account for various acts of military violence, they justified themselves by producing the instructions of Carnot, which were found to equal in atrocity any that had been issued since the reign of terror. Yet the Chamber of Deputies did not in all respects sanction the severities of the government. When a member, called Leguevel, made a motion for punishing with pains and penalties the royalists of the west, the assembly heard him with patience and approbation propose that the goods and estates of the revolters (whom he qualified as brigands, priests, and royalists,) should be confiscated; but when he added, that not only the insurgents themselves, but their relations in the direct line, whether ascendants, or descendants, should be decla red outlaws, a general exclaniation of horror drove the orator from the tribune.

There is little of general interest in the events of this second war of La Vendee, which was terminated by an action near La Roche-Serviere, in which both parties claimed the advantage, but which was decided against the royalists by the death of the gallant La Roche-Jaquelein. This gentleman possessed all the loyalty and devotion of his gallant brother, who had fallen in the same cause. Like him, he addressed his adherents:"If I advance, follow me-if I fly, kill me if I fall, avenge me." La Roche-Jaquelein fell, but his followers failed to avenge him. The spirit of the insurgents subsided after his death, and they submitted to BuoJune 26. naparte by an armistice, or capitulation, just when holding out a few days longer would have brought them news of the desperate condition of his affairs. Augustus, brother of the fallen La Roche-Jaquelein, signed the armistice, or rather surrender, by which the chiefs disbanded their followers, and laid

down their arms on condition of being suffered to live unmolested on their estates. It seemed to be destined that no Frenchman, whatever his situation or principles, should have any direct influence in the second restoration of the Bourbons; as a penalty for their national vanity, which had asserted the first to be their own voluntary deed. Thus ended the affair of La Vendee.

While these events were passing in France, the allies made the most gigantic preparations for the renewal of war. The Chancellor of the Exchequer of England had achieved a loan of thirty-six millions upon terms surprizingly moderate, and the command of this treasure had put the whole troops of the coalition into the most active advance.

The seat of the Congress had been removed from Vienna to Frankfort, to be near the theatre of war. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the King of Prussia, had once more placed themselves at the head of their respective armies. The whole French frontier was menaced by immense forces. One hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, disengaged from Murat, might enter France through Switzer. land, the Cantons having acceded to the coalition. An army equal in strength menaced the higher Rhine. Schwartzenberg commanded in chief, having under him Bellegarde, and Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent. Two hundred thousand Russians were pressing towards the frontiers of Alsace. The Archduke Constantine was nominal generalissimo, but Barclay de Tolli, Sacken, Langeron, &c. were the efficient commanders. One hundred and fifty thousand Prussians, under Blucher, occupied Flanders, and were united with about eighty thousand troops in British pay, and others under the Duke of Wellington. There was also to be reckoned the contin

gents of the different princes of Germany, so that the allied forces were grossly computed to amount to upwards of one million of men. The reader must not, however, suppose, that such an immense force was, or could be, brought forward at once. They were necessarily disposed on various lines for the convenience of subsistence, and were to be brought up successively in support of each other.

The Duke of Wellington's army might contain about thirty thousand English troops. They were not, however, those veteran soldiers who had served under him during the peninsular war; the flower of which had been dispatched upon the American expedition. Most were second battalions, or regiments which had been lately filled up with new recruits. The foreigners were fifteen thousand Hanoverians, with the celebrated German legion eight thousand strong, which had so often distinguished itself in Spain; five thousand Brunswickers, under their gallant duke; and about eighteen thousand Belgians, Dutch, and Nassau troops, commanded by the Prince of Orange. Great and just reliance was placed upon the Germans; but some apprehensions were entertained for the steadiness of the Belgian troops. Discontents prevailed amongst them, which, at one period, broke out in open mutiny, which was not subdued without bloodshed. Most of them had served in the French ranks, and it was feared some of them might preserve predilections and correspondencies dangerous to the general cause. Buonaparte was under the same belief. He brought in his train several Belgian officers, believing there would be a movement in his favour so soon as he entered the Netherlands. But the Flemings are a people of sound sense and feeling.

Whatever jealousies might have been instilled into them for their religion and privileges under the reign of a protestant and a Dutch sovereign, they were swallowed up in their ap prehensions for the returning tyranny of Napoleon. Some of these troops behaved with distinguished valour; and most of them supported the ancient military character of the Walloons. The Dutch corps were in general enthusiastically attached to the Prince of Orange, and the cause of independence.

It had been expected and designed, that the Duke of Wellington's army should receive a large and valuable addition, by a detachment of that Portuguese army, which had been formed by British officers, and distinguished itself under the command of the British general. But the jealous or selfish policy of the Portuguese Council of Regency declined to listen to this proposal, although Portugal was at least as much interested as any nation in Europe, in the instant suppression of Napoleon, and his usurped power.

The Prussian army had been recruited to its highest war-establishment, within an incredibly short space of time, after Buonaparte's return had been made public, and was reinforced in a manner surprising to those who do not reflect, how much the resources of a state depend on the zeal of the inhabitants. Their enthusias tic hatred to France, founded partly on the recollection of former injuries, partly on that of recent success, was animated at once by feelings of triumph and of revenge, and they marched to this new war, as if to a national crusade against an inveterate enemy, whom, when at their feet, they had treated with injudicious clemency. They were, however, deprived of a valuable part of their army by the discontent of the Saxon troops.

that the English and Prussians were desirous to fight in the celebrated plains of Fleurus, on account of these alleged advantages. But in the day of trial, Napoleon was found superior in the number both of horse and fieldguns.

Thus perfectly prepared for action, no doubt was made, that Buonaparte would open the campaign, by assuming offensive operations. Of peace there remained no hope, for the war had been actually commenced by Great Britain in her own proper element, by the capture of the Melpomene, and some slight skirmishes had taken place on the advanced posts. To wait till the enemy had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited neither the man nor the inoment. It was most agreeable to his system, his disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the allies, and by its dispersion, or annihilation, give Courage to France, animate her to fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the allies, and gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat of Buonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his immense preparations, and sadly anticipated the first victories as their result, though they trusted that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out by force of

numbers and reiterated exertions.

But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which his first exertions would be made; and, in general, it was augured, that, trusting to the strength of Lisle, Valenciennes, and other fortified places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever diversion might be made elsewhere, would be made upon Manheim, to break asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they were

forming, or rather to attack them separately to prevent their consolidation in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the advance of the Aus trians and Russians, by directing his main force to this one point, before they were fully prepared, it was suppo sed he might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.

But Buonaparte was guided by no ordinary principles of tactics on this occasion. He was aware his first pass would be the most decisive in vigour, and determined to aim it at the heart of his enemy. Schwartzenberg he knew, and had heard of Wellington; he, therefore, opposed walls and fortified places against the slow and cautious approach of the Austrian general; while he himself, with his chosen army of veterans, should engage the more enterprising Briton. Entrenchments were, therefore, constructed in the five principal passages of the Vogesian mountains, and all the natural passes and strong-holds of Lorraine were put in the best possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line of defence were strengthened with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of Lyons was improved with great expense and labour; a tete-de-pont was erected at Brotteau; a draw-bridge and barricade protected the suburb la Guillotiere; redoubts were erected between the Saonne and

Rhine, and upon the heights of Pierre Encise and the Quarter of Saint John. Guise, Vitri, Soissons, Chateau-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of any defence, were rendered as much so as posts, palisades, redoubts, and field-works, could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the Austrian line of operations, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the well-known tactics of