expence of the principal action, had oppofed General Washington with twenty thousand men, I do not very well know what would have become of us. As for us, in doubling our army, we should have nearly redoubled his force, and we fhould have nearly tripled our own embarraffinent. Thus much for the plan of this campaign. If we examine next the conduct of General Howe, we fhall fee that he has not done even what he had in his power to do. As I had the honour to write to you after the battle of Brandywine, "If the English had followed up their advantages that day, Washington's army would have been fpoken of no more." Since that time, likewife, General Howe has, in al: his operations, exhibited fuch flowneís and timidity, as on every turn to prove the object of my astonish[U] ment. ment. But we must recollect, is the people. They are foft with they may end another general,and then we fhall not find ourselves fo fortunately circumstanced. As for the reft, the events which depend on the ability of generals not being to be forefeer, we cannot count on them in our fpeculations on the future. Having then a reference only to the number of troops, I think I may affert, if the English can have here thirty thoufind effective troops, they muft reduce this country. A fecond thing which must haften this reduction, and even of itfelf nearly effect it, is the want of warlike ftores. They want almoft every thing. Another object is, they are in want of both linen and woollen cloths, leather, cordage, falt, fpirituous, liquors, fogars, &c. The laft articles are more important than at firft might be imagined. Before the war, the Americans, though defpifing luxury, had in abundance every thing that is neceffary to an eafy and agreeable life. To have no great matters to do; to pafs the greatest part of their time in fmoking or drinking spirituous liquors or tea, was the fate of thefe countries. I is then very little with their incinations that they find themfelves transformed at a ftroke into a warlike people, and reduced to the neceflity of leading a hard and frugal life. So much do they ja general deteft the war, that it is eay to fee, if their wants are but inceded to a certain point, they would prefer the oke of the Eng Eh to a liberty which cofts them the comp orts of life. Tus language aftonishes you, Monfeigneur, but in truth, fuch out refort, without vigour, without paffion, for a cause which they fuftain only, because it is natural to them to follow the movement with which they have been impreffed. "There is an hundred times more enthufiafm for this revolution in a coffee-house at Paris than in all the colonies united." It is receffary therefore for France, if he wishes to fupport this revolution, to furnish the people with every necefiary, nor fuffer them to fuftain any confiderable want. It will cost France a great fum, even fome millions; but he will be amply repaid by the annihilation of the marine power of England, which, having no longer any colonies, can in a little time have no marine. Commerce will of confequence país over to France, which can in that cafe have no rival among the pow ers of Europe. Sonte perfons have pretended that France has no intereft in fecing the English colonies form a free ftate, and that we might thereby run the hazard of lofing our own colonies; but whoever knows this country, fees that it will be fome ages before they could fend forth a fquadron to make conquefts, and long before that the jealoufies which one province entertains of another (the appearances of which are already difcernible) will have divided them into different states, none of which will be to be feared. I may be afked, whether France had not better make a treaty with the United States, and fend twelve or fifteen thousand men hither, to effect more readi'ythis revolution? This would be the most effectual - method method of spoiling all. This people, though at war with the Englih, hate the French more than them: we prove this every day; and notwithstanding every thing that France has done, or can do for them, they will prefer a reconciliation with their ancient brethren. Should they for the moment confent to the coming of the French troops, their natural antipathy would foon fhew itself, and produce the most fatal quarrcis. There is yet another object to examine. May not France, forced to make open war on England, feek to poffefs herself of Canada, in concert with Congrefs? After the observations in the preceding article, it appears that Congrefs would utterly reject fuch an arrangement. They would not feek freedom in the neighbourhood of the French, for they would not expect to retain it long. If they muft needs be dependent, they had rather be fo on England. If France does not declare war against England, fhe muft by every means that policy can fuggeft, prevent the English from having more than from twenty-five to thirty thousand men here at most. The American ftates will not have General more this campaign. Washington has never had more Gates than 15,000, General 10,000 men, and General Putnam from 5 to 6,000. Perhaps they would not be able to augment the whole by one quarter in cafe of neceflity. You have here, perhaps, Monfeigneur, more than you have afked of me; but forgive me thefe differtations, through a defire of fulfilling, at leaft, your intentions, and of rendering my abode. here, if poffible, ufeful to my I am, (Signed) To Monfeigneur the Count de St. Germain, Mini- To the Honourable the Commons of The bumble Petition of the freehold- T HAT your petitioners, fenfible of the original excellency of the conftitution of this country, moft ardently with to have it maintained upon the genu ine principles on which it was founded. Your petitioners further fhew, that it is neceffary to the welfare of the people, that the Commons Houfe of parliament fhould have a common intereft with the nation'; and that in the prefent state of the reprefentation of the people in parliament, the Houfe of Commons do not fufficiently speak the voice of the people. Your petitioners therefore humbly pray this honourable Houfe to take into their moft terious confideration the prefent state of the reprefentation of the people in parliament, and to apply fuch remedy to this great and alarming evil as to this honourable Houfe may feem meet. And your petitioners fhall ever pray, Heads Heads of two principal Acts of Parliament paffed during the prefent feffion. An act for better fecuring the free- ROM August 1, 1782, no FROM ployed in collecting or managing the duties of excife, customs, &c. fhall have any vote in the election ot members of parliament. The penalty on perfons voting who are difqualified by this act, is 1001. and rendered incapable of executing any office or place of truft, &c. Claufe, not to extend to commiffioners of the land tax, or perTons acting under them; nor to offices held by letters patent for any estate of inheritance; nor to perions who fhall refign their offices before Aug. 1, 1782. Limitations of actions, viz. 12 months after the penalty is incurred.. contract after the commencement of the next feffion, his feat fhall be void. Not to extend to incorporated trading companies. Not to extend to contracts already made for one year. Claufe relative to contracts which are not to expire until a year's notice be given, viz. that when any contract, agreement, or commiffion, has been made, enfered into, or accepted, with a prountil a year's notice be given of vifion that the fame fhall continue the intended diffolution thereof, the fame fhall not disable any perparliament until one year after fon from fitting and voting in the faid notice fhall be actually given for the determination of the Not to extend to contracts by defcent, &c. until after twelve months poffeffion. Members holding contracts may be discharged therefrom on giving twelve months notice.. Claufe relative to patentees for new inventions, viz. that if any tent for a new invention, or a properfon actually poffeffed of a pa longation thereof by act of parlia ment, and having contracted with government concerning the object of the faid patent before the paff ing of this act, hall give notice of his intention to diffolve the faid FTER the end of this fef- contract, the fame fhall be null An act for refraining any perfon concerned in any contract, commif fion, or agreement, made for the public fervice, from being elected, or fitting and voting as a mem ber of the Houfe of Commons. 1 A fion, all perfons holding con- and void from the time of giving tracts for the public fervice, fhall be incapable of being elected, or fitting in the Houfe of Com mons. Any member accepting a contract, or continuing to hold any fuch notice. fied'fhall be elected, fuch election If any perfon hereby difquali fhall be void. Difabled perfons who fall fit in the Houfe of Commons after this feffon, |