bird had his feather, Spain would be left wonderful naked. But yet there is a greater confederation against them than by means of any of these quarrels or titles; and that is contracted by the fear that almost all nations have of their ambition, whereof men see no end. And thus much for the balancing of their forces.

For the last point, which is the choice of the designs and enterprises, in which to conduct the war; you will not now speak, because you should be forced to descend to divers particulars, whereof some are of a more open, and some of a more secret nature. But that you would move the house to make a selected committee for that purpose; not to estrange the house in any sort, but to prepare things for them, giving them power and commission to call before them, and to confer with any martial men or others that are not of the house, that they shall think fit, for their advice and information and so to give an account of the business to a general committee of the whole house.

CONSIDERATIONS

TOUCHING

A WAR WITH SPAIN.

INSCRIBED TO PRINCE CHARLES,

Anno MDCXXIV.

YOUR highness hath an imperial name. It was a Charles that brought the empire first into France; a Charles that brought it first into Spain; why should not Great Britain have its turn? But to lay aside all that may seem to have a shew of fumes and fancies, and to speak solids: a war with Spain, if the king shall enter into it, is a mighty work; it requireth strong materials, and active motions. He that saith not so, is zealous, but not according to knowledge. But nevertheless Spain is no such giant: and he that thinketh Spain to be some great overmatch for this estate, assisted as it is, and may be, is no good mintman; but takes greatness of kingdoms according to their bulk and currency, and not after their intrinsic value. Although therefore I had wholly sequestered my thoughts from civil affairs, yet because it is a new case, and concerneth my country infinitely, I obtained of myself to set down, out of long continued experience in business of estate, and much conversation in books of policy and history, what I thought pertinent to this business; and in all humbleness present it to your highness: hoping that at least you will discern the strength of my affection through the weakness of my abilities: for the Spaniard hath a good proverb, De suario si empre con la calentura; there is no heat of affection, but is joined with some idleness of brain.

To a war are required, a just quarrel; sufficient forces and provisions; and a prudent choice of the designs. So then, I will first justify the quarrel; se

condly, balance the forces; and lastly, propound variety of designs for choice, but not advise the choice; for that were not fit for a writing of this nature; neither is it a subject within the level of my judgment ; I being, in effect, a stranger to the present occur

rences.

Wars, I speak not of ambitious predatory wars, are suits of appeal to the tribunal of God's justice, where there are no superiors on earth to determine the cause: and they are, as civil pleas are, plaints, or defences. There are therefore three just grounds of war with Spain: one plaint, two upon defence. Solomon saith, A cord of three is not easily broken: but especially when every of the lines would hold single by itself. They are these: the recovery of the Palatinate; a just fear of the subversion of our civil estate; a just fear of the subversion of our Church and religion. For in the handling of the two last grounds of war, I shall make it plain, that wars preventive upon just fears are true defensives, as well as upon actual invasions: and again, that wars defensive for religion, I speak not of rebellion, are most just; though offensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, unless they have some mixture of civil titles. But all that I shall say in this whole argument, will be but like bottoms of thread close wound up, which with a good needle, perhaps, may be flourished into large works.

For the asserting of the justice of the quarrel, for the recovery of the Palatinate, I shall not go so high as to discuss the right of the war of Bohemia; which if it be freed from doubt on our part, then there is no colour nor shadow why the Palatinate should be retained; the ravishing whereof was a mere excursion of the first wrong, and a super-injustice. But I do not take myself to be so perfect in the customs, transactions, and privileges of that kingdom of Bohemia, as to be fit to handle that part: and I will not offer at that I cannot master. Yet this I will say, in passage, positively and resolutely; that it is impossible an elective monarchy should be so free and absolute as an hereditary; no more than it is possible for a father to

have so full power and interest in an adoptive son as in a natural; quia naturalis obligatio fortior civili. And again, that received maxim is almost unshaken and infallible; Nil magis naturæ consentaneum est, quam ut iisdem modis res dissolvantur, quibus consti

tuuntur.

So that if the part of the people or estate be somewhat in the election, you cannot make them nulls or ciphers in the privation or translation. And if it be said, that this is a dangerous opinion, for the pope, emperor, and elective kings; it is true, it is a dangerous opinion, and ought to be a dangerous opinion, to such personal popes, emperors, or elective kings, as shall transcend their limits, and become tyrannical. But it is a safe and sound opinion for their sees, empires, and kingdoms; and for themselves also, if they be wise; plenitudo potestatis est plenitudo tempestatis. But the chief cause why I do not search into this point is, because I need it not. And in handling the right of a war, I am not willing to intermix matter doubtful with that which is out of doubt. For as in capital causes, wherein but one man's life is in question, in favorem vitæ the evidence ought to be clear; so much more in a judgment upon a war, which is capital to thousands. I suppose therefore the worst, that the offensive war upon Bohemia had been unjust; and then make the case, which is no sooner made than resolved; if it be made not enwrapped, but plainly and perspicuously. It is this in thesi. An offensive war is made, which is unjust in the aggressor; the prosecution and race of the war carrieth the defendant to assail and invade the ancient and indubitate patrimony of the first aggressor, who is now turned defendant; shall he sit down, and not put himself in defence? Or if he be dispossessed, shall he not make a war for the recovery? No man is so poor of judgment as will affirm it. The castle of Cadmus was taken, and the city of Thebes itself invested by Phoebidas the Lacedæmonian, insidiously, and in violation of league: the process of this action drew on a re-surprise of the castle by the Thebans, a recovery of the town, and a current of the war even unto the walls of Sparta. I demand, was

the defence of the city of Sparta, and the expulsion of the Thebans out of the Laconian territories, unjust? The sharing of that part of the duchy of Milan, which lieth upon the river of Adda, by the Venetians, upon contract with the French, was an ambitious and unjust purchase. This wheel set on going, did pour a war upon the Venetians with such a tempest, as Padua and Trevigi were taken from them, and all their dominions upon the continent of Italy abandoned, and they confined within the salt waters. Will any man say, that the memorable recovery and defence of Padua, when the gentlemen of Venice, unused to the wars, out of the love of their country, became brave and martial the first day, and so likewise the re-adeption of Trevigi, and the rest of their dominions, was matter of scruple, whether just or no, because it had source from a quarrel ill begun? The war of the duke of Urbin, nephew to pope Julius the second, when he made himself head of the Spanish mutineers, was as unjust as unjust might be; a support of desperate rebels; an invasion of St. Peter's patrimony; and what you will. The race of this war fell upon the loss of Urbin itself, which was the duke's undoubted right; yet, in this case, no penitentiary, though he had enjoined him never so strait penance to expiate his first offence, would have counselled him to have given over the pursuit of his right for Urbin; which, after, he prosperously re-obtained, and hath transmitted to his family yet until this day. Nothing more unjust than the invasion of the Spanish Armada in 88, upon our seas for our land was holy land to them, they might not touch it; shall I say therefore, that the defence of Lisbon, or Cales, afterwards, was unjust? There be thousands of examples; utor in re non dubia exemplis non necessariis: the reason is plain; wars are vindicta, revenges, reparations. But revenges are not infinite, but according to the measure of the first wrong or damage. And therefore when a voluntary offensive war, by the design or fortune of the war, is turned to a necessary defensive war, the scene of the tragedy is changed, and it is a new act to begin.