ferent size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none that would have answered the use that is now served by it.This mechanism being observed, the inference we think is inevitable, that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed an artificer, who formed it for the purpose, which we find it actually to answer, who comprehended its construction, and designed its use."

After some further remarks, Mr. Paley proceeds to prove, from the principles here laid down, the existence of God, or of a being who designed and created the universe.. This he does, by proving that, throughout the works of nature, objects are adapted to the production of certain effects, for which they are evidently designed, that they are put together in the way in which certain purposes may best be effected, in the same manner as the spring and wheels of the watch are put together, and adapted to the production of the motion desired; we must therefore conclude, that the universe was designed, and this adaptation of its parts produced, by an intelligent being. The Atheists attempt to destroy this conclusion by maintaining that we know and believe the watch to be the pro duction of human invention, only from experience; that this experience cannot extend to the universe and its maker, God.. They attempt to do away the effect of Mr Paley's assertion, that our conclusion would be the same though we had never seen a watch or a machine of a similar kind, by arguments which are not destitute of weight. These I shall lay before the reader, that I may not be accused of unfairness.

I. The Atheists assert that if we conclude from a first principle of belief impressed upon us by nature, that: the watch was designed by an intelligent being, we ought to adopt the same conclusion concerning animals,

man.

and vegetables, for they possess the same adaption of their parts to a manifest end, the preservation of their lives, and the propogation of their species. But do men unaccustomed to philosophical speculations adopt this opinion? The savage does not enquire who was the maker of the beast which he slays, though he may behold all the works of design, which its body contains. To this the Theists answer, that an animal is as much the product of contrivance as a watch, but that the animal was designed and created, by the creator of the universe, while the watch is the work of The Atheists ask in reply, why, if we suppose that animals and vegetables were created by God, we may not on finding a watch, assert that it was the work of the same being. In the case put by Mr. Paley, should any one assert that the watch had lain where it was found from the creation of the world, and that in the beginning it was created by God, he would find his opinion disregarded; no one would think its existence accounted for by being told that God might have imposed laws on metals and other inatter, which by their operation had brought the various parts into their present form; though if we did not judge from experience, this would certainly be satisfactory.

II. The Atheists assert that there are two qualities which always distinguish the products of human invention from animals and vegetables, to wit: 1st. The government of their parts by the ordinary laws of nature; and, 2d. The dissimilarity between the matter of which they are composed, and the matter of living animals and vegetables. That there are three qualities which distinguish them from minerals, or fortuitous collections of matter, to wit: 1st. The capability of producing some effect, which is generally desired by

man.

2d. A complicated adaptation of their parts to one another, by which certain motions are produced: and communicated, which could rarely arise from chance, and without which the desired effect would

not take place. 3d. A form, shape and arrangement of their parts, which could not arise from the operation of the ordinary laws of nature. The two qualities, which separate them from animals and vegetables, belong to all machines and to no animal or vegetable ; we may therefore easily distinguish a machine (if we have any acquaintance with machines in general) though viewing it for the first time, from either of these. By examining a watch we shall find that the spring produces the motion by the operation of a law, by which all springs of the same metal and shape are governed. We shall also perceive that this law remains the same, whether the spring be connected with, or removed from the watch. But by examining the frame of an animal, we perceive that the heart is governed by a law, that ceases to exist, the moment it is removed from the body; we find that the animal is governed by mind and will. If we examine a vegetable we find it governed by laws unknown to matter in its inorganic state; we find too that the matter composing all animals and vegetables is much alike in appearance, but that it has no similarity to the matter of the machine before us. We may therefore conclude that this is neither an animal nor a vegetable.

But the qualities by which we distinguish machines from minerals, do sometimes belong, in an imperfect degree, to a mineral, and do not always all belong to the same machine. There is, therefore, more difficulty in distinguishing machines from minerals, than from animals and vegetables. A mineral may sometimes produce effects which are desired by man; it may also be such in form as could not be produced by the operation of any law of nature, with which we are acquainted, and therefore be mistaken for the product of art; a fortuitous collection of matter may also possess such a curious adaptation of its parts to one another, as would make us mistake it for the work of design.The products of art too, may be so deficient in the or

dinary qualities of this class of objects, as to be mistaken for minerals. They may not produce any useful effect which we can discover; their construction may be simple, and their form such as matter thrown fortuitously together might assume; we are therefore to judge of the class to which objects belong, by the degree in which these qualities are possessed. But when we meet with an object, for the first time, that possesses all these qualities, very little experience is necessary to convince us that it is the work of man. There is sufficient analogy between a mill and a watch to induce us to place both in the same class.

III. When we meet with a machine, possessing all the qualities I have mentioned, we have less need of an extensive acquaintance with machines, to decide that it is the product of human invention, than of a knowledge of man, and of the laws of nature. If experience has given us this knowledge we know, 1st. That man exists.

2d. That he has power to contrive and create the machine under examination.

3d. That he has a motive for creating it.

4th. That the machine exists.

5th. That if it was not created by man, its existence could not be accounted for, in any way agreeably to the known laws of nature.

From these five facts we readily conclude that the machine was contrived by man, but when we attempt from the marks of design in the universe, to prove the existence of God, our reasoning is different.

1st. We know from observation that there exists an object, (the universe,) which bears a strong analogy to machines which are made by man, which nevertheless could not be created by him.

2d. That the existence of this object cannot be accounted for in any way agreeable to the known laws of

nature..

From these facts we conclude :

1st. That there exists a being possessing a mind analogous to man.

2d. That this being has power to contrive and create the universe.

3d. That he has a motive for creating it.

4th. That he did create it.

No one can doubt that this last argument is weak, compared with the first; for in the first, we prove one new fact from five others previously known-in the Jast, we prove four new facts from two previously known.

"

But the Theists will not admit that this is a fair statement of the argument. They assert that our conclusion in this case is not founded on experience alone. It is a first principle, as they maintain, the belief of which is forced upon us by the author of our existence, that arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to an use, in any thing that exists, imply the existence of intelligence and mind," by which the object possessing these qualities was designed and created. I shall not however further discuss the question, whether this is or is not a first principle, because if it is, the infidel will contend against it in vain; and if it is not, we can, by our arguments, convince only those minds which are governed by prejudice alone. Those who reject it, may give up all enquiries concerning reli gion, for they reject the foundation on which it stands ; but to those who adopt it, I have a new demonstration of the existence of God founded upon it, to offer.

But I must first observe that, if this principle should be admitted, a consequence highly advantageous to Theism will follow, which nevertheless has not been noticed by Theists. It is, that the existence of God may be proved, not from an examination of one or a