fuch a poft; but was fanguine in his defire of being put on fhore with the Antigua troops and the 69th regiment. This Jan. 28th. was accordingly done, and a fmart skirmish immediately took place, with a part of the Irifh brigade, who were stationed at Baffe-Terre. Our troops drove the enemy before them with confiderable lofs. About forty of our troops were killed or wounded; and a lofs of double the number was acknowledged on the other fide. This brought the Marquis de Bouille on the following morning with 4000 men from Sandy Point. But he found Gen. Prefcot fo advantageously pofted on a hill clofe to the fea, that he did not venture the attack, and led his troops back to the fiege. As no object was to be gained by continuing on fhore, Gen. Prefcot reembarked on the fame evening.

The vigilance of the enemy was now fo extreme, that all communication with the garrifon at Brimftone-Hill was totally cut off. Capt. Curgenven, with a few brave volunteer feamen, who boldly attempted to reinforce the garrifon, were not only foiled in the attempt, but expofed to imminent danger; and a number of officers, who knew all the roads and private paths of the ifland, and who adventured fingly the task of attempting to convey letters or mef, fages, were all detected and taken prisoners.

Their vigilance was equalled by the unremitting industry and labour with which they profecuted their works, and the inceffant fury of their attack. Batteries were multiplied upon batteries all round the hill; and for the last three

weeks of the fiege, they were con ftantly, night and day, cannonading and bombarding the garrison. During the greater part of that time, all the force and effect of twenty-three pieces of heavy cannon, and of twenty-four large mortars, was directed against a spot of ground, whofe greateft diameter did not exceed 200 yards; and new batteries were ready to he opened at the end. All the houfes and cover on the top of the hill were confumed or blown to pieces early in the fiege; and the works were everywhere crumbling to their base in its progrefs. The garriton, though every day thinned by the number killed and wounded, yet far from finking under their growing weakness, bore the inceffant fatigue of being under arms night and day, and the increafing danger, with wonderful patience and fortitude. Only one man deferted through the whole fiege.

Feb. 8.

The admiral underwent the painful mortification of understanding their diftrefs and danger by fignals from the garrifon, without having it in his power to administer relief, or even to convey information or counfel to the commanders. At length, the works on one fide being fo deftroyed as to form an entire and perfect breach, almost all the guns being difmounted or difabled, and there not being much above 500 men left who were able to go through duty, both the governor and brigadier-general thought it would be highly ungrateful as well as imprudent, to take the lives of fo brave and deferving a garrifon upon the ha zardous iffue of an affault; and wherein the greatest success that

could

It was faid, that the reduction of, Brimftone-Hill coft the French a thoufand men.

The defign against Jamaica, which had been fo often adopted, and, through a feemingly peculiar fortune, fo often laid afide or deferred, was now revived with more vigour, under a greater preparation, and with a more affured confidence of fuccefs, than ever. The Spaniards had a powerful fleet and a great body of land-forces in the islands of Hifpaniola and Cuba, who were amply furnished with abundant provifion for war, and in readinefs to join the Count de Gralle in the attack upon that ifland. The naval force of the two crowns in the Weft Indies, foon after the reduction of St. Kitt, amounted to not less than fixty fhips of the line; and their land-iorces, if joined, would have formed a confiderable army. Jamaica had nothing to oppofe to this mighty force, but fix battalions of regular troops (which must always be confidered on Weft India fervice, as having a numerous train of ineffectives) and the militia of the ifland. The high fpirit of the inhabitants, with the goodnefs of the troops, and the great natural ftrength of the country, joined to the effects of the climate, operating upon the moft levere and continual duty, would, however, have rendered the conqueft a matter of the greatest doubt and difficulty, and the war exceedingly tedious and bloody. But in all events, the ruin of the ifland, and the annihilation of its immenfe property, mult have been the immediate confequence of fo arduous a conflict.

The arrival of Sir George Rod, ney with twelve fail of the line at Barbadoes, on the 19th of February, and his fubfequent junction with Sir Samuel Hood's fquadron, though later than was hoped and expected, and too late for the prefervation of the island of St. Kitt, or for the attainment of thofe great objects which might poffibly have been within reach, had it taken place during the refiftance of Brimstone-Hill, was, however, moft fortunately decreed to break in upon the thread of this design against Jamaica. A fimilar piece of good fortune, and tending to the fame object, was the difafter which befel M. de Guichen's fleet and convoy, after the fuccefsful attack made upon the latter by Admiral Kempenfeldt; for they were fo fhattered and disabled, almost immediately after that fift mifad. venture, by a continued fucceffion of tempefts and foul weather, that only two of the men of war, with a very fmall portion, if any, of the convoy, could hold on their courfe to join M. de Graffe; and the remainder of the fleet were obliged to return in very bad condition to France. It feemed indeed, under the eagerness and violence of the prefent war, that both France and England would fet even the feafons at defiance in their naval enterprize and hoftility; but both nations, upon feveral occafions, paid feverely for their temerity.

In a few days after the junction of the fquadrons under Sir George Rodney and Admiral Hood, the fleet was farther reinforced by the arrival of three flips of the line from England. The firft obiect

with the English Admiral, was to intercept a fecond convoy from Breft, which failed from that place on the 11th of February, in order to fupply the failure of the former, and was conveying naval fores, artillery, ammunition, and all other fupplies to the Count de Graffe, which were either neceffary for the prefent repair and fitting out of his fleet, or for the further fupport and execution of the great object he had in view. For this purpofe he difpofed of his fleet in a line to windward of the French iflands, ftretching from the latitude of Defeada to that of St. Vincent, with a line of frigates ftill farther to windward; thus covering the courfe from Europe in fuch a manner, that it was thought impoffible for any number of fhips in company to avoid being entangled in the barrier. The French convoy had, however, the addrefs, by making the ifland of Defeada to the northward, getting to leeward of our fleet, and creeping clofe in under the land of Guadaloupe and Dominique, to efcape March 20th. the danger, and to arrive fafe in Fort-Royal Bay, where they found the Count de Grafle bufy in repairing his hips, and brought him the means of fpeedily equipping his fleet for the new intended fervice. This unlooked-for difappointment was a fevere check to the hopes of the British admiral, and left him nothing farther for the prefent to do than to return to Gros Iflet Bay, in St. Lucia, there to refit his fhips, to take in such a supply of water, ftores, and provifions, as would qualify the fleet for long fervice, and to keep a ftrict watch, by the

means of his frigates, upon the preparation and movements of the enemy in Fort-Royal Bay; taking care, above all things, to be ready to put to fea at the inftant that he should receive notice of their making a fimilar difpofition.

The objects of the hoftile commanders were not lefs opposite than their interefts. It was the bufinefs and defign of the Count de Graffe to avoid fighting by all poffible means, until he had formed a junction with the French and Spanish fleets at Hifpaniola; when their combined force would have been fo vaftly fuperior, as to forbid every attempt on the fide of England by fea, to obstruct their defigns during the campaign. On the other fide, the falvation of the Weft Indies, with the whole fortune and hope of the war, de pended upon the British commanders preventing the junction, or at least their bringing on a clofe and decifive engagement with the Count de Graffe before it took place. Such were the ftakes depending upon a fhift of wind, upon other the most ufual cafualties of weather, and upon the numerous accidents and difappointments to which all naval movements and operations are peculiarly liable. Nothing could be more perilously critical.

The British fleet at St. Lucia amounted to 36 fhips of the line. The force under M. de Graffe at Martinique, only to 34. We except from the latter account, 2 hips of the line armed en flute, and 2 fifty-fours; the former not being in either engagement, and the laft, if prefent, acting only as frigates.

The accounts

vary

vary greatly as to the number actually engaged. We here adhere to the written order for the line of battle, figned by M. de Graffe himself, and which feems confirmed upon an eftimate of the general teftimony. The French fleet feems to have been rather over-manned (though if it be an error, it is a general and national one); and befides a full complement of feamen, had near 6,000 land-forces on board. The Ville de Paris, of 110 guns, De Graffe's own fhip, had not lefs than 1,300 men, including foldiers, on board; and the French feventy-fours carried 900 men each. Their metal is always heavier than that of the English in equal rates; but feveral of their fhips were only in indifferent condition. The Englifh had five 90 gun fhips, which was their higheft rate; and the French had eight of 80 and 84 guns each, befides the Ville de Paris, which was confidered as the pride and bulwark of their fleet. So that upon the whole, if an exact eftimate were made of the force on both fides, oppofing fuperior weight of metal in larger fhips, and a much greater number of men, on the one, to the advantages of better condition, two frips more in number, and a fomewhat greater number of guns, on the other, the comparative balance would probably be found tolerably even, and it would appear, that contending fleets do not often happen to meet upon more equal terms.

The van of the English was commanded by Sir Samuel Hood, the centre by Sir George Rodney, and the rear by Admiral Francis Drake. The fhips were in good

condition; and perhaps a fet of more brave and able officers were never joined in the command of an equal number in any conflict. The three divifions of the French fleet were commanded by the Count de Graffe, M. de Vaudrevil, and M. de Bougainville, who were all diftinguiflied commanders.

The French fleet began to turn out of the harbour at Fort-Royal by the break of day on the 8th of April, with a great convoy under their protection, all bound to leeward, and intending to fall down to the French or Spanish ports in Hifpaniola., But as M. de Graffe had every reafon for withing to avoid any encounter on his paffage, inftead of pufhing, as his courfe was directly to leeward, which would have laid him open to the fair and unremitted chrace of his purfuers, and which it would have been impoffible to evade in an open fea with fo conftant a wind, he thought it more advifeable to keep clofe in under the iflands, until he had eluded the purfuit. The adoption of this courfe feemed to promife many advantages. The French being better acquainted with the coafts, could keep much clofer to the land than the English would dare to adventure, and keeping the convoy between him and the fhore, he hoped to throw them off entirely to leeward; the feveral channels between the iflands were likewife better known to the French; and thefe, with the great diverfity of winds and paffages which they afforded, feemed to hold out inexhauftible means of baffling the purfuit of an enemy.

His conduct, however, in this
bufiness