few objects alone, but from any thing that exists.

Whatever exists must produce an effect of some kind on the universe.

It must also consist of an infinite number of parts. These parts must be put together, and arranged in some particular manner.

If this arrangement was different, the effect produced by the object, must be different. In every object, therefore, there must be an arrangement of parts, producing a particular effect, an adaptation of means to an end, a subserviency of instruments, (to wit, the parts,) to an use. From these facts, the existence of

God inevitably follows.

In proving objects to have been contrived by man, we must confine our conclusion to those which produce effects desired by him. But no such restriction can be applied to our arguments for the existence of God, for we know not what effects are desired by that being. The existence of a stone may be of as much importance in his view as the existence of the human race. If it was admitted that the earth was created by God, we might perhaps infer, from certain marks which we behold in it, that the existence of man was desired by him; but this inference cannot be used in a demonstration of his existence, because it cannot be drawn, before his existence is proved. We are not to conclude that an object was created by man, unless its form, and the arrangement of its parts, are such, as could not possibly, or would not probably, be produced by the operation of the laws of nature, independent of the effects of mind; but we can be under no such restriction as this, in proving that objects are the work of God, for, excepting things formed by man, all objects are produced by the operation of these laws. We are not to suppose that an object was contrived by man, when he has no power to produce it, but this

does not restrict us in our proof of God's existence, for there is nothing which he may not have power to produce. We must conclude, therefore, that the existence of God may be inferred from the existence of every object which we behold. The number of sources from which this proof may be obtained, greatly augments the evidence of his existence; how unreasonable, therefore, must that man be, who, in the face of all this evidence, shall dare to doubt.

CHAPTER II.

AN ANALYSIS OF MIND.

SEC. I. OF IDEAS.

AN Idea is either a sensation or a conception. A sensation is an idea, caused in the mind immediately by an impression on the organs of sense. A conception is an idea corresponding to some sensation, which the mind retains, or recalls, when the impressions on the organs of sense, by which the corresponding sensation was produced, is removed.

The order of the succession of our sensasion, is usually the object of contrivance, because man in many cases has power to controul it, and to produce the existence of a sensation which he desires, but no one can desire the existence of a conception, which he has not.

Conceptions are, nevertheless, sometimes the object of contrivance. A man, when he has an agreeable conception in his mind, may contrive a method of recalling it at other times, or of communicating it to othPoems are contrivances of this kind.

ers.

No simple conception can exist in the mind, before a corresponding sensation. By abstraction we may divide a complex sensation. By imagination we may form from simple conceptions, those which are complex, and to which we have no corresponding sensations; but then we must have had sensations corresF

ponding to those simple conceptions, of which the complex one is formed.

We cannot have a conception, without conceiving ourselves placed in a situation to receive the corresponding sensation. No man can have a conception of an object, and at the same time conceive it to be placed behind him. No man can have a conception of the whole circumference of a circle, in the centre of which he conceives himself to be placed; nor can we form a conception of the whole surface of a globe or a cube.

We have, when awake, the power of distinguishing conceptions from sensations. But in sleep, conceptions derived from sight and hearing, are frequently, if not always, mistaken for sensations.

Conceptions may be agreeable or disagreeable, but not in so high a degree as sensations. For this reason, when an agreeable conception is in the mind, the corresponding sensation is always desired. Without the two kinds of ideas here mentioned a being could not contrive. He could not contrive without sensations, for they are the objects of contrivance. That there could be no contrivance without conception is manifest. The being that contrives must have a conception of the means used in producing the desired effect. or he could not conceive their use. He must also have a conception, of the object of his contrivance, for he would not labor to produce, that which he did not conceive.

The power of distinguishing conceptions from sensations, is also necessary to contrivance. Into what confusion should we be thrown, if these ideas were mistaken for one another?

Nor should we ever exert ourselves to contrive, if conceptions were equally agreeable with their corresponding sensations. The superior pleasures which

we derive from the latter ideas, may therefore be con> sidered necessary to contrivance.

SEC. II. OF ATTENTION.

Attention is the direction of the mind to some particular object, or train of ideas; or the faculty by which the will influences the train of thought in the mind.

Mr. Stewart thinks that this faculty is a power which the will possesses, of excluding some ideas from the mind, and of retaining others. The will certainly does not act on the train of our thoughts, by producing new ideas, nor can it prevent new thoughts from entering the mind, when they are suggested by association, because nothing can be willed, concerning an idea, which is not in the mind. I believe (though the opinion may perhaps appear hypothetical) that the will has power to exclude from the mind, immediately on their entering it, ideas not agreeable to its purposes, by which exclusion the mind is thrown back upon its former ideas. This opinion differs little (if any) from that of Mr. Stewart.

That attention is a faculty of the mind, which is governed by the will, is admitted by all. There are some instances however in which it appears not to be entirely voluntary. A person suffering under an accute pain, finds it difficult to attend to any thing but the pain itself. If you attempt to read in a room, where there is much noise and conversation, you will soon find your attention turned from your book. But these facts, as well as others of the kind, may be accounted for by the changes of the will. When a person attempts to read, for instance, his belief that this would be advantageous, is founded on a process of reasoning. which entirely disappears, the moment he begins to