THE

HE natural boundaries which ferved in fome degree to reftrain hoftility, and to throw South Carolina into two great allotments, which were refpectively held by the Royal and the American forces, could no longer produce their effect than while equal ftrength or mutual weaknefs prevented the operation of either party. The calm which attended and fucceeded the new partition arrangement made by Lord Rawdon a little before his departure from that province, accordingly lafted no longer than until General Greene had received fuch reinforcements from without, and had ufed fuch internal means in forming and difciplining the ftate troops and militia of the two Carolinas, as he fuppofed would enable him to act with effect. As foon as these ends were attained, he marched with his forces from the high hills of Santee, in order to pafs the Congaree River, and to attack Col. Stewart who commanded the British forces then in the field.

That officer was pofted at a Col. Thompfon's, near M'Cord's Ferry, on the Congaree; his troops were fickly, bread was fcarce, and a fupply of provifion was then on its way to join him. Upon this movement of the enemy he judged it necellary for the

fecurity of his convoy, and probably other reafons, to fall back about forty miles to a place called the Eutaw Springs, which lie about fixty miles north of Charles Town. Greene, however, ftill purfued his defign of attacking him, to which he was now farther ftimulated by understanding that Col. Stewart intended to eftablish a ftrong and permanent poft at the Eutaws (for which the place was admirably qualified) to ferve as a rampart on that fide, to a new and more contracted line of frontier. The former had paffed the river at Howel's Ferry; and upon coming to this determination, he fent back his baggage and ftores to that place, and purfuing his march until he arrived within feven miles of the Eutaws, encamped in the evening at a plantation called Bardwell; from whence he proceeded early the next morning to attack the royal forces.

General Greene's order of battle feems to have been rather peculiar: an obfervation by no means intended to arraign his judgment. His first line confifted only of two battalions of South Carolina, and two battalions of North Carolina militia; whilst his great strength was placed in the fecond, which was compofed of three brigades of Continental troops, including two

battalions

battalions of Virginians, two of Marylanders, and three of North Carolinians. Col. Lee, with his legion, covered one flank, and Henderson, with the state troops of South Carolina, the other. Col. Washington, with his cavalry, and the ftate troops of Delaware, under a captain, formed a corps de reserve. Brig. Gen. Marion commanded the firft line; and Sumner the North Carolina troops. No certain eftimate can be formed of the amount of the American forces. The English accounts state them at about 4000. Greene himself gives no clue; but loosely obferves, that they were much inferior to the enemy in number; and in his published letter, feems ftudioufly to reprefent the battalions in general as being very fmall." The first line advanced with two threepounders, and the fecond with two fix-pounders.

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Sept. 8th, the morning march, Colonel Wafh1781. ington, with the troops that covered the flanks, formed an advanced guard, and about four miles from the Eutaws fell in with Major Coffin, with a detached party of horfe and light infantry, who, after fome firing, fell back to the British main body; which, by the American accounts, was drawn up to receive them, between two and three miles in the front of their camp. The action commenced at nine in the morning, and lafted four hours without intermiffion. As the battle was fought in the woods, and the conflict obftinately maintained on both fides, it was fubject to much viciffitude; fo that different wings and parties on

each were victors, and vanquished by turns; chance and accidental conjunction frequently varying the fortune of the fight. It is impoffible to reconcile the Englifh and American accounts, they differ fo totally in almoft every part of the relation. Both fides claimed the victory, and both had fome ground for the claim; both fides held out the highest praises to their officers and men for the eminent fervices which they performed, and the extraordinary valour they difplayed; and the praife was undoubtedly, in the highest degree, merited on both. The contradictions which appear on the oppofite accounts are not to be entirely attributed to defigned mifreprefentation on either fide. The nature of the ground contracted the sphere of "obfervation within a very narrow compass: and report is feldom to be relied on as the basis of truth. The confequences must therefore be confidered as the beft explanation of the action.

It admits of no doubt that the conflict was exceedingly fevere, and abounded with inftances of the higheft gallantry on both fides. The Americans were now inured to arms and danger; and the provincial militia, who alone led on the attack in the firft line, not only fought with all the fpirit, but with all the perfeverance of old and well-tried foldiers. The bayonet, which had fo long been dreadful to the Americans, feems now to have become their favourite wea

pon. General Greene particu larly attributes the victory (which he claims as indifputable) to the fierce and irrefiftible attack of the Virginia and Maryland troops,

who,

Jay under the fire of the brickhoufe; that early on the following morning he detached Lee and Marion on the way to Charles Town, as well to prevent fuccours from thence as to embarrals the retreat of the main body while he purfued them; and, that the fugitives from the field of battle had fpread fuch an alarm, that the English burnt their ftores at Dorchester, and abandoned their poft at Fair Lawn. He acknowledges the lofs of two pieces of cannon, but fays he brought off one of theirs.

We are left as much in the dark as to the numbers on the royal fide, as we are with refpect to the American. Col. Stewart feems apprehenfive, as well as Greene, that it might be imagined from the various corps ftated to be under his command, that his force was confiderably greater than it really was. It may well be fuppofed, that from the climate, as well as from other caufes, they were refpectively very thin. Letters from Charles Town, at the time, loosely ftated Stewart's force

at about 2000.

The lofs on the American fide, in killed and wounded, by their own account, amounted to between five and fix hundred. That of officers, which could not be concealed, was very confiderable. One lieutenant-colonel, one major, fix captains, and eight other commiffioned officers, were killed. Five lieutenant-colonels, thirteen captains, and twenty-five lieutenants, were wounded. On our fide, only three commiffioned officers were killed on the fpot, but feveral died of their wounds. The whole number of men flain is rated VOL. XXV.

only at eighty-five; the wounded at 351, of which fixteen were commiffioned officers; and the miffing at 257; of these were ten commiffioned officers, fifteen ferjeants, and eight drummers. We mention thefe little particulars, as they ferve in fome fort to fhow the diverfity and various fortune of the action. No notice is taken in Col. Stewart's account or return of fifteen commiffioned officers, who Greene particularly specifies to have been admitted to their paroles on the field of battle. As this return was dated before the retreat from the Eutaws, it could not include the feventy wounded, who were faid to have been left behind on that occafion. Thefe, though it was made a matter of boaft, could only have been left behind, from their wounds being in too bad a state to admit of a removal. Colonel Stewart was himfelf wounded, and is faid to have been taken prifoner, and afterwards retaken. Every royal officer, who had the smallest command, even to that of a company, had an opportunity of diftinguishing himself in fome marked degree, which, in more fortunate feafons, and circumftances of less general exertion, would have been deemed an object of public note and applaufe.

The royal forces decamped on the following evening. Greene pretends that they ftaved a quantity of rum, and deftroyed many ftores, through the want of carriages; but what seems utterly improbable, he farther advances, that above 1000 fmall arms were found, which they had broken and hidden in the Eutaw Springs. [*N]

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In the mean time, Major M'Arthur was dispatched with so strong a détachment from Charles Town to meet the returning forces, that Marion and Lee could not hazard the fmalleft attempt to interrupt his purpofe; and Greene's purfuit as far as Harrifon's Swamp, was probably a mere matter of parade, without the fmalleft hope of being at all able to difturb the retreat. From that time, the country in the vicinity of Charles Town, and of the neighbouring great rivers, became the fcene of a fmall, cruel, and defultory war, in which, except the defign of ftraitening the capital and its garrifon on the one fide, provifions, plunder, and the gratification of mutual animofity, were the only objects.

The lofs of the Dutch ifland of St. Eustatius marked the conclufion of the year in the Weft Indies. The Marquis de Bouille, of whofe activity and generofity as an enemy we have had frequent occafion to take notice, learning the fecurity and negligence of the governor and garrifon, was thereby induced to undertake the otherwife hopeless task of furprifing and reducing the island. He embarked about 2000 men for this purpole, in a number of small vefiels at Martinique, and knowing that the only practicable landing-place on the island was left open and unguarded, he took his meafures in fuch a manner as to arrive before it betimes in the night. The landing was how ever to bad, the farf fo high, and the funken rocks fo numerous and dangerous, that he loft his boats, and had many of his men drowned in the attempt. By the utmoft

perfeverance and courage he could only land 400 men by day-break; and the means of landing more were then at an end. He faw at once the danger of his fituation, that all affiftance from his fhips and means of retreat were equally cut off; and confidering the garrifon to be nearly double his own number, that nothing but the fuccefs of a vigorous push and bold adventure could poffibly fave himfelf and his troops from being either made prifoners or cut to pieces.

The landing-place was about two leagues diftant from the town and fort; and the way was not only extremely difficult in all its parts, but was interfected by a defile in the hills, where a handful of men could have stopped, the approach of an army. The garrifon confifted of the thirteenth and fifteenth regiments, excepting their light infantry and grenadier companies, which had been called away upon fome other service; but the remaining number was not much less than 700 men; a force which, in lefs unfortunate times, could not have been fafely approached by an equal, much lefs an inferior enemy. The Marquis de Bouille, inftead of defpairing in his untoward fituation, boldly and wifely placed a full truft and confidence in the negligence of his enemy, and the confequent probability of a furprize. The troops landed were likewife among the beft in France, being principally compofed of Count Dillon's regi ment; a part of that Irish brigade which has been fo long and fo highly diftinguifhed for its valour and the excellency of the troops, and which the ill policy both

of